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ABSTRACT. 
The thosis defines and examines a position ('natural 
anti-realism') which combines an anti-realist semantics with an 
evolutionary epistemology. An anti-realist semantics, by requiring 
that a theory of meaning be also a theory of understanding, cries 
out for an explicit epistemological component. In urging an 
evolutionary epistemology as such a component, I seek to preserve 
and underscore the semantic insights of the anti-realist whilst 
deflecting the common criticism that the anti-realist must perforce 
embrace some form of noxious idealism. 
An evolutionary epistemology, I .argue, can provide a distinctive 
content for the belief that reality is independent of human thought 
without needing to claim that anything we can say or think about 
the world can be conceived as being true ·or false in full independence 
of our capacity to know it as such. This content is to be secured 
in two ways. The first is to observe that language is best understood 
as a tool of minds which are themselves best unde~stood as the 
producta of a natural process operating in an independently real 
world. The second is to form a non-transcendent conception of 
transcendent facts. The accessible evidence concerning the form 
of the selective process, it is argued, warrants the claim that 
reality may exceed its humanly accessible contours. For it warrants 
the claim that man is probably cognitively limited and biased in 
ways rooted in our peculiar, and somewhat contingent, evolutionary 
past. The natural anti-realist thus conceives of reality as both 
independent of, and potentially transcending the limits of, man's 
particular mental orientation. A largely realistic metaphysics may 
thus accompany an anti-realist semantics without the lapse into 
vacuity or incoherence which some commentators seem to fear. 
• . 
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Introduction. 
The relation of truth to A consistent naturalism sees 
the recognition of truth us and our representations 
is the fundamental problem as both parts of and causal 
of the theory of meaning, and evolutionary products 
or, what is the same thing, of (the) world ••• For our 
of metaphysics: for the world is not an aspect of us, 
question as to the nature of but rather we of it.Ultimately, 
reality is also the question . then, knowledge is self-knowledge. 
what is the appropriate not for the idealist's reason thai 
notion of truth for the there is nothing else to know but 
sentences of our language, for the deeper reason that to 
or, again, how we represent understand what else'there is to 
reality by means of sentences. know ••• we must come to under-
Dummett, M. ~ 314 • stand our understanding of it. 
Rosenberg, J. 147. 
Once upon a time it was not uncommon for philosophers to evince 
a fearsome antipathy towards all things evolutionary. Russell, in 
belligerent mood, once wrote "Anything evolutionary always 
rouses me to fury".1 This, perhaps, was the understandable backlash 
against the excesses of the evolutionary moralists and metaphysicians 
of the late 19th and early 20th centuriss. 2 Times, fortunately, have 
3 
changed. But the full impact of the evolutionary perspective has 
yet, I believe, to be assimilated by the philosophical community. 
What follows is an attempt to transmit some of that impact to the 
Realism/Anti-realism dispute within contemporary theory of meaning. 
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The discussion that ensues straddles semantics, metaphysics and 
evolutionary biology. This strange and heterogeneous mixture 
results in a surprisingly homogeneous perspective on mind and 
language and one which may be of interest to any philosopher 
impressed by Dummett's criticisms of classical truth-condition 
semantics but repelled by the idealistic metaphysical overtones 
of the anti-realist alternative. 
Discussions within contemporary theory of meaning tend to 
revolve around the following challenge; show us what there can be 
in the meaning of a sentence of a language beyond whatever is 
publicly manifestabls in association with recognisable circumstances; 
persuade us, if you can, that it is not a spurious conceit to picture 
the meanings of our sentences as extending beyond that grasp of 
content which is manifestable in relation to accessible circumstances. 
Belief in the latter picture is characteristic of a realist approach 
to semantics. for grasp of meaning, to the so-called semantic realist, 
consists in grasp of classical truth-conditions; conditions which, 
disreputably, are capable of obtaining or failing to obtain in 
immodest independence of any ability we may possess, even in 
principle, to come to recognise them as obtaining or failing to 
obtain. The semantic anti-realist believes that the semantic realist 
cannot meet his challenge and that he has exposed the theoretical 
alack in the realist's conception of meaning. 
There is a primitive realistic response to the anti-realist's 
challenge, which has, I think, more to recommend it than any 
sophisticated versions yet constructed. It is that ws most certainly 
~ have a notion of truth, at least, as potentially transcending 
human capacities to recognise truth, whether there is a problem 
about how we coma by it or not. That notion of truth, indeed, is 
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essentially implicated in any conception of an independent and 
external reality as the object of our speech. Does the anti-realist 
seriously propose that, in the light of his challenge, we should 
surrender this notion? If not, how is it to be reconciled with 
his idea that all grasp of meaning is tied to specifically human 
abilities to recognise circumstances as obtaining or failing to 
obtain? If, however, the proposal is indeed thet we give up the 
idea of an investigation-independent reality why should we not 
instead regard this consequence as a reductio of either the 
lagit~macy of the challenge or the supposition that the challenge 
cannot be met? 
Naturalisad (specifically evolutionary) epistemology, I shall 
sugyest, can help these semantic flies out of the fly-bottle. One 
way it does so is by enriching our conception of the role and • 
status of shared recognitional abilities by placing them inside 
e naturalised, ontolugically realistic framework of explanation. 
Shared recognit~onal capacities lie at the heart of the anti-realist 
analysis; they allow ue to attribute grasp of mesning in the absence 
of any explicit, non-trivial verbal account which the language-user 
might give. The notion of a recognitional capacity (the ability 
simply to recognise that a given circumstance obtains or fails to 
obtain) is a completely epistemological one as Oummett himeelf 
recognises ( R (1982) 106). This fact, combined with the importance 
of the role played by such capacities in the semantics, makes it 
all the more surpri~ing that the anti-realist lacks an explicit 
epistemology. It is the purpose of this thesis to supply what 
seems to me (for reasons to be advanced ahortly) the most appropriate 
epistemology for the task. That epistemology is thoroughly 
naturalised in the tradition of e.g. Lorenz, Campb.ll and Quine (1). 
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To see our shared recognitional capacities through the lens of 
that account of knowledge, I shall argue, is to take the vital 
step towards a rapprochement of realist intuitions and 
anti-realist semantics. Such a rapprochement proceeds, as 
we said, by a careful nesting of the anti-realist's insights 
within the larger framework of an ontologically realistic 
naturalism. The final result is a position from which we can 
intelligibly declare that our semantic limitations, correctly 
diagnosed by the anti-realist, are a special case of the general 
cognitive limitations and bias which characterises all evolved 
knowledge-acquiring mechanisms. We need not therefore suppose, 
as the idealist does, that our conceptions inform the nature and 
extent of the physical universe itself; but neither may we 
suppose our knowledge, even in the ideal, to constitute an 
objective isomorphic representation of tile world we inhabit, nor 
our words to describe reality in a way entirely independent of 
the investigations by which we could decide upon the appropriateness 
or otherwise of the assertions we choose to regard them as 
expressing. 
A.J.Clark 
I 
SEMANTIC ANTI-REALISM AND 
EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY; 
A NATURAL ALLIANCE? 
5 
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1. Minimal anti-realism. 
1.1 The concern of the present thesis lies with a specific version 
of semantic anti-realism which it is the business of this chapter 
to construct. In its original form,Dummett insists (RVA), semantic 
anti-realism was a colourless and negative doctrine. To be a semantic 
anti-realist in this sense it was necessary only that one should -
for whatever reason - fail to be a realist concerning the meaning 
of a given class of statements where to be a realist meant to conceive 
that statements of that class possessed 'an objective truth value, 
indepandently of our means of knowing it' (R (1963) 147). It is 
clear, however, both from the context of the preceding quote and 
others (e.g. p XXX, RP 359) that even at the most general level, 
Dummett hes a particular form of alternative account in mind as 
characteristic of the anti-realist stance. He has it in mind that 
instead of conceiving the meaning of a statement of some disputed 
class aa a function £!~~~!!}pal (i.e. potentially unrecognisable) 
truth-conditions, its meaning should be conceived as determined by 
the condit~EDs by whose meane we might com!.~_:~gard its assertion 
as warranted or unwarranted. This conception brings us closer to the 
kind of anti-realism with which we are to be concerned. That is to 
say it brings us closer to what Dummett now regards (RVA) as a 
specialieed form of anti-realism with a distinctive doctrine. 
I propose that we take as the mark of this specialised anti-realism 
an admiseion of the force of a particular set of criticisms of 
realist semantics, namely those which flow from a recognition of 
the necessary publicity of meaning. It is this kind of anti-realism, 
with its distinctively Wlttgsnsteinian roots, which is Dummett's 
concern in PB. And it is this kind of anti-realism (actually, 
one perticuler version of it) which is the focus of our present 
enquiry. 
1.2 An adherent of realist semantics holds the thesis that to 
know the meaning of a sentence is to know the cond.i tions under 
which that sentence would be~. And he holds truth to be a 
property possessed by sentences in virtue of their describing the 
nature of an objective and determioate reality - a reality wholly 
independent of our capacities to probe it. The anti-realist holds 
the conjunction of these two views to be implausible. This 
implausibility is most clearly manifest if we examine the case 
of undecidable sentences. (By undecidable sentences is intended, 
for example, sentences concerning the remote past, subjunctive 
conditionals, descriptions of the mental life of animals, clai~s 
about the nature of the universe beyond a black hole, mathematical 
assertions concerning the outcome of infinitary operations (e.g. 
Goldbach's conjecture, that every even number greater then 2 is 
the sum of two distinct primes, or Fermat's 'laet theorem' that 
Xn + yn = Zn has no solution among the positive integers for 
n ~ 3, and so forth.) For in the case of such sentences, since 
their truth might transcend human recognition, so would grasp of 
their truth-conditions. That is, our alleged grasp of ths 
truth-conditions of such sentences, in which the semantic realist 
seeks to locate their meaning, would be a grasp we eQuId not 
demonstrate in relation to accessible circumstances. By what 
right, then, do we attribute to ourselves such a grasp? 
The anti-realist says 'By no right at all' and suggests 
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instead that we characterise meaning as correlative with whatever 
we would count as evidence for a statement of some problematic 
kind ( R(1963) 146). 
This argument, it will be apparent, is a version of the 
so-called ~nifestation argument which insists there can be no 
legitimate reason why we should credit ourselves with any grasp of 
meaning beyond that which relates to the circumstances in relation 
to which we could ~ that graep of meaning. The argument has a 
second incarnation in the form of the damand of intelligible 
Acquisition, which insists that all we can learn is how a sentence 
is used, for what !1!! could possibly be taught us? from this 
angle to suppose there could be anything more to meaning than can 
be manifest in use is to suppose that someone could learn all we 
can teach him about a sentence (i.e. its use), behave just like 
someone who understands the ~eaning of the sentence in question 
yet!!!!! fail to grasp its 'true' meaning. This, surely, is 
absurd. ~eaning, on such an account, becomes 'ineffable, that is, 
in principle incommunicable' ( PB 218). But any suggestion that 
the meaning of an undecidable sentence is incommunicable is patently 
untrue. The point is just that what we are taught when we learn the 
meaning of such sentences is not what the classical analysiS auggests, 
namely the classical truth-conditions of the sentence, but rather 
whatever is taken as establiehing their truth. 
Yet another route to this anti-realistic terminus may be 
constructed around the idea that knowledgs of meaning, in the most 
fundamental case, must be implicit knowledge. for suppose that we 
assume that it must always be possible to give an informative 
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verbal account of uUI grasp of the meaning of a sentence. In 
that case no-one who :ould not reformulate it infor~atively 
in language could be laid to know the meaning of a sentence. 
Two objections are pe:tinent. first, where our grasp is of 
a very basic concept :say one of touch, taste, colour or smell) 
it seems unreasonable to demand anything over and above the 
ability to respond ap:ropriately in the face of stimuli which 
are communally agr6edto be of the relevant kind (e.g. of a blue 
object, a sour taste ind so on). Second, to assume that no-one 
can grasp a meaning ~o is unable to state it otherwise, is to 
start a regress which makes the learning of a first language a 
somewhat mysterious f:at (ps 217). But to admit that knowledge 
of mean~ng, in the mmt basic case, must be implicit knowledge is 
to inlJite the demand lf manifestation. for 
implicit know190Je cannot meaningfully be ascribed 
to someone unles! it is possible-to say in what the 
manifestation of that knowledge consists: there must be 
an observable drference between the behaviour or capacities 
of someone who u said to have that knowledge and someone 
Who is said to lick it. 
PB 217 
Underlying thoee demands of manifestability, however expressed, 
lie two supporti~g t~ses, one entirely general and one specifically 
semantic. The genora~ thesis, which is operative in the preceding 
quote is happily dnscribed by Dag Prawitz (1 p.11,12) as the 
insistence upon empi~cal import for theoretical tarms. Thus the term 
1 knowledge , as it fi~res in the phrase 'knowledge of the meaning 
of f' is a theoretic~ term whose function in a theory of meaning 
is spurious except i~ofar as it is connected with obeervable facts 
\ 
~ 
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concerning the speakers whose understanding it is the job of the 
theory' of meaning to model. In the light of this principle the 
anti-realist's point may be put like this; that the supposition 
that someone's grasp of the meaning of a sentence F consists in 
his knowledge of the truth-conditions of F (classically conceived) 
h~s no distinctive empirical import lacked by the alternative 
supposition that the speaker's grasp of meaning is best located 
in his ability to use the sentence appropriately in relation to 
accessible stimuli. This latter supposition is both more parsimonious 
and better able to account for our graap of the sense of undecidable 
sentencea. 
Motivating this entire corpus of conjecture, however, is a 
specifically semantic thesis which has its roots in the work of the 
later Wittgenstein. For the whole approach depends upon our taking 
a theory of meaning to be at the same time s theory of understsnding. 
It depends, that is, upon our identifying what a sentence means with 
whatever it is that a competent speaker of the language understands 
when he graeps the sentence. Everything thus revolves around -the 
notion of communicability. As Dummetthimself aays, his position 
rests upon taking with full seriousness the view of 
language as an instrument of social communication. 
PB 226 
For it is only from this perspective that we can insist that a theory 
of meaning is eseentially a theoretical representation of a speaker'a 
communicable understanding of the language and hence insist also that 
nothing can legitimately (i.e. non-spuriously) be claimed to enter 
into that understanding which could not be manifest in relation to 
A,J,Clark 11 
publicly accessible circumstances. This is to say that it is only 
from this perspective that we can insist 
that the meaning of a statement consiets solely in its role 
as an instrument of communication between individuals 
(and) ••• an individual cannot communicate what he cannot be 
observed to communicate. 
PB 216 
With this formulation we reach the spiritual core of the anti-realist 
stance. Jens Ravnkilde has labelled this core the principle of the 
necessary publicity of meaning, henceforth the publicity principle 
for short. The precise definition of the principle which he suggests, 
and which I endorse, expresses it as the claim that: 
(Publicity principle) 
No distinction can be sustained between interpretability or 
communicability (what a speaker csn be known to meen by his 
utterances} and meaning (what the speaker means by his 
utterances). 
Ravnkilde 11 
Let us pause to review the situation as it now stands. The 
anti-realist, in the somewhat specialised sense I intend the term, 
endorses a· certain flow of criticisms of a classical realist semantics. 
The chain of reasoning to which he is committed goes as followS: 
(Argument of semantic anti-realism) 
(1) he accepts a picture of language as essentially an instrument 
of communication between individuals 
(2) This leads him to endorse the so-called publicity principle 
which identifies meaning with communicable understanding. 
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(3) Thus it is knowledge of meaning, in the sense of communicable 
understanding of meaning, which is to be the kind of fact to 
be given theoretical representation in a theory of meaning. 
(4) The demand of empirical import for theoretical terms 
therefore arises with regard to the claim that any speaker 
has knowledge of meaning suitable for theoretical 
representation in such a theory. 
(5) It is therefore to be demanded that a speaker, in order legiti-
mately to be supposed to possess a communicable understanding 
of a sentence, be at least able to manifest that understanding 
in some distinctive way. 
(6) Given (2) that manifestation can only be performed in relation 
to accessible (i.e. at least potentially public) circumstances. 
(7) But distinctive public manifestation of grasp of meaning, 
. 
given that meaning is correlative with communicable 
understanding, cannot always be provided where grasp 
of meaning is identified with grasp of realistic (i.e. 
potsntially unrscognisable) truth-conditions. 
(8) So such an account of meaning' must bs rejectsd and supplanted 
by one in which grasp of meaning can always be succsssfully 
manifest- as, for example, would be the cas. in a theory of 
meaning having as its central notion the idea not of classical 
truth-conditions but of some kind of condition twhich wa must, 
by the nature of the case, be capable of effectively 
recognising wherever it obtains'. (PB in lQ 227). 
The argument thus tells in favour of a kind of verification ism. 
Truth, it seems, (or better, truth claseically conceived) is unsuited 
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to playa central role in the theory of meaning. A more suitable 
candidate is the notion of verification. In which case it will 
follow thata 
to know the meaning of a etatement is ••• to be cepable of 
recognising whatever counts as verifying the statement i.e. 
as conclusively establishing it as true. 
~ ~7 
In fact, Dummett here concedes too much to the traditional 
realist line. For the notion of conclusive verification proves 
too strong to account for our grasp of e.g. other-escriptions of 
pain made on the besis of obssrved behaviour. Instead of relying 
on conclusive verification the anti-realist need demand only that 
there be communally agreed assertion-warranting criteria which 
focus on publicly accessible circumstances. Just such a weakening 
of the original strongly verificationist anti-realist doctrine is 
proposed by Dummett in the preface to lQ (p. XXXVIII). The 
anti-realiet thus recapitulates, in psrt, the historical development 
of the positivist moving from strong to ever weaker conceptions of 
the kind of verifiability suitable for. his theoretical account of 
meaning. But anti-realism differs radically from old-fashioned 
positivism in its attitude towards the class of undecidable 
statements (such as Goldbacb1s conjecture). For it is no part of 
the prssent project to auggest that such conjectures are meaningless 
(which is what the sarly positivists would have had to say). Rather, 
their meaning is to be loceted first and foremost in our grasp of 
how the sense of the statement is built up out of its parts (that 
is the systematic aspect of an anti-realist theory of meaning). 
Only then does the test of recognisability come into play. 
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For to locate the potential empirical import of the knowledge 
we have now, in theory, attributed to the speaker who is said to 
grasp that systematic construction, we insist further that the 
legitimacy of hie claim to grasp the statement depends upon the 
following linguistic ability; that he should be able to decide 
of some purported proof of the statement whether or not the 
statement is indeed proven by the consideration then advanced. (for 
a non-mathematical statement, replace 'proven' by 'warranted'.) It 
ie in this sense (which Neil Tennant (1) and (4) has named the weak 
recognitional sense - as opposed to the strong recognitional sense 
which demands that we actually be able to produce a proof, or 
warrant) that knowledge of meaning is to depend on our capacity 
to recognise a situation as providing an effective warrant for 
the statement in question. It is in this sense that our grasp 
of meaning can never extend (if the anti-realist's arguments are 
correct) beyond the accessible circumstances in relation to which 
that graep could be publicly manifest. 
This analysis of meaning has implications for our notions of 
implication. That is to say, we may find that certain classically 
accepted implications of a sentence will fail the anti-realist's 
meaning-tests. In which caee, given that the sentence itself is 
seen to be legitimate, we are led to criticise the particular form 
of inference which allows ue to derive the unacceptable from the 
acceptable. It might be thought, however, that the only case in 
which we may properly assert sentences which would fail to meet 
the demands outlined above is precisely the case where we allow 
that these sentences are a direct consequence of others which do 
pass the meaning-tests given in terms of weak recognition above. 
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To adopt this course is to make logical relations among sentences 
a primitive feature of the language, a feature which is itself a 
determinant of meaning. Dummett (RVA) believes that such a stance, 
though not excluded by any argument so far adduced, is simply 
irrational. He holds the demand of harmony (see below) to be 
rationally self-evident and employs it to construct the foilowing 
argument which.permits criticism of the actual use of sentences in 
our language. 
The use of a sentence, so the argument goes (PS 221), is not a 
single feature but a type of feature. The fact is that there are 
different aspects to the use of a sentence and it is due to this 
that criticism of the actual use is possible even in an account 
which accepts the intimacy of meaning and use. for it is rational 
to require the systematisation of the various aspects of sentence 
. 
use. Rational, that is, to impose a requirement of Harmony on the 
different facets of use. Now there are (at least) two relevant 
aspects of sentence use. first, there ere the conditions under which 
the sentence is properly aeserted. And second, there is what the 
assertion of the sentence commits us to by way of its inferential 
links with other sentences. The requirement of Harmony ie simply the 
requirement that what the sentence commits us to (i.e. what can 
be asserted indirectly simply by uttering the sentence) must be 
nothing which couldn't be asserted directly if we so wished. Any 
consequences of a correctly asserted sentence f must be such that 
they themselves could be properly asserted by us in soma situation 
in which we could place ourselves i.e. for a consequence sentence C 
it must be the case that in some possible situation stimuli could 
occur requiring our assent to C. This is eimply the demand of weak 
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recognition applied to the consequences of our assertions. It 
is thus that, as Dummett puts it, the language as a whole must be: 
a conservative extension of that fragment of the 
languaga containing only observation statements. 
P8 221 
1.3 rrom the foregoing considerations we may derive, as a special 
case, the rejection of bivalence which characterises much of Dummett's 
anti-realist corpus. This is important because this rejection 
helps trac~ tha ontological and metaphysical consequences of the 
anti-realist stance which form the ultimate quarry of the present 
thesis. An account of meaning which takes assertability and not 
truth (classically conceived) as its central notion issues, when 
conjoined with the demand of consarvative extension, in a rejection 
of certain classical principles of inference and logical laws. Chief 
among these is the rejection of the law of excluded middle and its 
samantic correlate, the principle of bivalence. The law of excluded 
middle states 'A or not A', while the principle of bivalence reads 
'Every statement is either true or false'. Since my concern is with 
the semantic principle, I shall state the argument in that form. 
Given the principle of bivalence we can always infer from a 
etatement P to the truth of the disjunction 'P is true or P ie 
falee'(in the logical caee A·v - A). But euppose that the statement 
in question belongs to the realm of the undecidable.. In that case 
we might have no grounds for eupposing that we could ever be 1n a 
position to recognise that P 1s true or that it is false. That is, 
we would have no warrant for the claim that there exists a situation 
in which we would recognise P as correctly assertible, nor any 
warrant for the claim that there exists • situation in which we 
A.J.Clark 17 
wo~lj recognise that P will never be correctly assertible. The 
disjunction 'P is true or P is false' therefore fails the weak 
recognitional requirement upon graspable meaning. So we cannot 
simply be allowed, by virtue of a general rule, to pass from a 
statement P to the assertion of bivalence with respect to P. 
Endorsement of the principle of bivalence for statements not 
known to be effectively decidable severs the connection between 
the truth of a statement (now anti-realistically conceived) and 
the kind of fact we could have been taught as justifying the use 
of the statement. Otherwise put, if an understanding of P consists 
in our implicit grasp of the recognisable circumstances in which P 
could be known to be true or false, then we must be agnostic with 
respect to the assertion of bivalence in cases where we have 
neither a demonstration that P is true, nor a demonstration that P 
. 
is false. Unless we know a statement to be effectively decidable, 
this argument suggests, we must be agnostic concerning the 
applicability of bivalence to that statement. This does not amount 
to a denial of bivalence, but only to a rejection of bivalence ~s 
a universal principle i.e. a refusal to endorse its instances 
without the required proofs either way. 
The realist, as Dummett characterises him, balieves by contrast in 
the universal applicability of bivalence even in regard to statements 
not known to be effectively decidable. He thus believes that it is a 
determinate matter, in no way related to the possible scope of human 
investigations, whethar or not the conditions for the (classical) 
truth of a sentence is or is not fulfilled. We may take this 
affirmation in either of two ways - two ways which Dummett, I think, 
regards as identical but which I shall later insist are crucially 
distinct. We may, he says: 
regard this aa a metaphysical assumption - an assumption 
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of the existence of an objective reality independent of our 
knowledge. We can, equally, regard it as an assumption 
in the theory of meaning, namely that we succeed in 
conferring on our sentences a sense which renders them 
determinately true or false. 
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(Call the former the ~etephysical Interpretation and the latter 
the Semantic Interpretation.) 
Oummett, I said, probably regards these as equivalent thesss. For 
the metaphysical view, he elsewhere tells us, is 
a picture which has in iteelf no substance otherwise than 
as a representation of the given conception of meaning. 
EI 383 
It is for this resson that he sees his semantic observations 
as bearing on the traditional dispute betwsen Realism and Idealism, 
and indeed, as coming out against the realist's notion of the 
physical universe as an 'objective reality independent of our 
knowledge'. (EI 382). Dummett thus holds that metaphysics is 
essentially a picture which reduces to semantics. I shall later 
insist that it does eo only if semantics is taken in conjunction 
with epistemology and that a fundamental divergence in outlook may 
thereby be produced bstween Dummett and ths 'natural anti-realist' 
who conjoins his assertBbility-condition semantics with a naturalised 
epistemology. (For future reference let us call Dummett's claim 
concerning the identity of metaphysical and semantic que.tions the 
thesis of metaphysical reductionism.) 
1.4 OUr characterisation of semantic anti-realism has so tar come 
to this; that all grasp of meaning must ultimately connect with the 
observable circumstances in relation to which that graep of meaning 
, 
• 
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may be publicly manifest. The realm of the observable then, is the 
primary locus of semantic facts; it is the semantic bedrock at which 
our demands for the justification of attributions of grasp of meaning 
must stop. The domain covered by the term 'observable' is to be 
correlative with whatever area is marked out by the equelly pivotal 
notion of 'shared recognitional capacities'. for 'the observable' 
as it functions in the anti-realist argumsnt can be nothing other than 
that which is capable of being brought to public attention by the 
sxerciae of bssic recognitionsl capacities. But these notions of 
'what we can recognise to be the case' and 'what is observable' are 
crucially ambiguous. It is the final task of this introductory 
section to begin the job of pinning them down. 
The notion of 'what we can observe to be the case' is ambiguous 
in precisely the same way as the notion of 'what we can verify to be 
. 
the case'. Indeed, the anti-realist's point about observability 
(however it is to be analysed) is at the same time a point about 
verifiability. For the ultimate case of verification, to which all 
other cases (e.g. thoee concerning deeply embedded theoretical 
sentences) must eventually answer, is .the case in which the form 
of verification is immediate observation. In sseking sn appropriate 
sense of observability, therefore, I shall take a hint from an 
analysis of possible senses of 'what we ars capable of verifying' 
developed by Crispin Wright (Wright (1 chapt.X pp. 182 - 186) ). 
Wright notes that this notion could be taken as 'involving a double 
idealisation' so 8S to mean; 
What we are capable, in principle of verifying - that is to .ay, 
what soma being with limitations differing from our own only in 
finita degree i. capable in practice of verifying - at ~!!m!. 
Wright (1) 182. 
, 
. 
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Similarly we might take as our sense of 'observable' a notion of 
what some (finitely limited) being could at some time observe to 
be the case. This rules out appeal to God, whose abilities are 
presumably of infinite degree, and thus saves us from the total 
trivialisation of tha ideas of the recognisable and the observable. 
It savas us from the situation in which the observable isisomorpnic 
with the (classically) true. But that is about all it does. ror 
such a senae is probably too weak to sustain any distinctive 
rejection of bivalance and is at any rate quite unwelcome given the 
daep motivation of the anti-realist's position sketched earlier. 
To adopt an In principIa/at soma time sense of 'observable' is to 
make a nonsense of the thought that we can only learn to read into 
8 sentence the kind of meaning which relatas to the sorts of 
circumetances which confronted us, human beings with our present 
. 
capacities, when we were taught the use of sentences of that kind. 
It makes nonsense too of the correlative thought that communicable 
understanding must be such as could be fully manifest in relation to 
publicly acceseible circumetances with the community of .peakers. 
ror the community of apeakers, ~e may be sure, finds accessible 
only that ~hich is detectable by means of the actuel senaory and 
cognitive apparatuB ~ith ~hich it is provided and not that which 
may be accesaible to some alternatively (though finitely) endowed 
being a. yet unkno~n to them. Publicity of meaning, if it is to be 
(as I think it ahould be) a common-eense requirement relating to our 
natural notions of how ~e could come to know the meaning of a sentence, 
cannot be publicity in some ideal or non-human community but ~~ 
publicity within the community in ~hich the concept expreseed by the 
sentence wa. formed, laarnt and (therefore) .ucc.s.fully communicated. 
, 
. 
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In principle/sometime anti-realism, then, will not do. It will 
not do'because to move outwith the actual capacities to recognise a 
situation as obtaining, if it does obtain, with which human beings 
are endowed is to ignors the correlation of meaning with communicable 
understanding on which much of the intuitive force of the analysis 
depende. But the extreme alternative (in which whet is observeble 
is to be read as what we can actually now observe) looks equally 
unsatisfactory. For we surely have an effective grasp of truth for 
now 
sentences whoae truth is not actually observable/but whose truth 
could be observed by us, endowed axactly as we are, if only we were 
in the right place to observe it. Ths extreme alternative, that is 
to say, rules out the weak recognitional account of grasp of meaning 
which we opted for earlier, end which seems necessary if we are to 
preserve enough of our ordinary usage to justify us in regarding our 
task as the theoretical description of the actual understanding 
exercised by a competent epeaker of the language. 
An intermediate poeition between these two unacceptable extremes 
may be constructed. And it is this intermediate position which I 
shell label Minimal anti-realism (minimal, beceuse it ie the weakest 
position compatible with there being any distinctive doctrine to call 
anti-realism at all). Minimal anti-realism equates the realm of the 
observable with that which ~ could in principle recognise to be the 
case. The 'we' is stressed so as to indicate that it is our present, 
humanly standard capacities of recognition which are at issue. By 
'in principls' we therefore mean that which we could, by ths sxerciee 
of our pressnt capacities, recogniss to ba the cs •• were we placed in 
the corrsct situation and given the appropriate etimuli. This 
interpretation does juetice to the publicity principle without 
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impoverishing the class of meaningful sentences beyond all 
recognition i.e. without implying that we are unable to grasp 
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the meaning of a sentence which, for some contingent reason, we 
are unable to verify in our present circumstances. What, then, 
of the sometime/now dispute? ~inimal anti-realism, for all 
present purposes, is, I think, compatible with either temporal 
specification. But for the sake of dsfiniteness, we may opt for 
the 'now' interpretation. What is observabls, on that account, 
becomes Just whatever is observable now, by a member of the 
present epistemic community. Any philosopher who finds this 
choice unacceptable may, however, simply reverse it without 
affecting any of our subsequent arguments. The temporal restriction 
seems, however, to be in line with the anti-realist's account 
of learnin~ meaning, since we learn only by exposure to present 
events, albeit over a period of time. It is, at any rate, worth 
noticing that the temporal restriction need not be pernicioue 
in its implications for statements concerning the remote past 
and distant future. It will, of course, mean that these realms 
are somewhat underpopulated with regard to true facts (i.e. facts 
which we can assert to be true of such times including, for 
example, claims that either A is true or A is false where A 
ia some undecidable assertion concerning the state of the world 
at some time in the ramote past). But all this means is that 
we cannot rely on a God's-eye view of the space-time worm to 
donate semantic content, analysible in terms of classical truth-
conditions,to undecidable past-tsnse statements. The question 
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of the reality of the past is, at any rate, one with which the 
present thesis has no immediate concern since it seems to be a 
question unaffected by the conjunction of semantic anti-realism 
and naturalised epistemology. Our concern is rather with 
present-tensed ontological and metaphysical assertions and with 
whatever sense of an external and independent reality the anti-
realist can plausibly sustain. tor this reason I shsll not dwell 
on the temporal issue, but merely repeat that the minimal anti-
realist may be assumed to endorse the equation of the observable 
with that which is humanly, in principle, observable now. 
To sum up, ths minimal semantic anti-realist (henceforth 
'anti-realist' for short) is one who (a) embraces the principle 
of the necessary publicity of meaning by equating semantic content 
with communicable understanding, (b) endorses as a result mOVeS 
1 - 8 of the argument for semantic anti-realism and hence recommends 
tha replacement, as the central element of a theory of meaning, of 
classical truth-conditions with conditions which we can always 
recognise as obtaining if they do obtain and (c) explicates this 
notion of 'that which we can recognise' as meaning that which we 
could now, in principle, observe to obtain by the exercise (in the 
most fundamental casee) of whatever capacities for the recognition 
of circumstances are ae a matter of fact standard within the present 
epistemic community. Clearly, more neede to be said about the nature, 
rols and statue of these shared recognitional capacities around which 
eemantic content appeers to revolve. It is a pre-condition of this 
further account and of the modifications to the ontological and 
metaphysical stance of the anti-realist it involves, that we should 
first acquaint ourselves with the form of a naturalised epistemology. 
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In the next section therefore, I Dutline the relevant parts of 
one such epistemology and indicate why it seems particularly 
appropriate to the spirit of the anti-realist analysis presented 
above. 
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2. The Epistemological Component. 
2.1 It is a feature of an anti-realist analysis that ths study of 
semantics is not to be dislocated from questions of epistemology. 
This feature is most obviously expressed in Dummett's claim that a 
theory of meaning, to be acceptable, must at the same time be a 
theory of understanding; the thaory of meaning is thus a theoretical 
representation of the (practical) knowledge we have when we are said 
to know the meaning of a sentence. The epistemological component 
therefore carries over into any dis cues ion of the important notion 
of a recognitional capacity; for it is in shared recognitionsl 
capacities that we locate the warrant for attributions of practical 
knowledge. Given the consequent intimacy of semantics and epistemology 
for the anti-realist it is surprising that so little attention has 
been paid to the epistemological component itself. In particular we 
might ask what ~ of epistemology would be appropriate and whether 
its pr.sence would affect the implications of the anti-realist 
analyais in any interesting way? The present chapter is an attempt 
to tackle the first of these two questions. 
2.2 One reason for the lack of attention given to the matter of 
epistemology may be Dummett's own insistence that although epistemology 
has a role to play, it is very much a secondary one. , In adopting this 
attitude Dummett is following rrege, one of whose principal achievements, 
it seems, was la shift of perspective which displaced epistemology from 
its position as the starting-point of all philosophy'. Ir 61. 
The upshot of this shift in perspective: is. the,'· primacy,instead, 
of theory of meaning or semantics. It seema to ma that Dummatt takes 
too strong a line on this matter (see a.g. P XL) and that it ia 
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rather the case that relations of priority between the two areas 
depend,. even within academic philosophy, upon the particular 
explanatory or argumentative purposes we hsve in mind. 
Nonetheless one of the possible motivations behind frege'e 
'shift in perspective' is importantly corrsct snd will constitute 
a constraint upon our subsequent choice of epistemology. That 
motivation is the rejection of psychologism or mentalism in the 
theory of meaning; the rejection, that is, of the identification 
of meaning (in any allegedly explanatory context) with private 
mental contents. frege's resistance to any such identification 
springs from his obssrvation that the' content of a though~ may 
sustain a degree of publicity to which no mental image can aspire. 
He complains that 'people speak e.g. of such and euch a mental 
image as if it could ba in public view, detached from tha imagining 
mind'. Yet, he says, wa cannot even be sure our private image of 
red, for example, agrees with that of our neighbour. The 'peculiar 
character' of our image of red, then, i8 something We cannot convey. 
The content of a thought, expressed in language, however, is truly 
public property; 'one and the same thought can be grasped by many 
men'. Consequently the content of the thought must be distinguished 
4 from ths images which may accompany the having of the thought. 
The potential spuriousness of notions of mental processs8, 
images and the liks 1n ths context of a theory of meaning thus 
demands that wa proceed with caution. For we must be canful of 
exactly how We concaive of an epistsmology attaching itsalf to s 
theory of meaning if we sre to avoid an analogous charge of focuasing 
on the iness.ntial. Recalling ths acquisition argument aketchad 
in 1.2 (p. 8) above we may therefore distinguish two possible 
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interpretations of the points there at issue. On the one hand, 
there is the psychologistic interpretation which sees the argument 
as issuing from a consideration of how we in fact come to acquire 
the concepts of our language. On the other hand there is the 
transcendental interpretation (which we shall see to be the correct 
one) which sees the acquisition argument as asking what must be the 
case (logically) if we are to acquire a certain concept at all. 
It is the latter interpretation which is suggested by the comment 
(IF 74) that. theory of meaning is an attempt to 'render 
intelligible the phenomenon of interchange in (a) language'; and it 
is the latter interpretation which sits comfortably with the 
fundamental characterisation (given in 1.2 above) of the anti-realist 
critique as flOWing from taking seriouely the notion of language as 
an instrument of communication. In the light of this it becomes 
clear that what is objectionable is the intrusion into theory of 
meaning of any mentalist epistemology. Such epistemology is intrusive 
because it simply ignores the transcendental force of the anti-realist's 
insistence on communicability a. requiring publicity and offers instead 
a psychologistic account of our (alleged) actuel grasp of meaning 
which is totally non-explanatory. What is to be resisted then ia 
the kind of bogus, mentalistic epistemology which allows that 
(thesis of mentalism) 
What gives meaning to the sounds that • speaker utters no 
longer lie8 open to vi.w: the meaning he attache. to them 
depends upon something interior to him, his understanding 
of the language, perhapa conceived as his implicitly knowing 
a theory of meaning governing it, and his communication of 
that meaning to his hearer dependa upon the hearer's being 
in the aame interior st.te. IF 75 
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It will therefore be a constraint upon an acceptable use of 
epistemological notions in our account of meaning that such notions 
should involve nothing like the thesis of mentalism. The semantic 
points, such as those concerning communicability and publicity, are 
thus prior to any epistemological ones insofar as they function as 
constraints upon the acceptable role of epistemology in a theory 
of meaning. This, as Dummett well realises, is by no means to 
diminish ths importance of the rols of some kind of epistemological 
component in the anti-realist account. Epistemological concerna 
enter into that account by a fairly straightforward route stemming 
from tha aquation of a theory of meaning with a theory of understanding. 
Backing this equation, we saw, is the simple thought that a theory of 
meaning is nothing but a theoretical representation of the knowledge 
involved in a competent speaker's mastery of hie language. Once 
this is takan on board, however, it becom.s, in Dummett's own words, 
'impossible to keep the theory of meaning sterilised from all 
epistemological considerations'. (R (1982) p.106.) For our purposes, 
the most important sita of apiatamological infection liee in xhe 
appeal to shared direct recognitional abilities. The anti-realist 
appeals to the exercise of such abilities as providing the naceeaary 
warrant tor attributions of implicit knowledge. (See 1.2). Ha does so 
because he endorses both the demand tor empirical import of theoretical 
terms (i.a.~knowladge') and the thought that it is too much to require 
of a competent speaker that he be alwsys in a position to give an 
informative verbal account ot in what his knowledge ot meaning consiats. 
That ia to say, the anti-realist allows that we may know the ~eaning at 
various basic terme (e.g. the application of colour, shapa, taste 
predicates etc.) without being in a position to aay any more about 
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the conditions which warrant our use of such terms than is contained 
in the"bare assertion that 'this is red' 'this is round' 'this is sour' 
and so forth. In such cases our knowledge of the meaning of the terms 
involved is implicit knowledge which is manifest in use. ~nifsst, that i 
in our capacity in the right circumstances to rscognise that an 
assertion involving such terms is appropriately made. Our grasp 
of some of the moat basic concepts of our language (roughly, the 
concspts appropriats to the fragment of our language containing only 
obeervation statements) is thus manifest in the direct recognitional 
capacities ws exhibit. 
The direct justification of our claims to implicit knowledge 
of meaning, and in some sense the ultimate justification of our 
claims to all knowledge of meaning, thus lies in our faculties of 
unmediated recognition. It is at this point that the giving of 
. 
grounds, expressed in language, comes to an end. It is at this 
point that the threet of circularity~ or infinite regrees, in an 
account of knowledge of meaning finally dissolves. For we may now 
just point to the faculty of recognition, whose application in 
specific cases is agreed by some substantial proportion of the 
community. In its operation our grasp of msaning is manifest and 
our claims to knowledge of meaning legitimiaed. At this important 
juncture, we have entered the epace of epistsmology. For, as· 
Dummett readily admits; 
the claim that we possess a faculty for direct 
recognition of a condition of a certain kind is an 
epistemological one. 
R (1982) p.106 
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2.3 Epistemology, then, has a real role to play in a developed 
system' of anti-realist semantics. What remains undetermined is 
precisely what form this epistemology should take. The answer to 
this question, indeed, is not Just undetermined but in principle 
underdetermined; consistency with an anti-realist approach to 
languaga does not forca any particular choice of epistemology. 
There are two prima facie reasons, however, why an evolutionary 
epistemology would seem to be e happy choice. They are 
(1) The active support of evolutionary epistemology for 
the anti-realist's fundamental intuition that language 
is essentially an instrument of communication, and 
(2) The ability of evolutionary epistemology to comment 
on the nature and status of the shared recognitionsl 
capacities taken as basic in the semantic analysis 
• 
itself. 
Since the second of these points will be dealt with in some 
detail in the chapter on recognitional capacities, I shall confine 
myself at present to commenting ·on the first. An evolutionary 
epistemology, I want to say, is not merely compatible with the 
position of anti-realism, but actually offers it active support. 
"ore precisely, it offers active aupport to a fundamental component 
of the anti-realist analysia, namely the publicity principle (see 1.2). 
The publicity principle stated, we recall, thet a speaker cannot be 
held to mean by his utterances anything more than he can be known 
to mean by them. "eaning is necessarily communicable. Belief in 
this principle ia a pre-condition of anyone's accepting the force 
of the anti-realist's criticisms of classical semantics. For those 
criticisms were aeen to be essentially of the nature of a challenge; 
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show me, communicate to me, what ~ there could be to meaning than 
is captured by an assertabi1ity-condition semantics! The challenge 
has force only if we accept that any ingredient in meaning must be 
communicable. 
Acceptance of the publicity principle amounts to a rejection 
of what (in 2.2) we termed the thesis of mentalism; the idea that 
meaning could depend on something essentially interior, not open to 
public viewing. Rejection of such a thesis, and the stress, by 
contrast, on the communicable nature of meaning, is associated with 
the work of the later Wittgenstein. In particular, it is associated 
with the observations made in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
concerning private language and following a rule. Thus, for example, 
at 59c I "Understanding a word": a state. But a mental state? I 
Or again; 
Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' 
at all - for!h!i is the expression which confuses you. 
But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of 
circumstances, do we say 'Now I know how to go on'. 
Wittgenstein (1) 61c. 
This approach to meaning, and to what it is to grasp meaning, 
was inherited wholesale by the anti-realist (see a.g.Dummett PB 
226, T 19). And it is an approach dictatsd by a thoroughly 
naturalised attitude to language. For once we see language a. a 
phenomenon in the natural order we cannot credit it with the ability 
to do more than it can be observed to do. Anti-realism, to this 
5 degree, is a logical outcome of a naturalistic view of mind. 
Otherwise put, to locate grasp of meaning as an item within the 
natural causal order is to insist that meaning be exhaustively 
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determined in terms of conditions which are capable of impinging 
on us.. Unless this is so, the communicability (and hence the 
learnability) of meaning becomes a mysterious feat, insuscsptible 
of natural explanation. That is one dimension in which a 
naturalised approach to epistemology (specifically to knowledge 
of meaning) is appropriate; it supports the anti-realist1s 
premises concerning neceseary publicity. 
The special appropriateness of an evolutionary epistemology 
shows itsalf in a related area (as well as in the account of 
recognitional capacities - see chapter 3). It shows itself in 
relation to the picture of language aa an instrument whose purpose 
is to affect action. This picture of language as an instrument 
having a purpose or goal is implicit in the anti-realist1s 
criticisms of classical semantics. Such a semantics, the anti-
• 
realist believas, divorces the goal of language from the analysis 
it offers of the meanings of our words. for nothing in the ~ of 
the instrument (language) suggests, so the anti-realist argues,that 
an analysis of our understanding of language requires or suggests a 
classical notion of truth. The goal of language, for the anti-realist 
as well as the classicist, is the making of true statements. But 
the actual use of language as an instrument affecting and modifying 
human actions speaks only for the conception of truth favoured by 
the anti-realist i.e. a conception of truth as warranted assert&bility. 
Worse still, language (conceived as an instrument aiming at warranted 
assertability) may malfunction so long as rules of inference based 
on the classical conception prevail. Thus we may be led, by an 
application of bivalence, to assert a conclueion for which no 
effective warrant can be found. Unconservative extenaion (aee 1.2) 
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is an evil because it may allow language to miss its goal; to fail 
as an 1nstrument aimed at the making of warranted assertions. 
The anti-realist, then, believes that the nature of language 
is precisely the nature of an instrument aimed at affecting human 
action by the making of true statements. And the notion of truth 
is modified by the goal of affecting human action into a notion of 
something which is necessarily non-transcendent. This picture of 
language, I want now to suggest, is perfectly (though contingently) 
supported by an svolutionary account of the role of language. Thus the 
most plausible function of language, from an evolutionary perspective, 
ia surely the dissemination of survival-relevant information. The 
initial function of language, we may say, was probably the sharing 
of knowledge concerning the environment. An example, given in 
~cDowell (1) p.129, would bs where the species makes the move from 
individual sensitivity to the environment to quasi-linguistic 
communication in which the benefits of an individual's perceptions 
may be shared by others. Thus an· individual, seeing a predator, may 
emit a'squawk' cauaing the other individuals to run. The 'squawk' then 
constitutes enother mode of awareness of predators apert from ths 
ordinary perceptual sensitivity to predator-shape Dr whatever. 
Our own language, with all its sophistication, is surely an 
extension or development of soma such capacity. The difference of 
couree is that ws are aware of the intentions of ourselves and of 
others as speakers. Such a development (which generates the 
possibility of decsption and of non-assertoric speech acts - see 
~cDowell (1) ) may perhaps be explained, in part, by the observation 
that as social animals the states and attitudes of our fellow 
individuals are a vital factor in our selectivs environment. 
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Sensitivity to a speaker's intentions is thus as important to us as 
knowledge of the location of food or of the presence of predators. 
What is important, at any rate, is that language regarded as a 
characteristic with an evolutionary function, must confer some 
benefits on its possessora. And that such benefits look likely to 
concern principally the reception of true information about the 
selective environment, where the reception of that information 
affects the subsequent actions of the recipient in a survival-enhancing 
way. So-if language has a function or purpose, in an evolutionary 
sense (to be made precise in 2.4 following), then that function looks 
to be Just as the anti-realist insists it must be i.e. as an instrument 
affecting and modifying human actions in a be~eficial way. The point 
to stress is the necessary tie between truth, as it occurs in the 
evolutionary account, and action. For insofar as we may say, ss 
evolutionsry apistemologists, that language aims at making ~ 
statements or disseminating true information, we can mean by true 
only 'true and capable of affecting human action'. The idea that 
a classicsl and potentially transcendent notion of truth is appropriste 
as a pivotal concept in an analysis of the meaning of sentences in 
human lsnguage is thus as inoppertune from the vantage point of an 
evolutionary account of the function of language as it is given the 
anti-reslist's parsimonious attitude towards the application of 
theoretical terms such as knowledge of meaning. 
2.4 We have Bome csuse, then, to regard evolutionary epistemology 
as a suitable candidate for combination with an snti-realist 
semantics. Both parties, it appears, respect Wittgenatain'. 
obsarvation that tit ia our acting which liea at the bottom of 
the language gamet. (Wittgenstein (2) 204). It remains, therefore, 
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to characterise further the notion of an evolutionary epistemology 
itself .and to draw attention to those aspects of such an epistemology 
which will be especially relevant in the chapters to come. 
Evolutionary epistemology falls into place as part of a 
philosophical tradition whose locus classicus is Quine's 
'Epistemology naturalised'. (Quine (1) pp.69 - 91). Quine, seeing in 
the Cartesian quest for certainty only a 'lost cause' (ibid 74), 
suggests instead that we focus on the empirical facts relevant to 
the detarmination of our picture of reality. He sees no future in 
the project of rational reconstruction, no way to validate the 
grounds of ampirical science by a strict derivation from logic and 
sense experiance (or even from logic, sense experience and set theory). 
That being the case we may abandon the quest for the 'sure and secure 
foundations of knowladge'. And in so doing we abandon ~ all rsason 
. 
to rule out the use of empirical science itself in our efforts to 
discern the relation between theory and data, or meaning and the 
sensory evidence on which it depends (viz. shared stimulations -
ibid 75, 81). Where the goal of epistemology was the logicsl 
validation of science, such an appeal to the data provided by 
empirical science itself was rightly denounced as circular reasoning. 
But that goal was seen to be unattainable. The new goal, which 
hopefully is attainable, is to study, in a non-foundationalist manner, 
how the numan subject of our study posits bodies 
and projects his physics from his data (ibid 83) 
and in so doing 
We are well advised to use any available information, 
including that provided by the very science whose links 
with observation ws are trying to understand. (ibid 76). 
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Quine's principal interest is therefore the relation between human 
input,"given in terms of tsensory irradiations t and human output, 
conceived as 'a description of the three-dimensional external 
world and its historyt (ibid 83). 
What distinguishes an evolutionary epistemology from this 
mors gensral naturalised approach is the thought that the nature 
of the cognitive processes and sensory capacities which-mediate 
end make possible this relation is determined by the process of 
natural selection. Cognition, so this central thought goes, is 
adaptive. Evolutionary epistemology, in this sense, has little 
to do with the Popperian project of providing a 'eurvival of the 
fittest t account of scientific theories. It is rather a matter 
of drawing out the philosophical consequencss of the idea that 
mind is dependent on an adapted organ, brain. This latter idea 
. 
can be found (albeit in a somewhat distorted form) in work by 
6 Herbert Spencer as early as 1855. ~ore acceptable versions of 
the thesis begin to appear with Lorenz (see Bibliography) who 
describes innate categories of thought as being arrived at 
, 
/ 
a postsriori by the species (though a priori for the individual) 
in a form determined by natural selection. Others who adapt the 
perspective I aesociate with evolutionary epistemology include 
Waddington, who writes; 
The faculties by which we arrive at a world-view have been 
selected eo as to be, at least, efficient in dealing with 
other existents they have been moulded by things-in-
themselves so as to be competent in coping with them. 
Waddington (1) quotsd in Campbell p.445, 
and more recently Neil Tennant (2) (3) and Elliot Sober. But why 
should we adopt such a perspective? . 
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The principal reason why ws should adopt such a perspective 
(viz. that 'cognitive structures are evolutionary products' -
Tennant (3) p.3) is a negative one. There is no reaeon why we 
should exempt our cognitive structures from the account we give 
of our gross physical organs. Why should it n2i be that, as 
Lorenz says, 
Juet as the hoof of the horse is adapted to the ground of 
the steppe which it copes with, so our central nervous 
apparatus for organising the image of the world is adapted 
to the raal world with which man has to cope. 
Lorenz (1) 25. 
In order to subscribe to cognitive adaptionism, we need only 
to agrse that creatures whose cognitive orientation (a broad term 
designed to compass sensory modalities and basic information 
processing characteristics) fails to detsrmine appropriate (i.s. 
survival-promoting) responses to life situatione would stand at 
an evolutionary disadvantage with reepect to other crea~ures, 
competing for the same resources, WhOS8 cognitive strategies tended 
to work. This seems impossible to deny. Acceptance of this near-
tautological proposition, however, is sufficient (given the proviso 
of heritability or transmissibility - Bee below) to confer, on 
whatever physical etructures underlie our eensitivity to stimuli 
and our dispositions to reapond, an svolutionary function. To agrse 
that cognitive orientation is functional 1n an evolutionary eenae 
is to concede at once the relevance of an adaptive atory to tha 
nature of manta image of the world. (Whether or not thie relevance 
extends even to the nature of the scientific imags of the world is 
a further question and one we shall face 'in chaptar 7 following.) 
But do cognitive structures have such functions? In order to 
decide·we must clarify what is meant by a cognitive structure and 
a function. Taka cognitive structure first. By such a term we 
may mean, at most, some general strategy of ordering snd 
conceptualising input. It is certainly implausible to suppose 
that specific items of information are innate and genetically 
transmissible. (Indeed, the demand of cost-efficiency (see 2.5 
following) suggests that general strategies will be preferred to 
multiple individual unita of information.) Candidstss for such 
innate general modes of orientation might be various basic, 
important and pervasive features of man's natural image of reality. 
for example, to borrow a list of Neil Tennant's, 'the concept of 
substance, the notion of a continuant, concepts of identity by 
various sortal criteria, the notion of event and of cauae' 
(Tennant (2) p.1?1). ~ore minimally, but sufficient for our ends 
we may ssttle for the innate sense of similarity (Tennant's 'sortal 
criteria l ) which allows us to learn language and then to share 
direct recognitional responses to naw causes (for example, to, 
agree of a new object that it is red, sour, heavy or whatever). 
This minimal inherited cognitive orientation lies between the strong 
notion of inherited concepts and the weak idea that all that is 
evolutionarily determined is eensory modalities. Nor is this 
minimal innate orientation seriously to be doubted (.s we shall 
see in our discussion of Quine's Quality Spaces in chapter 3), 
for s sensory modality without a disposition 00 sort sensory input 
into useful arrangements of information would clearly afford no 
advantage at all. To deny the minimal cognitive adaptioniam I am 
advancing would, in .ffect, be to commit oneself to the psychologically 
A.J.Clark 39 
and biologically disreputable notion of completely uninterpreted 
sense data. Indeed, it seems likely that the stronger version 
detailed above is true. for inbuilt cognitive strategies enabling 
us to take over succeaaful ways of conceptualising experience 
evinced in earlier generationa would surely afford beings so 
equipped a considerable advantage. Popper argues for such a case 
euggesting we interpret Bome of the Kantian categories as 'genetically 
a priori' and 'prior to observation' but not 'valid a priori' Bince 
thay wduld be the fallibls products of aelection during the species' 
contingent evolutionary paat (see Popper p.47). 
By cognitive structures, then, is meant the physical conditions 
underlying at leest our basic sorta1 responses and at most certain 
basic cognitive strategies such as thoee named in Tennant'a list. 
I am inclined to believe in the slightly richer innate repertoire 
• 
orchestrated by e.g. Tennant, Popper and lorenz. But most of our 
arguments will depend only on the more minimal claim associated 
with Quine's quality spsca. and detailed further in chapter 3 
following. Do auch cognitive struotures have functions in the 
requisite biological aense? 
Normal talk of functions occurs in the context of the explanation 
of the parts of human artifacts. It is, we say, the function of the 
plunger relief valve in the oil pump of a ford Escort to control the 
oil pressure by occasionally bleeding oil back to the sump. And it 
iB, likewise, the function of the all pump itself to force faed 
lubricant to the appropriate parts of the engine (e.g. the small 
end bush, the gudgeon pin and the cylinder bores). function, in 
ite normal use, is thue very much context-relative. Wa talk of 
the function of X in Y. Talk of the function of X simplioiter makes 
ssnse only insofar as a context is presumed ££ because we have 
it in mind that the object was designed with a purpose (whether 
or not we know it and whether or not it ectually fulfils it). 
faced with an exotic mass of alien technology the B-movie scientist 
announces that 'the function of the mysterious machine which 
recently materialised in front of the Pentagon remains a mystery'. 
Is it a death ray perceptively trained on Ronald Reagan; or is it 
a coffse-maker sadly misdirected by the ~atter Transmission service? 
By function, then, ws mean either the role of a part relative to a 
whols, or the end for which a whole object was designed. 
~oving now to the application of the concept of function to 
natural objects (sows, human brains, hearts, mice, moles etc.) we 
find that one of our disjuncts is missing. The heart we can 
accommodate; its evolved function is to pump blood. If this was 
. 
not done, beings like us would die. So selection operates in 
favour of efficient hearta. But the Sow is a problem. It cannot 
qualify for function by design because nobody designed it. Unlike 
a part (e.g. a heart) a naturel whole has no designed uae. It seems 
odd then to look for its function, for, as a recent commentator 
suggests; 
the notion of function gets its primary application in the 
case of parts of machines and other things with use-purposes. 
Purton p.1B 
In Purton'. terminology, the reason why it is nonethele •• eccaptable 
to talk of the function of a part of a natural object i. that the 
object has a 'maintained state' regulated by proce •••• of neg.tive 
feedback. Thus the heart pumps faster in order to maintain lavsls 
of vital gase. in the blood. It r.gulatss the .y.tem in a 
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goal-directed way, the underlying explanation of which is to be 
found in the selective account just sketched. Without such 
regulation we would die before reproducing. 
Our ordinary notion of function thus extends to cover the 
life-maintaining function of parts of natural objects - for 
example, the physical structures to be found within the human 
brain. But natural functions too are context-relative. Thus 
although it is only the parts of natural objects which have functions, 
what we choose to ~ as part and whole may vary according to our 
explanatory interests.? Thus a co-adapted bacterium may count as 
part of a cow's stomach which in turn has a function in maintaining 
the cow's life. Or a valley may count as a whole eco-system in a 
state of evolved stability to which some animals contribute by 
eating certain plants which would otherwise swamp the valley 
destroying the habitats of its native animal population. With 
that proviso, however, we may conclude that parts of natural 
objecte can indeed have evolutionary functions, and that to have 
an evolutionary function it is sufficient that a part contribute 
to the maintained etate of a whole natural object. Where that 
natural object is an animal, the evolution of the part in question 
is sxplained by the fact that a maintained state of fit and heslthy 
life promotss reproduction and so aelection occure in favour of 
beings with well adapted minds, strong hearts etc.. For mental 
characteristica, we may be eure, ars ae essential to the maintaining 
of life as phYSical ones. Selection will favour beings whoee 
internal representationa enable them to cope with a world they 
never made. The evolution of appropriete cognitive strategies 
ie thus explained by the contribution of such strategi.s encoded 
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in some physical structure within an animal tothat animal's 
survival. Healthy bodies and healthy minds are the legacy of 
a demanding mother nature. 
Baaic cognitive characteristics may thus have functions in 
the requisite evolutionary sense insofar as the presence in an 
animal of the physical structure which encodes any such characteristics 
tends to promote the survival and reproductive success of that animal. 
Cognition and circulation are thus equally respectabls as items with 
evolved functions. Both fit the basic definition,8 implicit in our 
overell account of function, that; 
A function of I (in S) is to do C means I does C and 
if, ceteris paribus, C were not dane in an 5 then the 
probability of that S surviving or having descendants 
would be smaller than the probability of an S in which 
C is done surviving or having descendants. 
Canfield (1) p.287. 
(Note: Communication, conceived as the dissemination of beneficial, 
behaviour-affecting information clearly has a function in this 
technical sense also - recall 2.3 above.) 
Nat every characteristic of an evolved being hes such a 
function. Some characteristics may be selectad because they 
accompany, in the genetic coding, a characteristic which does 
perform some ueeful taak. Basic aenaory modes and minimal cognitive 
orientation are too obviously vital to human survival to be plausibly 
aasimilated to such spin-off characteristics however. They are by 
no means accidental within the evolutionary context (though they 
are the result of accidental factors and chance). For their presence 
in us can be explained by the functions they fulfil. Sensory 
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modalities enable us to find food and avoid being eaten. In 
fulfilling this task they co-operate with basic cognitive strategies 
which sort and identify input. Together, our sensory and cognitive 
natures bestow upon us the capacity to respond to our environment 
in a survival-enhancing way. Some minimal cognitive oriantation. at 
least, is thus surely amenable to the kind of explanation in terms 
of evolved function favoured by the evolutionary epistemologist. 
There is, however, one fUrther requirement upon evolutionary 
explanation which deserves mention. This is the requirement of 
transmissibility9. A characteristic, however advantageous, cannot 
be given an evolutionary explanation unless we have some idea of 
the mechanism of heritability involved in its transmission. A 
materialist theory of mind (in a broad sense; we may espouse 
supervenience without reduction regarding mental states and still 
be sufficiently materialist) is thus a pre-supposition of the 
evolutionery epistemologist. The capacity of DNA to transmit 
information concerning physical structure (more precieely, it 
transmits coding for proteins which in turn form tertiary structures 
in accordance with higher level laws of form) from generation to 
generation is, on that pre-supposition, enough to ensure the 
heritability of basic cognitive structures encoded in the 
organisation of the human brain. And there is, of course, no question 
but that our sensory modalities are heritable in the same manner. 
The combination of a basic materialism with the notion of 
function outlined above justifies us in adopting an evolutionary 
perspective with regard to cognitive structures and sensory 
modalities. It does so by meeting the three requirements of 
evolutionary explanation (aee Bechtel and Richardson's article 
referred to in note 9) i.e. (1) variation (by mutation and 
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recombination of DNA and RNA complexes), (2) transmisaibility by 
some intelligible mechanism of variations produced, (3) selection 
between variations by differential survival and reproduction of 
phenotypes. 
The adoption of the broad perspective of an evolutionary 
epistemology therefore looks, on even the briefest of reflection, 
to be compulsory. As philosophers, then, the important question 
is '50 what?' What are the consequences, for our picture of 
knowledge and of our knowledge-acquiring capacities, of recognising 
the adaptive background of cognition? 
2.5 The consequences of the adoption of the evolutionary perspective 
are ~ simply that cognitive structure and capacities for sensory 
discrimination are fitted to the environment. If this were so then 
the evolutionary epistemologist would be guilty of committing what 
I shall label the Turkish Driver fallacy. The perspiring tourist, 
critical of the quality of driving in Istanbul, may be told en old 
and interesting proverb. In Turkey, so it is said, they have only 
good drivers because all the bad ones ere dead. Evolutionary 
epistemology, it must be stressed, is ~ just a minor variation 
on this old and fallacious proverb (as anyone who's been to Istanbul 
knows). Cartainly, auch an apistemology does involve claims which 
have the logical form of the proverb. The form, that is, of an 
inference to a kind of correctness of knowledge acquired and 
processed by evolved means conducted by an evolutionary reductio 
performed on the assumption of invalidity (cf 'creatures 
inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but 
praise-worthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind'. 
Quine (2) 125). Claims of this nature make up what I ahall term 
the appropriateness argument. When philosophers" refuse to take 
A J.Clark 45 
evolutionary epistemology seriously. they tend to sen in it only 
this one argument. But there is another, to my mind more important, 
consequence of the adoption of the evolutionary perspective. This 
I term the fallibility/scope argument. It is this latter argument 
which adds much-needed provisos to the appropriateness argument 
itself, thus rescuing it from the Turkish Driver fallacy. 
Let us therefore focus on the two kinds of considerations 
themselves (viz.the appropriateness and the fallibility/scope 
arguments). The general nature of the appropriateness argument should 
by now be clear, and I shall not labour it. It may be put like this: 
(appropriateness argument) 
For a typical individual X, of a species XX in 
an environment V. 
If (assumptions) 
(1) XX evolved, by a process of natural selection in V and 
(2) X has some apparent knowledge of V gained through 
evolved means of sense and modes of processing 
Then suppose (Reductio.clause) that XiS apparent 
knowledge (kx) bore no relation to Y ( - (kxRV) ) 
In that case XiS knowledge would fail to aid X in the 
pursuit of natural goals (survival and reproduction) in Y. 
So X would fail to reproduce. 
So X-type organisms would generally fail to reproduce. 
So XX would become extinct. 
(End of Reductio clause.) 
XX is not extinct. 
So XiS knowledge bears some useful relation to V (kxRV). 
This somewhat realistic-sounding conclusion, however, needs 
amending in several ways to take account of various eVDlutionary 
constraints on the ~ of relation we may plausibly expect ou~ 
knowledge to bear to the world. Such constraints form a complex 
of arguments which, in virtue of their common fallibilistic 
conclusions, I have gathered together under the banner of the 
fallibility/scope argument. Before examining these constraints, 
however, let me say a few words in response to a potential line 
of objection to the Appropriateness argument as it is presented 
above. To say (as we did in the reductio clausal that a being's 
apparent knowledge 'bears no useful relation to the environment' 
is to say, in deliberately vague terms, that the being in question 
held mostly false beliefs. If soma philosophers would baulk at the 
use of belief in thie context, they may instead think of the animal 
as holding mostly false belief-analogues. This term is borrowed 
from Dennett (p.10) and used to stand for ~ rational reconstruction 
of the animal's natural programming, given for convenience in 
intentional terms and based on its observable behaviour. Suppose 
then that we allow ourselves to speak of the evolutionary failure 
(the u~successful being in the reductio) as holding mostly false 
beliefs or belief-analogues. We do not suppose that this is the 
only or even the most usual cause of evolutionary failure; environ-
mental change is a more common killer. But it ~ a potential cause 
of maladaption, and one which bears directly on the central thesis 
of evolutionary epiatemology viz. that our cognitive capacitias have 
been partially moulded by the forces of selective success and failure 
so as to be competent aids to survival and reproduction. The objection 
I want now to address is that we cannot make ~ of the evolutionary 
reductio as it is meant to be applied to a creature's beliefs (or 
belief-analogues) since we could never, on methodological grounds, 
be justified in ettributing mostly false beliefs ( or belief-analogues) 
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to the creature in question. Such an objection, if it were upheld, 
would undercut our right to usa the appropriateness reductio in an 
epistemological context. 
The objection stems from the principle of charity developed 
by Donald Davidson (see e.g.Davidson p.17 - 20). Davidson points 
out that our interpretation of actions and/or utterances must 
always proceed by our first assuming that most of what the subject 
believes is true and ~ correlating his aotions or words with the 
pursuit of obvious goals (e.g. eating, avoiding predators etc.). 
But suppose we apply charity to the evolutionary failure in the 
reductio clause? It then seems that, if we are to say it has any 
beliefs or belief-analogues at all, we cannot regard them as in 
any large part false. So the r9ductio cannot be performed in an 
epistemological setting. For instead of saying that the evolutionary 
failure held mostly false beliefs (or belief-enalogues) we must 
aither say it held none at all ££ that it held mostly true beliefs 
but had soma rather bizarre desires (e.g. to falloff a cliff-top) 
which these true beliefs enabled it rapidly to fulfill 
The letter option i8 as usele8s to the would-be evolutionary 
epistemologist as the former. Clearly, in weighing up beliefs and 
desire. in the case of the evolutionary failura we naturally aeek 
more emphasis on belief (or belief-analogue8) and Ie •• on d •• ira 
(or deeire-analogue.). The problem is how to maks this a convincing 
8pecial case rather than an ad hoc stipulation. The way to do so, I 
suggest, ia to regard the principle of chari~y as its~tr. being 
derived from the apistemological version of the Appropriateness 
argument, in a way which makes clear exactly why it i8 that the 
svolutionary failure i8 a special ca8e. Thus we may argue that it 
is precisely becaus9 the holders of falee belief-systems tend to 
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die out or to bungla their interactions with the world that it 
is legitimate to treat successful, surviving species as holding 
mostly true beliefs. The appropriateness argument is thus seen 
as offering naturalised support to the Davidsonian principle in 
a way which simultaneously displays why charity should only be 
extended (as it generally is) to successful, established groups 
of beings. for it is manifestly imp~oper to deploy the demands 
of charity against the very evolutionary failures whose 
characteristic non-existence explains the success of the 
principle as an interpretative tool. 
The epistemological significance of the Appropriateness 
argument thus defended, we may now examine some constraints on 
its conclusion (viz. the conclusion that the knowledge of a 
surviving being will tend to be appropriate to its environment). 
These constraints together make up the fallibility/scope argument 
mentioned above. 
The abilities of an evolved creature to acquire knowledge of 
the world must depend solely on the range of sensory access to 
information processed by itself and (in ·the case of communicating 
beings) its peers and (perhaps) on any innate categories of thought 
similarly evolved by differential survival within the species. The 
nature of capacities to access and process information are thus 
plausibly tied to whatever constraints are imposed by the 
evolutionary process itself. The first such constraint concerns 
the specificity of the selective environment itself. Rscall the 
conclusion (kxRY) of ths appropriateness argument (above). The 
constraint of specificity implies that the environment Y to which 
XIS knowledge-acquiring capacitias have had to answer ought not to 
be identified with any quasi-Kantian notion of the world-in-itself; 
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nor indeed, with any mere spatio-temporal portion of that world. 
This is because an environment, for the purposes of evolutionary 
argument, is simply the set of physical parameters appropriate 
for judging the fitness of,an individual organism. An individual's 
fitness relates, in an obvious way, to its knowledge of its ~ 
environment. Thus, for example, when the relevant environmental 
factors transcend an individual's knowledge its fitness diminishes 
since it must ignore pertinent factors in the making of survival-
relevant choices. Thus understood, the environment, to which the 
knowledge-acquiring capacities of an organism are directed (though 
they may not encompass it in its entirety) is neither the world-in-
itself, nor some spatia-temporal portion of it, nor even the world 
known by the organism. Rather it is whatever enters into survival-
relevant causal relations ·with the organism. (Thus see, for example, 
Rosenberg (1)). This observation suggests that the nature of evolved 
knowledge-acquiring faculties will be-niche-relative; aimed, that is, 
at a sensitivity to factors which are relevant to ths survival and 
reproquction of the type of organism concerned. It is evident, ~f 
course, that human beings at least, have knowledge which goes beyond 
their environment (in the strict evolutionary sense of environment). 
Our point, carefully stated, is not that knowledge can relate only 
to the selective environment but that all knowledge (even that which 
transcends survival and reproductive relevance) is gained through 
forms of sense and modes of processing which evolved in response to 
the specific nature of a selectivs environment. The course of possible 
enquiry, we may say, is thus governed by the form of life; but the 
possible content of knowledge may still exceed that relevant to 
the reproduction of life. 
The second constraint to notice is that even in this reduced 
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context (of knowledge as gain~d and p~ocessed by means appropriate 
to a given form of life in a given local environment) the 
. t h t· f· . 10 d t t""· appropr1a enees argument as only sa 1S 1C1n9 an no op 1m1s1ng 
force. The word 'satisficing' was coined by H.Simon to describe 
'methods that look for good or satisfactory solutions instead of 
optimal ones'. (Simon,H. p.64). Its use in the present context 
is meant to signal that the forms of sense and modes of processing 
selected will be geared to efficacy rather than detailed veridica1ity. 
For efficacy and veridica1ity (or, if you like, truth) diverge as soon 
as the parameter of cost-efficiency is introduced into the equation. 
Selective pressure would bear on the evolution of cognitive 
mechanisms which generate fast cheap approximations suitable for the 
practical purposes of the organism. Speed and economy (cf Tennant (3» 
are worth more than accuracy to the being engaged in the struggle 
for survi val. 
A third constraint may be located in the picture of evolved 
perceptual channels and cognitive structures as selected from a 
random pool of options. I refer here to what Campbell calls the 
inevitable blindness of the evolutionary process. This is just the 
familiar point that evolutionary variation is in some sense random, 
although subsequent selection amongst variations is not. A little 
care is neceasary here if we are to be biologically accurate. 
Darwin's 'chance variation' is now explained by the random mutation 
of genee. But 'random' may be a misleading term (hence Campbell's 
use of 'blind'). For a gene is a string of triplets of nucleotides 
of which there are only four kinds. So only certain types of variation 
11 
are possible • Nonetheless mutation i! random in one important sense, 
namely that: 
The alterations produced in a gsne and the effects which this 
alteration will have on the phenotype of the individual which 
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develops under its influence are not causally connected with 
the natural selective force' which will determine its 
success or failure in producing offspring in the next 
generation. 
Waddington (2) 94. 
In other worde, there is no caueal link between the nature of 
mutatione and the presaures of the selective environment. 
Retained variations are the moet efficient of a blindly generatad 
pool of options. Contingency and non-optimality thus again 
infe&t the Utopian pastures of the appropriateness argument. 
A final constraint (on the abilities of an evolved being 
to accees and procees information) deserves mention, even though 
it is unconnected with the specific process of evolution and 
hence not properly part of the fallibility/scope 'argument' itself. 
It is the constraint of physical structurs. Whereas before we 
were concerned with the contingencies inherent in the selection 
of the apparetus of knowing, we may now consider such limitations 
as may proceed from the mere fact of employing any apparatus ataLl. 
We are therefore considering what limitations may bs implied by the 
thesis of materialism alone. This is relevant because the force of 
the evolutionary theorist's .ssertion that basic forma of human 
thought are limited in non-neceasary ways is intensified by tha 
resultant combined belief in the necesaary limitedneae of any 
apparatus at all and in the somewhat accidental, imperfect 
(coat-efficient) and biased natura of the particular cognitive 
apparatus employed by man. The idea is Simple. Heritable 
cognitive structure and modes of sensory discriminatiDn must 
be physically ba.ed. Being so based, they will inherit 
operational limitations which ara a direct result of their 
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material construction. As Konrad Lorenz puts it; 
Every solid structure, although indispensable as a 
support for the orgenic system carries with it an 
undesired side-effect: it makes for rigidness and 
takes away a certain degree of freedom from the system. 
Lorenz (1) trans. p.28. 
~an's picture of reality, so this argument goes, even at its 
most scientifically sophisticated, is of necessity bound by the 
physical limitations of the apparatus through which it is acquired. 
Intslligent thought, we may say, needs the support of a rigid, 
highly differentiated structure (viz. the human brain); but such 
a structure, while increasing the possibilities of knowledge in 
certain dimensions, may also impose some limits on the extent of 
a being's possible knowledge, beyond which it cannot reach. 
This last argument may remain tentative. If accepted, it lends 
weight to the conclusions of the fallibility/scope considerations. 
But it is not easentisl. What is important is that it is a 
consequence of the adoption of the evolutionary perspective 
with regard to human cognitive structure that such structure 
be seen as optimal only subject to constraints. Such constraints, 
explicit in the fallibility/scope argument itself, are rooted in 
considerations of (1) random generation of variations (2) coat-
efficiency'as a selective parameter and (3) the gearing of 8elective 
preesure to the particular needs of a given species in a local 
environment. The conclusion, then, is that the reassurances of 
the appropriatenees argument be tempered with humility. By such 
reflactions we grssp that our primitive view of the world is 
bissed imperfect and limited. This outcome ia predictable from 
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the evolutionary genesis of the capacities which sustain 
it (viz. our basic sensory modes, similarity spacings and 
perhaps, some degrae of cognitive organisation). ~n's 
primitiva or cornmon-sanee image of reality is thus revealed 
as appropriate to, but not uniqusly and complately isomorphic 
~ the world with which it copes. (Whether or not such 
conclusions extend to cast doubt on a realistic view of 
science is a further question; a spectre to be faced in 
chapt. 7 following). 
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3. The Role of Recognition. 
3.1 In Chapte.I and 2, I presented, in outline, the positions 
of semantic anti-realism and svolutionary spistemology. I showed 
that the anti-realist account demands an epistemological component 
and offered some reasons why an evolutionary epistemology might be 
thought an appropriate choice. It is time now to follow this 
project through and to see what effects the introduction of such 
a component might have on the form and consequences of the 
anti-realist position itself. We begin at that point where the 
epistemological influence on anti-realism is at its greatest; 
that is, in the account of a recognitional ability. 
3.2 It is useful to distinguish two ways in which the notion of 
a recognitional ability enters into the anti-realist analysis. 
It enters first in the identificstion of our notion of a true 
statement with one which we are in principle at least, capable 
of recognising as true. In this context (see e.g. l[ 444) the 
stress on recognisability flows from the conviction that it makes 
no sense to suppose that we sustain a notion of truth which 
somehow transcends everything which could have gone into our 
learning of that notion. Recogniaability here functions as a 
methodological requirement on our poasible grasp of the notion 
of truth. There is, however, a second (not unrelated) usa for 
the notion of recognition; and it is with this second use that 
epistamology makes its proper entry into the anti-realist scheme 
of things. In this other context the relevant notion is not one 
of recognition simpliciter but rather one of unmediat.d recognition. 
Unmediated recognition, I want to say, playa a very special role 
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in the anti-realist's account of meaning. To understand this 
role we must racall the notion of an implicit grasp of meaning 
and the constraints put upon the attribution of such a grasp 
to a speaksr of the language. 
It was noted (1.2 pg. 9 above) that it is too much to demand 
of a competent speaker that he be able to give a non-trivial 
verbal account of his knowledge of the circumstances under 
which a sentencs which he claims to understand would be properly 
assertible. Nonetheless it is to be agreed that, if we are to 
make sense of what Dummett terms 'our progressive ecquisition 
of our language' ~ 318) we cannot dislocate grasp of meaning 
from grasp of recognisable assertion-warranting circumstancss. 
It ia also clear that the attribution of such a grasp requires 
some juatification, and that such justification cannot, on pain 
of circularity, consist merely in the utterance of the string 
of sounds which comprise the eentsnce in question. (Recsll the 
'demand of empirical import for theoretical terms'. 1.2 pg. 9abova.) 
The anti-realist's proposal, in the light of all this, is to 
locate the necessary justification for the attribution of 
implicit grasp in the ability 'in favourable circumstances, to 
recognise the condition as obtaining or not obtaining'. ~449). 
In other words, the juetification, in the usual caee, ie to 
consist in observing a speaker's ability to utter the eantancB 
in whataver circumstencss are gensrally judged to bs appropriate. 
An sxample of the kind of ability in question would thereforB be 
our ability (re in lQ 129) to recognise an object (in favourable 
conditions) as being rad. It is on this ability that a typical 
language-master's understanding of the meaning of 'red' depends. 
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This notion of direct or unmediated recognition is involved 
with some of the most fundamental intuitions underlying the 
anti-realiet analysis. In particular, it is involved with the 
idea that an acceptable (i.e. non-mentalistic) model of our 
prograasive acquisition of knowledge of the meanings of the words 
in our language demand a that all intelligible meaning be built on 
the foundation of some basic fragment of our language viz. the 
fragment containing only observation statements. For it is only 
relative to this fragment that we can make empiricist sense of 
our acquisition of grasp of meaning. ('All inCUlcation of meanings 
of warde must rest ultimately on sensory evidence'. One of Quine's 
two cardinal tenets of empiricism. See e.g. Quine (1) 75.) 
It is in this realm of basic observation statements that our 
ebilities of unmediated recognition are exercised. In this 
realm, we may say, we find a stripped-down version of the way 
in which the anti-realist conceives !!! meaning to attach to 
sentences. This attachement is somewhat obscured, in higher-level 
caees, by the roles played by association and inference in our 
understanding. Even in such CBeee, however, the explanation Df 
our capacity to acquire such understanding demands that ths 
constituents of the language in which such understanding ie 
expreaaed have their roots in the realm of the directly observable. 
It is thers that maening is born for it is there that tha semantic 
features of a sentence (Iits atructure and the referencea of its 
cDnstituents' l[ 461) are identical with its use or employment. 
To usa a statament of unmediated recognition ~ to understand it 
correctly; we can ask no more, for all verbal explanation hes 
caasad. Sinca all we can ~ be shawn, so tha anti-realiet 
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insists, is use, then all meaning must be constructed upon such 
bases~ If we are to make sense of our ability to acquire grasp 
of meaning we must ground that ability in cases where no previous 
underetanding mediates between semantic contsnt and use, i.e. in 
cases apt for the exerciee of direct recognitional abilities. 
It eeems then that for the anti-realist language must 
contain what Crispin Wright (Wright (6) 219) has called a 
'base-class of statements for which the notion of truth is 
unproblematic'. Recognition of the truth of statements of the 
base-class is unproblematic because it is direct. It consists 
merely in a 'practical discriminatory skill' which we are, as 
a mattsr of brute fact, able to be taught by exp08ure to perceptual 
stimuli. Without such a base-cla •• ofatatements, Wright points 
out, it become. hard to make senss of the manifestation and 
acquisition argument. themselve.. For the manifestation a~ument 
insiats that all grasp ·of meaning be publicly manifestable in 
behaviour keyed to observable circumstances. A classical 
truth-conditional account of grasp of meaning fails this test 
because on euch an account grasp of meaning need not imply a 
racognitional skill of any kind. But without a base-claas of 
.tatemants grasp of which can be displayed by the exhibition of 
recognitionsl competencea, the same fate would befall the 
anti-realist altarnative. Similarly with AcquiSition, where 
the claim is that our linguistic training cannot instil in us 
any gra.p of verification-transcendent truth for the .imple reeson 
that we can only be exposed to non-transcsndent circumstanca •• 
Hera too wa must believe in a ba.e-class of statements who.s 
truth-conditions !E! directly sccasaible to human inspection 
if we are to giva any substance to the intended contrast. 
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The necessity of this base-class does not, I think, go unnoticed 
by Dummett himself who writes: 
There muat be some sentences for which we are able to 
perceive or apprehend that which makes them true, that 
is, to perceive or recognise directly that they are true, 
since otherwiee it is hard to see how we could ever 
establish the truth of any sentence. This does not apply 
only to reporte of observation, but equally (say) to 
numerical equations stating the rssult of a computation. 
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Upon what does the existence of such base-classes depend? 
One plausible thought is that it depends on what Wittgenstein 
termed agreement in judgments (Wittgenetein (1) prop.242). 
Such judgments, as Wright points out, must be taken to be of 
a very basic sort. Thsy must be 
Judgments which we make responsivsly without reason, 
under the impact of our immediats environment. 
Wright (3) p.30. 
Examples would be judgments concerning"form, pattern, colour, 
loudness, pitch, texture, warmth, temporal precedence etc.'. 
It is because we agree in the exercise of euch basic concepts 
that languaga can auatain the necessary baas-class of atatements 
which we can directly recogniee to be true. Our recognition of 
the truth or falsity of simple sentences involving such concepts 
ie, as Dummett suggeets, unmedieted in the sense that what makss 
such sentencss true is 'the very thing of which W8 are dirsctly 
aware' when ws rscognise them as being t~s. ~ 449). 
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There is thus an important, indeed vital, role for a 
base-class of statements whose truth is directly recognisable 
in an anti-realist analysis. This base-class depends, in turn, 
on common capacities of unmediated recognition. Thus the public 
claim 'there is a red coffee cup on the table' may feature in 
the base-class of directly recognisable truths. But it can do 
so only because we share capacities of unmediated recognition 
trained on the colour,shape and location of the cup and the 
table, and because we agree also (equally unreflectively) on 
the conditions of application of the relational term 'on'. 
In my terminology (or rather, in my use of Dummett" terminology), 
then, it is statements which are sometimes directly recognised 
as true, and ~ (both relational and attributive) which may 
be graeped to apply by the exercise of unmediated recognitional 
capacities. That I have a direct recognitional grasp of the 
meaning of a statement is thus a fact to be explained by pointing 
out that the exercise of unmediated recognitional capacities is 
alone sufficient to prompt its assertion. This stipulation has 
the advantage of separating out the actual capacities referred 
to from the particular sentences which the employment of such 
capacities renders directly assertlble. Sinca avolutionary 
considerations may be expected to say mora about our capacitiea 
than about our sentences, this separation promisee to be an 
ultimately worthwhile one. 
3.3 Unmediated recognitional capacities, and the direct 
recognitional abilities they sustain, thus lie at the very 
heart of the anti-realist analysie of meaning. Appeal to auch 
shared capacities makes inte~ligible our ability to coma to grasp 
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tha basic fragments of our language which describe the phenomenally 
manifest world around us. And the public exercise of such 
capacities providas the bedrock Justification of our claims 
to grasp the meaning of those fragments which ara, in effect, 
the atomic parts of our language. These stomic parts sre apt, 
we said, for the description of the observable world. Sincs the 
anti-realist demands (as we saw in '.2) that language as a whole 
be a conservative extension of that part of it which contains 
only the observstion statemsnts, it is obvious that truth, for the 
anti-realist, cen never entirely outrun our unmediated recognitionsl 
capacities. Inferentially reached co~clusions must p~eserve the 
possibility of direct assertion if the inference itself is to be 
acceptable (cf. ths demand of harmony in '.2). And any compositional 
anslysis of grasp of meaning (auch as that given for undecidable 
statements whose meaning is located in our grasp of the meaning 
of their parts ,and how they sre Joined together) is meant precisely 
to justify the thought that wars the described circumstances to 
obtain we would be able to recognise them se doing so. 
There is eome reason therefore to suspect that whatever turn. 
out to be true of the basic Judgments, agreement in which is both 
a terminus of Justifications of grasp and a pre-condition of 
getting language going, will turn out to be true of !!! Judgments 
whatsoever. It will suffice, however, merely·to obaerve 
that sevsral important anti-realist claims pivot crucially on the 
idee of our being able to recognise directly when certain claims 
are properly made. This claim, made for any particular eantence, 
is, as Dummett aays, a thoroughly epistemological ona (g[ 449). 
We might therefore expect the contribution of an evolutionary 
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epistemology to an anti-realist semantics to lie precieely 
in its ability to comment on the particular capacities of 
unmediated recognition which form the epistemological core 
of any auch theory of meaning. 
Before proceeding with such a line of thought,however, 
it is worth injscting a cautionary note. It would be only 
too easy, at this point, for the naturalised epistemologist 
simply to identify the anti-realistls ideas of direct and unmediated 
recognitional abilities with soms physical enabling counterpart 
among the organs of sense and the physical constituenta of the 
brain. To do ao would be to miss the purely functional force 
of the anti-realistle notion. For we share a direct recognitional 
gresp of some eantance P Juet in case we are equally disposed, 
without raliance on any conscious chain of thought, to assert 
the truth of P in the pre8ence of 80me non-linguistic stimulus S, 
(ase PB in !Q p.22?). Likewise the claim that we share various 
capacities of un •• dieted recognition anabling us to detect the 
/ 
truth of P by exposure to S is·meant only as a partial 
explanation of how agreement is achiaved"and of why it ~8 repeated 
in eimilar casas. Nothing in eithsr case strictly impliee that 
the physical apparatus underlying the common capacitie8 of 
recognition should bs the same. A Martian may have 80me unmediated 
recognitional capacity which enables him to recogniee diractly the 
truth of the claim that there i8 a ~quare block on the table. We may 
thue share direct recognitional abilities and capacitias of 
unmediated recognition without sharing any particular physical 
realisations of the functional .tructurss involved. Satisfaction 
of the teats far .hared direct recognitionsl abilitie. or 
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unmediated recognitional capacities does not depend on the 
employment of physically similar organs of sense or even on 
common modes of processing. The sams programme, to become 
briefly cybernetic, may be instantiated in various software 
and run on various hardware.12 It is in the running of the 
programme, and not its particular physical background, that 
the locus of anti-realist and semantic interest lies. The 
test for ehared capacities of unmediated recognition is a 
test for functional similarity among language-users. 
Recognition of this fact, however, need not preclude the 
naturalised epistemologist from suggesting that the best 
empirical explanation of our general agreement in the exercise 
of unmediated recognitional capacities (especially our willingneas 
to treat new caees in a eimilar fashion) is that we share basic 
forms of sense and modes of processing, and appealing to an 
evolutionary modal of eelective retention by differential 
eurvival and genetic heritability to explein in turn why such 
capacities ara common human property and why they are aimed 
at Just those feetures of the world which. they ara. That they 
are common human property is, from the point of view of the 
cognitive adaptioniat, nor mora aurprlslng than that arma, nosea 
and so forth ara for the most part uniformly distributed acroes 
a population. That .uch capacitis. are as they are ia to be 
explained as determined by a combination of our peculiar human 
needs, chance and the real natura of the selectiva environment. 
The natura of our unmediated recognitional capacities i. thue aeen 
as a function of the appropriatene •• argument .nd the fallibility/ 
scope conetrain~. on appropriatene.s, datailed in 2.5 preceding. 
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It seems then that logically speaking the notion of shared 
capacities of unmediated recognition implies neither common 
organs of sense nor common modes of processing; it is not necesssry 
that we bring any shared physical apparatus to the semantic task. 
What ~ necessary is that members of a linguistic community exhibit 
certain functional similarities in their basic disposition to 
respond to given stimuli. Nonethelsss ths best explanation of 
such shared dispositions may yet need to refer them to their genetic 
besis in common phyeical apparatus. We may make this clearer if we 
introduce an intermediate step. The notion of shared capacities of 
unmediated recognition looks to me to pre-suppoae (on an empirical 
level) somsthing like the Quinian account of shared quality apaces. 
And the best scientific explanation of th.se, in turn, comas from 
evolutionary epistemology; let us see how such a proposal might look 
in practice. 
3.4 A quality space, as it figures in Quine's account of learning 
and natural kinds (Quine (2) pp. 122 - 125) is just an 'innate 
standard of similsrity' which we all share and which underlies 
our capacities e.g. to learn a first language or acquire a habit. 
The notion is e purely behavioural one. Two creatures share a 
spacing of qualities in which a pink ellipse is clossr to a red 
circle than it is to a blue triangle if, for example, a conditioned 
response to a red circle is more essily elicited again by a pink 
ellipse than by a blue triangle. What ie at work in euch cases is 
a 'primitive eense of similarity' of the form 'a is more eimilar 
to b than to ct. And where this similarity senee first shows itsslf 
is in our tendency.to find certain stimulations similar to one 
another, and to regard other stimulations as different to these. 
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Thus Quine also speaks of an 'innats qualitative spacing of 
stimulations'. 
This notion of similarity of stimUlations is clearly 
pre-eupposed by our earlier account of e common unmediated 
recognitional capacity as explaining a shared disposition 
to aseert P in the presence of a stimulus S. tor consider 
how we might learn a use of language involving the application 
of some unmediated recognitional capacity. We ere taught to 
say P in the preeence of some given stimulus, S. We must then 
go on to find other atimuli which strike us es similar to 5 and 
exhibit our mastery of the language by a.serting P in their 
presence too. Thus the very possibility of the •• mantic use 
of unmediated recognitional capacities dapends on our having 
a notion of similarity applicable to S, and not so far removed 
from that of the rest of the linguistic community as to render 
us incapable of learning P in Just those cases which the rest 
of the community will find relevantly similar also. Thus we may 
have, for example, a direct recognitional grasp of truth as applied 
to the claim 'that is yellow' (sea e.g.FO in 1Q 129). To have 
learned such s grasp, as Quine points out (Quine (2) 121), is to 
have engeged in a procese of assesaing the communally agreed 
applications of the word to sample. (o.t.naively givan) in an 
attempt to grasp when and where a language-master would be prepared 
to apply the term in question. It is a fact that we succeed in 
thie endeavour remarkably well; almoat anyone, it seeme, can 
become a language-master. Ie our success a matter of luck? 
Quine answers in the negative. If we succaad, Quine .ay./it i. 
because we sre playing 'a gama of chance with loaded dics'. 
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The dice are loaded for the naturalised epistemologist's reason 
that we have all inherited a more or less similar apacing of 
qualities (i.e. disposition to group objects and situations 
according to intuitions of similarity and difference) as that 
on which our teachers themsslves rely, for example, in their 
grouping together of various objects as falling undar the tarm 
'yellow' (sae Quine (2) 125). And this, to anticipate a future 
topic, is why unconscious recognitional criteria can be equally 
as sctive in our scquisition of a grasp of meaning as conscious 
ones. for all that matters in the learning situation is that 
whatever criteria the teacher employs be available, consciously 
or otherwise, to the student. In any case, wers it not for soms 
substantial overlap in our subjective innate spacing of qualities 
our success in the general acquieition of knowledge o.f where to 
apply baaic concepts would appear unduly fortuitous. Given such 
an overlap, it becomes a mundane inevitability. It seema we make 
our own luck. 
There ~s another, tactical, r .. son for introducing the notion 
of shared quality spaces as intsrmediats between the anti-realist'a 
notion of unmediated recognitional capacities and the evolutionary 
account. It is that the thoroughly behavioural content13 of the 
Quinian notion will ansura that our epiatemology remaina anewereble 
to the overarching demand that semantic content be exhaustively 
manife.t in practical u.e. Wa are Justified in attributing quality 
apacings only on the basis of gross behavioural evidenos, end what 
such spacings explain is our tandency to group together objacts and 
states of affairs in certain ways. The hypotheais that human baing. 
pos,ess a set of innate similarity spacings ia thus on a par with 
any similar hypotheeis made for some lower animal. Both are 
'condensed versions' of behavioural claims testable in the 
laboratory (see Quine (2) 123). As a characterisation of 
a priori knowledge then, quality spaces are an acceptable 
compromise between anti-realistio parsimony and the extended 
empiricism of an evolutionary epistemology. We could not, for 
example, simply claim that we had evolved an innate a priori 
capacity to grasp realistic truth-conditions in all cases, for 
the manifestation of this capacity in basic behavioural 
dispositions would support no such conclusion. (More on this 
in chapter 4 following.) 
It therefore seems both plausible and desirable to take on 
board the idea of shared quality spaces as an empirical sub-stratum 
to the anti-realist's idea of shared capacities of unmediated 
recognition. For by so doing we guarantee that candidates for 
the status of dir.ect recognitional abilities respect the demand 
of exhaustive manifestability. Quality spaces, moreover, are 
sufficiently economical to be biologically plausible. Any innats 
cognitive structures ought to be as austere in content as is 
compatible with their usefulness. First, because the less which 
is coded-in the better ~s regards cost-efficiency. Second, becausE. 
the more adaptable to variation in circumstancea the better, 
environment not being guaranteed stable. Quality spacss, for 
these reaaons, constitute an ideal form of innate knowledge. 
Cheap to .code in, adaptable in operation, minimal in content. 
A classic evolutionary sccount may be given of how we should 
come to operate with such speces. Innate quality spacas, .fter 
the fashion of Lorenz (1) would fall under the rubric of knowledge 
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which, though a priori in the individual, is a posteriori in 
the species - learnt by causal interaction with the world in the 
form of differential survival and reproduction. Which, as Quine 
himself notes (Quine (2) 126, 127),explains why our subjective 
spacing of qualities saems to 'match that of the cosmos'. It aleo 
explains why we find exceptiona to this 'matching', and cases 
where it has only very limited appropriateness. for our innate 
quality spaces are subject to the conetraints on appropriateness 
outlined in 2.5. In sum, our innate spacing of qualities is seen 
to provide an empirically acceptable source of knowledge, aubject 
to varioua provisoa, which is acquired by the ueual process of 
differential eurvival in relation to the biological usefulness 
or otherwise of particular tandancias to group objacta together 
according to intuitiona of relative similarity. 
In this chapter I have tried to show the important role 
played by unmadiatad recognitional capacities in an anti-realist 
account of meaning. Such capacities, implicitly manifest in our 
use of basic concepts, halt the regress of verbal Justifications 
of knowledge of meaning and explain how we can make empirical 
sense of the acquisition of language. Although no account of 
the nature and origins of such capacities is strictly reqUired 
by an anti-realist semantics, still claims involving such capacities 
are primarily epietemological one. and hence in principle answerable 
to epistemological discoveries. The special relevance of an 
evolutionary epistemology in such a oontext is that the best 
available explanation of the otherwise brute fact that auch capacities 
are ehared seems to be that they are grounded in heritable mechanisms 
of some kind. One suitable candidate to play the role of such 
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heritable 'mechanisms was seen to be the Quinian notion of an 
innate-(hence physically realised) spacing of qualities possessed 
a priori by the individual, though a posteriori to the species as 
a whole. 
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4. The Nature of the Impact. 
4.1 How are we to conceive the impact of adopting a naturalieed 
epistemological account of our shared capacities of unmediated 
recognition? In what followe I coneider two options. We may 
seek a diract modification of anti-realist claims in particular 
areae by suggesting expansions, within a scientific context, on 
the range of unmediated recognitional capacities we may be thought 
to possess. Or we may settle for a more indirect route which 
weighs the pre-suppositions and implications of the naturalised 
account of the possibility of shared recognitional capacities 
against the usual non-realistic and non-transcendent metaphysics 
of the anti-realist analysis. The direct route will bs seen to 
fail, although it yields some useful refinements to the anti-
realist's account of implicit knowledge. The indirect route 
proves to be a source of greater interest, not to say difficulty, 
and is pursued throughout the remainder of the thesis. 
4.2 The notion of unmediated recognition, we saw, is eseential 
to the anti-realist's empiricism concerning meaning. It is to be 
invoked in the necessary bedrock of cases whers the speaker can 
give'no informative account of even the anti-realistic truth-
conditions of a sentence but where he nonstheless exhibits a 
practical capacity to employ the sentence correctly. Recognition 
of this type is unmediated in the sense that; 
neither the speaker nor the meaning-theorist can say whereby 
he recognises the condition as obtaining. That which rsnder. 
the sentence true is the very thing of which we are directly 
aware when we recognise it a. being true. 
1L 449 ( • ! (1982) p.106). 
n -, 
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To say whereby a speaker recognises a condition as obtaining is 
not, then, a Job for the meaning-theorist. Rather, as Dummett 
goes on (in the same passage) to tell us, it is a job for tha 
epistemologist. It is the epistemologist, if anyone, who must 
explain the operation of euch faculties of unmediated recognition 
as we may poseees. 
It is tempting, therefore, to think that a sufficiently 
liberal epistemological stance, availing itself of all the 
resources of modern science and biology, might somehow shift 
the boundaries between realism and anti-realism by unveiling 
an increasing range of previously unsuspected direct recognitional 
capacities posseseed by human beings. And at first sight, some 
such opening does indeed look to exist. We read that: 
The theory of meening determines what makes a statement 
true, if it is true; it belongs to epistemology to Judge 
whether we are able to recognise what makes a statement 
true as obtaining, or whether we are able to establish 
the truth of the statement only indirectly. 
Such passagss are misleading. They seem to suggest not just 
that it is up to ths epistemologist to disclose how our capacities 
for unmediated recognition operats, but that it is also his job to 
decide when such capacities exist. If thie were so, then there 
would indeed exist at least a possible direct route from the 
adoption of a naturalised epistemology to a modification of 
anti-realist conclusions. for ths spistsmologist may (or so we 
might imagine) uncover direct recognitions 1 sccsss to the 
circumstances which constitute the reali.tic truth-conditione 
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of some disputed class of sentences thereby demonstrating that what 
had appeared on the surface to be a case of transcendent (hence 
anti-realistically unacceptable) 'meaning' is actually a grasp 
which in no way surpasses the limits of our recognitional capacities. 
In such cases peace raigns betwaen the two rival camps. Just ao 
long as we have direct recognitional access to the realist's 
truth-conditions the warring factions may agree on the form of 
a aemantic analysis for sentences of the given class. Realistic 
truth and recognisable truth are, in such cases, subatantially 
the same notion. 
The epistemologist, however, cannot simply announce that we 
possess a faculty for the direct recognition of the realiatic 
truth-conditions for statementa of soma disputed cla.s. He has to 
prove it. And this, I conJ.cture, will prove difficult if not 
impossible. The reason is that the anti-realist's claim that the 
realistic truth-conditions are (in at least soma cases) inaccessible, 
and hence semantically inert, is based on the over-arching demand 
of public manifastability of grasp of communicabla meaning (88e 1.2). 
It is this demand which determines if there is to be a gap between 
communicable meaning and our allaged grasp of realistic truth-
conditions. A naturalised epistemologist may discover that our 
semantic competenca, a. it stand., involv.a the operation of more 
cspacitiea of unmediated recognition than we had hitherto auapacted. 
But auch discoveries should only explain what is already manif.at 
in our practical use of statem~nts. Such discoveri.a will not 
reveal unexpected direct access to realistic truth-conditiona for 
atatement. of • given claae ainca J! auch accaaa axistad it would 
alraady ba avident in the public (not marely inferential) us. of 
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such statements, i.s. there would be no gap, in favourable 
circumstances, between our tendency to assert a statement of 
that claas and the obtaining of its realiatic truth-conditions. 
The quote from JL 446 above, then, is misleading rather than 
in error since it states that the meaning-theoriat has already 
eettled the matter of what can count as the semantically acceptable 
truth-conditions of a atatement. And what the epistemologist 
may do is tall us if ~ vary conditions are amenable to 
direct recognitional acceas or not. The quote misleads only if 
we take the phrase 'what makss a statement true' to refer to its 
realistic truth-conditions; a common freudian slip among anti-
realists, but one we should not attribute to Oummett. Understood 
as referring to its anti-realistically acceptable truth-conditions, 
however, we can aee that the divergence from realiam, if there is 
to be any, will have occurred before the epistemologist is called 
to the scene; it will have occurred-in the ieolation of acceptable 
truth-conditions on the basis of the demand of public manifestability. 
4.3 Two eKBmples may help to make this clsarer. The first is, 
if you will, a control model. It shows how the semantics and 
the epistemology ought to relate. Ths second is designed to test 
the hypothesis (rejected above) that the epistemologist might 
uncover unexpected direct recognitional accesa to the realistic 
truth-conditions of statements of a disputed type. Both example. 
revolve around the neglected notion of an Unconscious recognitional 
ability. 
Example one: This concerns the recognition of individuals. 
In particular, it concerns the theaia, recently expounded by 
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Viki ~cCabe, that such recognition proceeds by the unconscious 
perception of structural and transformational invariencea. We 
recogniss, to take an exampls, a given face de~ite various, 
often radical, componential variations caused by cosmetics, 
accidents, or ageing. Ons way of explaining this ability is 
to suppose that our recognition is tied not to the actuel 
components of ths face (nose, eyes etc.) so much as to the 
relations which these features bear to one another. Such relations 
are invariant over major componential changes. The supposition 
then is that the systematic relationships which exist among the 
components are 'directly available in the visual display as 
mathematical ratios'. If this is so, then it may be that in 
apprehending objects in the world we apprehend first and foremost 
in terme of the invariant structurea of such obJecta. There is a 
classical demonstration of this which is reproduced in figure one 
below. We take ~ face and maintain the relational invariances 
which it exhibits whilst changing the features. It is still 
recognisable aa a face. But if instead we were to alter the 
relational invar~ants and .maintain~he· features it would 'collapse 
into a partially random aggregate' • 
• ___ •• 0. __ .' ....... ___ • __ ••••• _ •• _ .... _ ... 
0·· 0++ ., 
A • 
r!.1. C ...... betwh. chanpn, the c:omponents and c:hanpn, the IChema fIl a 
Ie 
(Reproduced from ~cC.b. p.496.) 
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Transformational invariance is just a dynamic analogue of 
structural invariance as described above. Suppose we take an 
individual (call her Mary) and ask ourselves how we are able to 
recognise Mary over the years. Part of the answer may be that 
as suggested above we are seneitive to the structural invariances 
she exhibits; 
Mary is constituted of a unique invariant structure which 
maintains its proportional ratios over most componential 
changes. 
~cCabe 500. 
Such an anewer is not, however, entirely adequate. To attain 
the proper generality of scope we need in addition the idea of 
transformational invariance. That is: 
If she loses a limb or becomes pregnant she is .till 
recognisable because her structurally inveriant properties 
are available under a set of acceptable transformations. 
~cCabe 500. 
Clearly, we are not conscious of operating with such 
mathematical ratios in our daily life. If I recognise an old 
friend after a protracted absence I am hardly aware of my 
proceeeing a number of acceptable transformations to identify 
the invariant structure which is unique to her. Why then should 
we suppose ourselves actually to employ such methods? It turns out 
that the supposition has value in the explanation of a numbsr of 
experimental results. These are exhaustively detailed in ~cCabe 
14 15 
and concern experiments conducted with birds, human infanta 
and human adults.16 
A9suming then that we !£! directly aware, in at least some 
cases, of the schematic structure of our world, the question 
arises why such awareness is (as it seems to be) unconscious? 
~cCabe ventures the following hypothesis, which accords with our 
evolutionary perspective on cognition. The unconscious nature 
of our apprehension of such atructures, she thinks, may be due 
to such apprehension being a task performed by the right 
hemiaphere of the human brain. Experimental evidence is again 
cited to suggest that information processed by that hemisphere 
is less readily available for linguistic expression and 
consequently harder to bring to conscious awareness. 17CertainlY 
there ia a large weight of evidence to suggest that the 
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apprehension of f.ces ia a task performed by the right hemisphere. 
And demage to the left hemiephere is far more likely to cauae 
linguistic difficulties than damage to the right. These 
differences between the activities of the two hemispheres may 
be explained as arising from the order of their evolutionary 
emergence. The right hemisphere is the more primitive of the 
two; similar structures appear in our non-human predecessors. 
The left hemisphere, the seat of our conscious cognitive faculties, 
has no counterpart in such predecessors. Unconscious recognitional 
abilities, if they do exist, may therefore plausibly be aeen .s 
mechanisms encoding basic survival techniques (e.g. for identifying 
a mate, ~r a predator), utilised by non-language using species 
and preserved in humans in the non-linguistic hemisphere of the 
brain. 
It seems, then, that the naturalised or evolutionary 
fU 
epistemologist has good reason to countenance unconscious 
sensitivity to sensory inputs as potentiHlly involved in some 
of our direct recognitional skills. 19 What example one shows, 
however, is that the operation of such unconscious sensitivity 
falls easily within the scope of the existing anti-realist 
attitude towards implicit knowledge and the recognition of 
lbjPcts (viz. individuals). tor the meaning-theorist, we are 
told, must not ask 'how or by what the object is recognised' 
since 'even if thl're is an answer the subject does not have to 
know it'. (FD in TO 129.) Unconscious recognitional abilities, 
as they function in this example, cause not even a minor ripple 
on the anti-realist's pond. The task of the epistemologist here 
is simply one of tidying up; of showing how the recognitional 
capacity which we knew we possessed actually operated. 
Example two: In this example I try, by drawing on the ideas 
developed in the previous case, to construct a situation with 
radical semantic consequences. The attempt fails, but does suggest 
a minor refinement to the notion of implicit knowledge. 
Suppose it were shown that human beings, when in pain, secrete 
through their apocrine glands some characteristic pheromone or 
ectohormone which is sub-consciously detectable, in favourable 
circumatances, by other human beings. Suppose, that ia, that we 
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can, without knowing it, smell when someone near us is in pain. 
Suppose elso, as seems very likely, that the emission of such a 
pheromone wes an event quite insusceptible of intentional control. 
In such circumstances we would have a case importantly different 
from that detailed previously. For recall the notion of an 
unconscious sensitivity to structural invariance. This unconscious 
sensitivity had a dirFct conscious rl)rrGlace viz. nur ordinary 
capacity to describe or draw a human face by the reproduction of 
features suitably arranged. This conscious capacity, as Neil 
Tennant has pointed out to me, recapitulates (without our knowing 
it) the information on which W9 base our assertions of the form 
'That is myoId friend Dave' etc. for this ~eason, in case one, 
the unconscious recognitional capacity warranting our assertions 
had a conscious correlate of identical semantic significance. 
Perhaps this is not the case in thE example of pain. For the 
conscious correlate of a sensitivity to pheromonal emissions 
could only be an awareness of pain behaviour. Behaviour which is, 
notoriously, under intentional control. Because the conscious 
correlate is, in this case, under such intentional control, it 
follows that shamming and stoicism are possible for us. The 
anti-realist, then, taking into account only the consciously 
available public evidence of another's being in pain (viz. pain 
behaviour; wincing, screaming etc.) must conclude that the sense of 
other-attributions of pain is to be dislocated from the realist's 
conception of the truth-conditions for such statements. for the 
realist conceives the truth-conditions as simply that it should 
be with a person f as it is with me when I am in pain (p in lQ 
xxxii ) i.e. as relating essentially to an inner state of being 
in pain. Given the options of ehamming and stoicism, however, it 
follows that this latter notion of the truth of 'f is in pain' could 
apply even in the absence of any consciously available evidence for 
the assertion that f is in pain. Or, conversely, if f is shamming, 
warrant for the assertion may be had evan though its realistic 
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truth-conditions are unsatisfied. The anti-realist therefore 
concludes that the realist's notion of trut~-conditions is 
semantically inert as regards other-ascriptions of pain. He then 
proposes to replace it with a notion of truth-conditions such 
that: 
the supposedly contingent connections with pain stimuli 
and pain behaviour are in fact essential to the employment 
of the word. 
P in TO xxxvi. 
Meaning and employment being inseparable from the point of view 
of a theory of understanding, the anti-realist therefore takes 
it as belonging to the meaning of other-ascriptions of pain that 
our grounds for asserting them in any particular case are always 
inconclusive. Consequently he must reject the suggestion that 
our grasp of the meaning of e.g. Ir is in painl is dependent on 
our grasp of bivalence as applied to such statements. Our grasp 
of such statements does not flow from our grasp of the idea that 
for anyone F sither it is or is not with r now as it is with me 
when I am in pain. To think it does is to misconstrue the deep 
grammar of other-ascriptions of pain. Once that error is avoided, 
however, no temptation remains to accept any notion of truth for 
such statements involving their having determinate realistic 
truth-conditions irrespective of our capacity to know them. For to 
do so is to separate our notion of the truth of such statements 
from our notion of their meaning. 
Is this situation altered if we now credit the anti-realist 
(courtesy of the naturalised epistemologist) with information 
concerning an unconscious sensitivity to pain pheromones? No. 
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For the fact remains that, whether we are thus sensitive or not, 
shamming and stoicism can fool us. And our semantic characterisation 
of other-ascriptions of pain ought to reflect this fact. Given 
this brute fact of human practice we cannot be justified in 
assimilating any direct access to pain-pheromone emission we 
may possess to a notion of direct access to the realistic 
truth-conditions of other-ascriptions of pain. So we cannot be 
held to understand fully the realist's notion of truth for such 
statements, and the rejection of bivalence stands. 
In fact, to make the pheromone hypothesis get anywhere close 
to a vindication of realist intuitions we have to add a revealing 
proviso. We must add that our sensitivity to pain-pheromone 
emiseion is such that under favourable circumstances (the person 
is near us, no masking odours ara prasant, we are both biologically 
normal) no mistake is possible in our assessment of whether another 
is in pain. Given this we might hold that the gap between the 
realistls notion of truth fer ether-ascriptions of pain and the 
anti-realist's insistence that that notion cannot exceed the bounds 
of accessible circumstances is closed by a direct causal link. 
Te be in pain would (in principle at least) be to be recognisably 
in pain, and so the flaga of truce might be raised. ror there is, 
we saw, no active dispute so long as the realistic truth-conditions 
of an assertion are in some way accessible by the exercise of a 
direct recognitional capacity. If, as in the present case, access 
is only to some criteria for the obtaining of tha realistic 
truth-conditions, the question devolves upon the nature of the 
relation between such criteria and the obtaining of the circumstances 
in question (i.e. rls being in pain). Since this relation is causal, 
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and not subject to intentional control, it presen;::s the semantic 
properties of direct access to the realistic truth-conditions 
themselves (i.e. it lacks the inconclusiveness, even in the most 
favourable conditions, which affects accounts of meaning given by 
reference to pain-behaviour alone). 
In the case above the epistemological question of how our 
recognition proceeds has semantic significance. It might incline 
us to retain the realist's acceptance of bivalence for other-· 
ascriptions of pain while still analysing the meaning of such 
statements as relating to recognisable circumstances21 • But such 
a case is never likely to arise. for if we had that kind of 
faultless sensitivity to pain-pheromone emission then our concept 
of pain in others would be a different concept to what it is. 
There WOUld, for example, be no such thing as shamming or stoicism 
under favourable circumstances. And so the public manifestation 
of our grasp of statements such as 'f is in pain', being generally 
faultless, would have alerted us in advance to the operation of 
some d'irect recognitional capacity albeit of a modally unspecified 
nature. The job of the naturalised epistemologist, as in example 
one, would be one of tidying up; of showing how we are able to 
perform those feats of direct recognition which are already manifest 
in our use of language. 
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4.4 Consideration of the cwo examples suggests one refinement 
of the anti-realist's analysis, and two lessons. The refinement 
is needed to allow for the kind of case in which epistemological 
findings disclose not an unexpected recognitional ability so much 
as an unexpected recognitional modality such as the unconscious 
perception of pheromones. In the \ight of this we should add to 
the anti-realist's characterisation of implicit knowledge that 
the speaker and m8aning-theo~ist need not even be aware of the 
modality of the direct recognitional capacity manifest in a 
given use, let alone have any idea of the particular criteria 
on which it fixes. Thus in the example of face recognition we 
knew the modality (visual) involved but lacked awareness of the 
particular criteria, viz.structural and transformational invariance, 
on which it was focused. While 1n the example concerning pheromone 
emission and reception we were not even aware of the modality which 
might playa part in our grasp of pain in others. This brings us 
to the first lesson to be drawn from all this. It is that the 
demands of acquisition and manifestation must indeed (1.4) be 
relativised to a specifically human community if the epistemologist 
and the semantic theorist are to stand in their customary relation. 
(Other possibilities will be explored in Part II.) for it is only 
because we are all human and may be presumed to share whatever 
capacities of unmediated recognition we have that grasp of meaning 
mey be taught. learnt and generally communicated in,full ignorance 
of any conception of the particular criteria and modalities involved 
in the warranted assertion of basic jUdgments. A grasp of meaning 
may be acquired by teaching it in whatever circumstances the 
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language-master considers to be appropriate; he need not know 
why they are appropriate. The student will learn the meaning 
because he too is sensitive, whether he knows it or not, to 
just those circumstances capable of impinging on his teacher. 
This is so, at least, in the normal case. Where someone involved 
lacks a sensitivity the other possesses complications arise. (See 
Part II chapt.9). But ~ shared sensitivity is probably 
essential to any learning of language at all. We thus arrive 
at a proviso to the manifestation thesis itself. The proviso 
is that meaning,though it must be manifest in relation to 
circumstances accessible (consciously or otherwise) to the 
community at large,need not be unconditionally manifest in the 
sense of being manifest tout court, without reletivisation to 
the particular sensitivities of the epistemic community. 
Unconditional manifestation~ on examination, is quite probably 
an unintelligible demand. But the observation that the demand of 
publicity of meaning must refer to publicity within a strictly 
~ community has important consequences when considering <as 
we shall) alternative languages based on alternative sensitivities. 
The second lesson concerns the effective nature of the 
relation between the meaning-theorist and the epistemologist. 
Thus we may ask who has priority in assessing the legitimacy 
of some claim to unmedisted recognition of the realistic 
truth-conditions of aome disputed statements. As long aa we 
are concerned only with the assessment of such claims made within 
and concerning our human community, an answer is now indicated 
in favour of the meaning-theorist. for as we saw, the question 
what are the intelligible tDUth-conditiona of 5 is settled by 
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the application of the demand of manifestation alone. It is 
only relative to tha anti-realistically acceptable truth-
conditions of 5 (i.e. those visibly accessible in our use of 5) 
that the epistemologist is called on to decide if such conditions 
are directly recognisable or not; and so far as the realist is 
concerned this is already too late, for it is only if the 
realistic truth-conditions prove directly accessible that the 
dispute dissolves. 
One implication of this is that one picture of a possible 
dialectic between the realist and the anti-realist now looks 
to be an unlikely option, at least within and concerning the 
human community itself (though it may stand in regard to our 
assessment of the capacities of a non-human community - see 
chapter 9). For the picture suggests a dialectic in which: 
The realist formulates his conception of what the 
truth-conditions of the given sentences consist in; 
the anti-realist protests that on that conception the 
truth-conditions would objectionably transcend our 
faculties; the realist replies by disputing the assumptions 
about our faculties which underlie the anti-realist'e 
protests thus (as he hopes) restoring their accessibility. 
~cGinn (1) 166. 
Such a dialectic involves exactly the strategy employed in ralation 
to example two above. It is a strategy which has also been employed 
by ~cOowell in arguments concerning pain, the past and other minds. 
(l'IcOowell (2) p.131.). That dialectic, however, could only occur 
if the epistemologist discovered we had unexpected access to the 
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realistic truth-conditions of s disputed statement themselves. 
But this supposition, though not unintelligible, seems extremely 
unlikely insofar as if we had such access, then we might expect 
that it would make itself felt in our use of the concept in 
question - e.g. there would, in the case of pain, be no practical 
gap between our being in pain and our being recognisably in pain 
(whether or not we are aware of how our knowledge is achieved). 
If, as seems more likely, the epistemologist uncovers instead 
some unexpected additional criteria by which we do in fact judge, 
e.g. whether someone is in pain, then a gap will still be felt 
between our capacity to recognise the satisfaction of this 
criterion and the obtaining of the realist's truth-conditions. 
The anti-realist will thus still insist that no such gap can be 
tolerated insofar as the realist's truth-conditions are alleged 
to be a component in an account of the meaning of such statements, 
since the gap is offensive to the intimacy of meaning and 
communicable understanding. 
We may sum up by reflecting that the true form of the 
anti-realist's protest, despite its misleading appearance as a 
point about the actual dstails of our methods of acquisition of 
concapts, is rather that the realist's alleged conception of the 
truth-conditions of the disputed statement is one which is in no 
practical way manifest in our use of the statement in question. 
~, it becomes uncleer how we could have acquired it. We were 
therefore correct in our earlier presentation of the acquisition 
argument ee being transcendental in its force (2.2 above); not 
that is, concerned with how as a matter of fact we acquire the 
conceptions expressed in our language but rather with what those 
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conceptions can involve if we are to make sense of our having 
them at" all. 
It is for this reason that the acquisition argument is best 
seen as a facet of the logical demand of manifestability and not 
as an example of armchair learning theory. This, at bottom, is 
why the naturalised attempt to go direct to modifications in the 
details of the anti-realist critique fails. For any claim to 
possess extended recognitional capacities can be legitimate only 
insofar as those capacities are manifest in our practical use of 
statements in whose meaning they are meant to figure; but being 
so manifest they would, in every semantically significant sense, 
figure already in the anti-realist1s account. 
4.5 The direct route, it seems, is a dead end. rt leads to no 
significant alteratione regarding either the form or implications 
of an anti-realist semantics. Nor should this surprise us, for the 
heart of the anti-realist1s position involves logical arguments 
against the suitability of a transcendent notion of truth as a 
component in a theory of meaning; and its major conclusions involve 
a revieion of our attitude to logically undecidable sentances. 
Arguments appropriate to these realms, it ie clear, are likely to 
be singularly unaffected by the kind of scientific disclosures 
introduced by the adoption of a naturalised epistemology. from 
these purely logical considerations, however, the anti-realist hes 
traditionally been led to suggest revisions in what might best be 
described as our metaphysicsl picture of the world. Revisions, for 
example, in the idea that 'we really do succeed in referring to 
externs1 objects existing independently of our knowledge of them'.(rf 446: 
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It is relative to these metaphysical impli~ations that the 
impact of a naturalised epistemology needs to be most carefully 
assessed. It is in this connection that we should consider the 
possibility of an indirect route leading from the endorsement 
of a naturalised epistemology to significant alterations in the 
anti-realist metaphysics. 
We saw in chapter 3 that the notion of shared capacities of 
unmediated recognition is essential to the anti-realist analysis. 
After the pattern of the later Wittgenstein, the anti-realist 
holds that it is a pre-condition of the communicative use of 
language that we be able to agree in the making of certain very 
basic judgments. (Wittgenstein (1) 241,142, pp 226-7. Also, for 
example, Quine (2) 123, Wright (3) 30.) Such judgments would 
be those into our undsrstanding of which no process of conscious 
inference or reflection enters; for example, the judgment, under 
favourable conditions, that an object is blue. Where Wittgenstein 
talks of agreemsnts in judgments, than, the anti-realist might 
talk of agreements in the application of statements involving 
capscities of unmedisted recognition. (It always takes the 
anti-realist longer to say things.) Such statements also mark 
the point at which the threataned regress of verbal justifications 
of grasp of meanings is seen to dissolve (see 1.2). Without the 
notion of an unmediated recognitionsl ability the anti-realist 
account would COllapse. But with it, given the presence of a 
naturalised epistemologicel component, it cannot sustain the 
radically non-realistic metaphysiCS to which it i8 accustomed. 
To argue thus is to follow what I have termed the indirect route. 
It attacks traditional anti-realist metaphysics on tha basis of 
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a generally naturalised (evolutionary) view of the genesis and 
nature of shared capacities of unmediated recognitiJn themselves. 
For recall now the traditional form of an anti-realist metaphysics. 
We are to impose a total ban on all transcendent concepts and, for 
reasons to be explored shortly, to refuse to endorse any pictUre 
of reality as truly objective and standing independently of our 
ways of knowing about it. (Thus see e.g. IF p.446 and recall the 
metaphysical interpretation of the semantic claims noted in 1.3 
above.) What can we make of such a grim picture if we seek to 
give an evolutionary account of how we came to share the capacities 
of unmediated recognition essential to the anti-realist's account? 
Clearly, we cannot tolerate the complete loes of our external, 
mind-independent reality. For on any evolutionary account the 
world (in some sense of 'the world') must be seen as objective and 
separate; a mind-producing, not a mind-produced, realm. Moreover, 
to adopt an evolutionary perspective on cognition is to court 
problematic claims of ontological and phenomenal transcendence. 
An evolutionary epistemology, we saw, lends support to the 
anti-realist's intuitions concerning publicity and the role of 
language as a pragmatic instrument of communication. But it ~ 
hints at dimensions of transcendence which threaten to be 
anti-realistically problematic. On the evolutionary model, our 
basic apprehensions of reality look likely to be imperfect and 
biased by our psrticular needs. Much of what we believe, being 
grounded in such basic capacities, may be only partially true. 
The universe may transcend the, limits of human capacities to know 
it. What's more, other beings with other needs, environments and 
evolutionary histories may enjoy direct (unmadiatad) access to 
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realms of experience we do not have. The knowledge expressed 
in their basic judgments may therefore transcend our capacities 
to understand it. In short, the evolutionary perspective seems to 
suggest a completely realistic metaphysics, whereas anti-realism 
has traditionally been associated with idealist tendencies. 
Perhaps this traditional association is simply misplaced. 
Perhaps the anti-realist is wrong to believe in the thesis of 
metaphysical reduction (the claim that all metaphysical pictures 
reduce to semantic points) attributed to Dummett in 1.3, wrong to 
think that his semantics in any way demands the radical metaphysical 
pictures with which it is customarily associated? Should not 
metaphyaics be rather a function of our chosen epistemology and 
not of our semantics? 
4.6 Alas, things are not so simple. for the theory of meaning 
delimits, on logical grounds, the range of statements for which 
we can have a proper gresp of the concept of truth, and hence for 
which we have a full and "intelligible idea of their meaning. It 
follows that what the epistemologist can properly sax must answer, 
in some way, to the meaning-theorist's demands. This is a point 
which eludes, for example, ~.Devitt in hie recently presented 
argument against "the identification of the realism dispute 
(concerning physical objects) with the semantic dispute (concerning 
grasp of meaning). By realism, Devitt understands the view that 
phYSical objects enjoy an objective, mind-independent existence. 
By Realist Truth he understande the assertion that statements 
have realist truth-conditions. He then writes: 
Does realist truth entail realism? It does not. Realism ••• 
requires the objectiva, independant existence of common-senae 
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physical entities. Realist truth concerns physical 
statements and has no such requirement. 
Devitt 77. 
Devitt thus asserts that one searches in vain for any 
relation of dependence between the ontological and the semantic 
issue. One concerns statements, the other entities: a weak link 
may be discernible in terms of a relation of inference to the 
best explanation but that is all (Devitt 77, 78). 
Throughout this conceptual separation of semantics and 
ontology Devitt misses one vital observation. It is that a theory 
of the world if it is to be a communicable theory must be stated 
in a language. Consequently any constraints imposed by an . 
acceptable semantic theory upon the possible content of linguistic 
assertions are, ipso facto, constraints upon the range of possible 
theories of the world. The bearing of semantic anti-realism upon 
the matter of ontological realism is thus more indirect than 
Devitt, at least, thinks that anti-realists intend it to be. 
But it is, by the same token, a bearing unaffected by the (doubtless 
valid) observation that 'theories of language and understanding 
ehould not determine theories of the world'. (Devitt 75). An anti-
realist theory of language, on the present account, does not 
indeed determine any theory of the world. What it does do, however, 
is to delimit the range of alternative theories of the world deemed 
intelligible enough to be candidates for adoption. The threat,then, 
is not that the semantic anti-realist analysis should constitute an 
explicit denial of Ontological Realism, but rather that given the 
semantic doctrine, the actual content of the assertion of ontological 
realism looks open to question. Perhapa than, wa may taks Dummattts 
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insistence on the logical priority of semantics (CA in lQ 441, 
IF 62,-69) as just the legitimate observation that only 
intelligible theories of the world count as lsal options. 
The relevance of a semantic anti-realism, in this latter 
sense, to theories of the world, is quite untouched by Devittts 
demonstration (assertion?) of the independence of their 
respective subject matter. The nature of language may not 
constrain the nature of reality but it certainly constrains 
the nature of human thought about reality. Here, surely, is the 
truth behind the metaphor thesis (tMetaphysics beyond msaning 
ie mere metaphor I Devitt SO) which Devitt finds so objectionable 
in the works of Oummett. I suspect, however, that Dummett does, 
as Devitt suspects,have some sympathy for the stronger thesis 
that the entire contsnt of a metaphysical theory is that of a 
claim about meaning. Thia is what I earlier termed the thesis 
of metaphysical reductionism (1.3 p.18). If so, I believe he is 
mistakan. And I believe that an examination of the claims of 
evolutionary epietamology will show this. 
In contrast to both Devitt and (probably) Dummett, thsn, 
I want to claim that our metaphysics should be determined by the 
interplay between what we know of the nature pf meaning on the 
ana hand and what we know of tha nature of the physical conditione 
which aet the limits to the range of our meanings (i.e. the 
conditions which determine the extent of our recognitional 
capacitias) on the other. MetaphYSics, I want to say, should be 
a Joint function of semantics and epistemology. Confusion results 
from the unfortunete fact that the historical order of events is 
not like this at all. Historically, I think it is fair to ssy, 
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we ~ with our metaphysical pictures of reality, seek a . 
semantics which can accommodate them and then build an epistemology 
to make sense of the semantics. Dummett is surely right to combat 
this by asserting the priority of semantics over metaphysics; but 
wrong to do so without taking account of the best epistemological 
account of general cognition we have available. What we must do, 
then, is to weigh the idea that the pre-suppositions and 
consequences of that account (i.e. of evolutionary epistemology) 
simply carryover into the metaphysics appropriate to an anti-realist 
semantics against the demand that such pre-suppositions and 
consequences be intelligible in the light of • semantics which 
associates meaning with recognisable conditions of assertion. 
It would be odd indeed if they proved unintelligible under such 
an analysis since the anti-realist stance can, we saw, be seen as 
flowing from a naturalised view of mind (2.3 preceding). But, as 
Skorupski (2) has pointed out, such a situation is not impossible; 
it would show only that naturaliam ia in some sense self-defeating 
as a philosophy of mind, since it may lead to a kind of idealism 
concerning the physical world. Such drastic repercussions, I hope 
to show, may be avoided by • careful analysis of the interplay 
between the semantic and epistemological components and some 
close attention to the logical form of the evolutionary theorist'a 
assertions. 
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5. Tension among the allies. 
5.1 An evolutionary epistemology was seen both to corroborate 
and supplement an anti-realist view of language. It corroborates 
it by demonstrating the scientific plausibility of treating 
language as in essence an instrument of communication whose 
purpose it is to affect action. And it supplements it by 
suggesting heritable innate mechanisms, geared to human needs 
and saliences, as an empirical sub-stratum to the functional 
notion of shared recognitional capacities. Any such naturalised 
epistemological account threatens, however, to import realistic 
elements into the anti-realist's metaphysical picture of reality. 
This indirect effect of the adoption of a naturalised epistemology 
may well be thought desirable. It is an important question, however, 
whether or not such realistic elements can be intelligible to the 
anti-realist. For supposing them to be unintelligible, and supposing 
them ala a to be necessary conditions of an evolutionary account at 
all, then it would follow that the anti-realist cannot consistently 
help himself to the image of man and mind developed by the 
evolutionary theorist. The corroborative and explanatory attractions 
of an evolutionary epistemology, if this were the caee, would be 
neither here nor there. In investigating this issue our task is 
by no means as negative as it may therefore sound. For to ahow 
the consietency of an anti-realist semantics with a partially 
realistic epistamology would be to allow the anti-realist to enjoy 
some of ths metaphysical opulence which hitherto has been the sole 
prerogative of the semantic realist. We begin, though, by enquiring 
just how the anti-realist regime acquirad its reputation for 
metaphysical austerity in the first place. 
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5.2 The anti-realist analysis, I have claimed, appears to heve 
radical consequences for our metaphysical picture of reality. 
Just what can this mean? The notion of a metaphysical picture 
of reality is not an easy one. Dummett offers the definition of 
metaphysics as 
that branch of philosophy which is concerned with the most 
general features of reality, that is, of the world as it is 
in itself rather than with our knowledge of or relation to 
the world. 
]I 428. 
If ~ is what we mean by metaphysics then the radical 
implication of the anti-realist analysis is that there can be no 
such thing as metaphysics at all! for the picture of intelligible 
reality as independent, external and determinate, as, in effect, a 
world-in-itself. is precisely what the anti-realist account seems 
to ruls out. We may, however, be a little more liberal and define 
metaphysics as concerning our best general picture of the nature, 
constitution and scope of reality. In which case,the non-evolutionary 
anti-realist ~ have a metaphysics, only it is a very odd one. 
One in which the nature and constitution of rsality is actively 
determined by human investigative potential and in which the scope 
of reality cannot exceed the scope of man. At any rate, whether we 
call this position one of radical metaphysics or one which is radical 
because it is anti-metaphysics is unimportant. What is important, 
however, is how the anti-realist gets there. 
The route, in fact, is quite e simple one. Idealism seems to 
issue almoat directly from the anti-realist's ban on transcendent 
concepts. A transcendent concept is one whoss truth conditiona 
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are meant to be such that they might obtain in full independence 
of our .capacity, even in principle, to recognise them as so doing. 
The anti-realist, we have seen, identifies meaning with communicable 
understanding. And as an empiricist he identifies communicable 
understanding with understanding which can be displayed without 
residue in use. Where the truth-conditions of a sentence appear 
such that were they realised we would be unable to know it, there 
can be nothing in our displayed understanding which suggests that we 
associate the meaning of such a sentence with such truth-conditions. 
If we understand them at all, then our understanding must proceed 
from our grasp of something much weaker than the classical 
truth-conditions viz. assertability-conditions. At the end of this 
process of erosion we have no notion of truth for statements 
independent of our capacity to recognise truth. Can we therefore 
have any notion of an independent and external reality or have we 
already placed the fatal foot on the slippery slope to idealism? 
In giving up semantic realism we give up the idea that an 
external and independent reality may make our sentences ~ 
irrespective of our capacity, even in principle, to recognise them 
as true. We thue give up all hope of the straightforward route to 
ontological realism which says that our grasp of ontological realism 
consists in our grasp of the notion of realist truth as ,applying to 
the statement. of our common language. Our concarn now is whather 
that is the only way to make sense of the idea of an external and 
independent reality or whether there may yet be some other routa 
available to the anti-realist also. If not, then as Crispin Wright 
points out: 
the anti-realist must, it appears, be committed to some 
A.J.Clark 95 
version of the claim that human thought and cognition 
constitute the world. And what is idealism but that? 
Crispin Wright (2) p.13. 
Philosophers such as Wright believe, then, that there is a 
clear and apparently non-optional progression from anti-realism 
concerning meaning to idealism concerning reality; hence the 
metaphysical austerity alluded to earlier - the limits of the world 
.are the limits of our knowledge. If we are to assess this alleged 
progression we must try to make it precise. Let us begin with a 
preliminary definition of realism. 
Dummett suggests that: 
The primary tenet of realism, ss applied to some given 
class of statements, is that each statement in the class 
is determined 8S true or not true, independently of our 
knowledge, by some objective reality whose existence and 
• 
constitution is, again, independent of our knowledge. 
1E 434. 
Our question, in effect, is whether someone might consistently 
endorse the latter part of this formulation (the 'objective 
reality 
, 
independent of our knowledge) without baing a a.mantic 
realist about the notion of truth applicable to our claime concerning 
that reality i.e. without accepting the former part concerning 
realist truth. For euch appeara precisely to be the position of 
the evolutionary epistemologist who supports anti-reelism concsrning 
meaning within a framework which depends crucially'upon the notion 
of an objective, independent mind-producing reality. Such a p08ition, 
if the progreSSion spoken of above is correct, muat be incoherent. 
How i8 the progression (anti-realism to idealism) supposed to run? 
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One plausible thought, due to Rasmussen and Ravenkilde, is that 
the progression turns crucially on the anti-realist's revisionary 
stance concerning classical logic. ~ the rejection of classical 
logic, they say, then the slide to idealism is inevitable. Thus, they 
say, suppose someone sought to occupy the position of 'eclectic 
theorist' combining anti-realism and ontological realism. What 
could be the intelligible content of his claim that the world was 
mind-independent? Well, we saw earlier that the ban on transcendent 
concepts issued in the identity of truth with recognisable truth. 
Given this, would not the eclectic theorist need to assert 
that tha mind-independent segments of the world are such as 
not to make any of our daclarative sentences describing those 
segments either true or false. 
Rasmussen and Ravnkilde (1) 380. 
And what, thay ask, can be the intelligible content of this? 
Nona, it aeems, in the absence of classical logic. for given a 
constructive interpretation of the existential quantifier we could 
not aasert aven the existence of a.pects of reality resistant to 
demonstration in language by the production of inetancea. Only in 
the context of a classical logic, they argue, can the conjunction 
of anti-realist semantics and ontological realism be intelligible, 
for only in that context can we quantify over aspecta of reality 
without the obligation to provide instancea. They are thus persuaded 
that: 
If endorsement of CL (classical logic) entails acceptance 
of semantic realism then anti-realism entaila idealiem. 
Rasmussen and Ravnkilda (1) 380. 
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It would not be a caricature of this line of argument to 
reformulate it as follows. Independent reality, (they claim), 
is, for the anti-realist necessarily ineffable. But the claim 
that there is some ineffable reality is senseless in the absence 
of classical logic. For on a constructive interpretation of 
(~)() nothing can be claimed to exist if it is not demonstrable. 
And what is ineffable is, naturally, not demonstrable. So the 
revisionary anti-realist cannot be an ontological realist also. 
The tsrm Ontological Realism as it functions in this argument 
covers two distinct cases which are worth eeparating. On the one 
hand it seems to mean (What we ordinarily take it to mean) the claim 
that the objects picked out and spoken of in human discourse 
concerning the physical world enjoy a mind-independent existence. 
On the other hand it alao covers the case where the mind-independent 
sspects of reality are held to be ineffable and precisaly ~ those 
aspects spoksn of in ordinary discourse. Rasmusssn and Ravnkilde 
use a vague formulation which seems to cover both cases. Ontological 
realism, for them, is the claim that our sentences 
~~ an objective or mind-independent reality, a reality, 
that is, that exists irrespective of any capacity on our part 
to attain knowledge about it. 
Rasmussen and Ravnkilde p.379 (my emphasis) 
But the term 'deal with' seems too broad; it leaves open whethar the 
mind-independent reality is to be that spoken of in our sentencea or 
whether it is some hidden noumenal realm which our lentences may help 
us to cope with, but do not properly describe. To clarify mattera, 
then, let us mean by ontological realism the usual claim about the 
mind-independence of the objects of ordinary discourse. And lat us 
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introduce a new term Material Realism, to capture the more 
minima! claim that there !! s.ome mind-independent reali ty even 
if it is not that reality (or those aspects of reality) about 
which we speak. 
Rasmussen and Ravnkildets point may now be put like this. 
The claim of ontological realism must, they think, be an empty 
one in the mouth of the anti-realist. For regarding those aspects 
of reality about which we actually speak, the anti-realist must 
repudiate any notion of truth which extends beyond human access 
to conditions of truth. The ontological realist's claim of 
mind-independence then is just a form of words which can mark 
no real disagreement with the idealist who thinks the world is 
constituted by human activity. The independent-world anti-realist 
must therefore suggest that the mind-independent aspects of reality 
are nEi those dealt with in our sentences. He is therefore a 
material, not an ontological, realist in our new terms. But 
material realism, they claim, is unwarrantable in ths presence 
of • constructive interpretation of the existential quantifier. 
So without classical logic, anti-realism implies idealism. 
The argument for a radical metaphysics, as developed by 
Rasmussen and Ravnkilde, therefore has something like the 
following form: 
(1) Assertion condition semantics 
.J, 
(2) Emptiness of claim of Ontological Realism (from 1) 
..J., 
(3) Constructive account of existential quantification (from 1) 
J, 
of claim of Material Realism (from 3) (4) Emptiness 
(5) Idealism (from ~ and 4). 
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Such an argument might be attacked in various ways. We 
might deny that (1) implies (3), or that the diSjunction 
of (2) and (4) exhaust the ways of giving content to the denial 
of idealism, or we might attack the derivation of (2) from (1). 
I shall suggest, however, that recourse to an evolutionary 
epistemology#even if we accept assertions (1), (2) and (3), 
enables us to block effectively the derivation (4) from (3) 
and hence to halt the progression to idealism. 
The intuitive core of the idealist tendency may thus be 
traced quite directly to the anti-realist's ban on transcendent 
concepts. We can have no idea of truth for our statements which 
is not linked to our capacities to investigate their truth,hence: 
The committed anti-realist may, in apparent consistency, 
claim to believe that the world, conceived as a totality 
of objects, exists independently of his investigations of 
it; but ha may not conceive of his statements concerning 
thoee objecte as investigation independent, and it is 
unclear in consequence what serious content attaches to 
his professed belief in the autonomy of the objects 
themselves. 
Crispin Wright (2) p.14. 
ThiS, then, is to be the locus of our problem; how can the 
anti-realist donate distinctive content to any evolutionary 
belief in mind-independent reality when all intelligible claims 
made in language must (on his analysis) fall within the scope 
of human investigations? ror unlike the semantic realist 
the anti-realist cannot seek distinctive content in the claim 
that our statements about the world are determinately true or 
falee in complete independence of any human capacities to 
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determi~e them as such. But what content, failing that, could 
the required belief in mind-independent reality have? 
5.3 A question which needs to be pressed is just what ~ of 
'belief in mind-independent reality' is required by the 
evolutionary epistemologist (and hence by the would-be evolutionary 
anti-realist). It is, as we have said, a pre-condition of an 
evolutionary account of mind and language that we conceive of the 
world (the mind-producing system) as ontologically prior to, and 
independent of, the activities of the minds it throws up. But it 
does not follow that the mind-producing system must be thought of 
as our everyday world, the world of coloured macroscopic solid 
objects. Indeed the evolutionary epistemologist, as we shall see, 
is a phenomenal relativist who has cause to deny any such unique 
identification. 
It is not the phsnomenal world which the evolutionary 
epistemologist must take as mind-independent but the world of 
scienca. It is the scientific image which must be held to 
describe the common reality to which various beings are variously 
adapted. Thus consider a typical evolutionary claim. The claim 
is that: 
The hydrodynamics of sea-watar, plus the ecological value 
of locomotion, have independently shaped fish, whale and 
walrus in a quite similar fashion but the 
Jet-propelled squid reflects the seme hydrodynamic principlss 
1n a quite different ••• shape. 
Campbell p.447. 
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tor such claims to be intelligible the evolutionary theorist 
must claim some right to employ ~ scientific account of the 
hydrodynamics of sea water as descriptive of the common reality 
to which both squid and fish are adapted. In some sense then, he 
must assume that our scientific accounts of reality enjoy a 
degree of objective validity, sufficient at least for the world 
revealed by science to be justifiably taken to describe the real 
environment in which adaptation occurred. tor the evolutionary 
epistemologist, in particular, the implication is that the world 
to which our brains are adapted (the mind-independent reality 
with which they cope) must in some way be that accessible to science. 
To that extent an evolutionary epistemology could not afford to ba 
radically idealiat. The lIIorld which makes minds must in some 
degree be the world which minds know if the mind's explanation 
of ~ the world makes minds is to carry any force. 
Perhaps, then, some form of Ontological Realism concerning 
the objects and relations spoken of in decidable sentences of 
science (e.g. concerning the correct hydrodynamic description 
of seawater etc.) will be sufficient to secure the required 
non-ideelist base for an evolutionary epistemology. If 80, then 
the evolutionary anti-realist can donate content to euch a 
concsption in a fairly simple way(if somewhat superficial}. 
For all he needs to do is to insist that where a scientific claim 
is warranted (i.e. decidable, even if non-conclusively) that it 
had the truth-value it does even in advance of the investigation 
which uncovered the warrant for it. This allows us to locate 
the content of a belief in mind-independence in a belief in tha 
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pre-existence of the truth-determining facts which warrant our 
assertions - in this case, those of science. Such a position 
is at least consistent with anti-realist demands for we may still 
-be agnostic about the determinacy in truth-value of as yet 
undecided statements, only allowing this picture of mind-independence 
to be warranted with respect to statements whose truth-value we 
have (defeasibly) determined already. Such a position may seem 
strained, but it is an intelligible option, and one which provides 
at least a prima facie alternative to a radical idealism. It would, 
I think, amount to what Crispin Wright calls a 'belief in strict 
bivalence for decidable statements'. Such a belief, he suggests, is: 
A parfectly adequate vahicle for the conviction that the 
world is mind-independent, for it presupposes the 
investigation-independence of those statements - the conviction 
that the world confers determinate truth-values upon them 
independently of our actually carrying out any investigation 
into their truth-status. 
Wright (2) p.15 
Wright has reservetions concerning the ultimate success of 
such a move as a means of rebutting the charge of Idealism. Let 
us euppose, however, that the initial tension (between anti-realist 
idealism and evolutionary realism) can be thus reeolved. Would the 
coherence of the natural anti-realist's position then be guaranteed? 
5.4 Probably it would not. The reason for such pessimism is that 
we have so far only considered the anti-realist intelligibility 
of the pre-conditions of an evolutionary eccount. There remains 
the matter of the intelligibility of its claimed implications 
concerning mants cognitive status. In this area deap difficulti •• 
-A.J.Clark 103 
loom for the natural anti-realist (evolutionary epistemologist/ 
semantic anti-realist). For he must somehow make sense of the 
profound acceptance of transcendence which, I shall argue, is 
embedded in the evolutionary epistemologist's humble conception 
of man's own cognitive position. 
This acceptance of transcendence may be brought out by 
considering an example given by Lorenz. The example (Lorenz (1) 
trans. pages 31,32) concerns the spatial knowledge of the water 
shrew and the sewer rat. But what will concern us is not so much 
the example itself as the kind of conclusion evolutionary 
epistemologists tend to draw from such treatments. Lorenz found 
that a water shrew, when placed in new surroundings, learns ita 
way around by a saries of rendom eccentric excursions. These 
excursions serve to lay down routes which are then followed by 
rate. These routes may include long detours or entirely superfluous 
loops. Still they are faithfully repeated time and again. The 
water shrew is aeen to be precluded from ever finding a more 
direct rout. to its destinations. The idea of • short.cut, to put 
it rather anthropomorphically, is alien to its thought. Mora 
correctly, the shraw is precludad, by the very nature of ita 
evolved meana of coping with reality, from actively aeeking out 
short cut. or direct rout.s. This i. because the shrew is a true 
kinaesthetic creature; it lays down routes by slow crawling, 
aniffing and feeling rether than by an outright apatiel survey 
such as we might conduct by sight. The shrew's policy is affective 
and afficient given it. naeds and abilities. Its knowledge,however, 
may be contrasted with that of the sewer rat for the aewar rat is 
easily able to locate short cuts. The spatial knowledge of the 
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sewer rat may therefore legitimately be claimed to be more 
extensive than that of the watar shrew. The example thus 
recapitulates the tlllin pillars of the evolutionary theorist's 
account of knowledge given in chapter two. for we conclude, in 
line with the fallibility/scope arguments, that the water shrew 
has inbuilt limits: 
For the true kinaesthetic creature such as the water shrew 
it is literally impossible as far as its thinking is 
concerned to find a short cut. 
Lorenz (1) trans. p.32. 
And we conclude aleo, in line with the appropriateness argument, 
that its appreheneion, although limited, is still valid - it 
reaches i~s goals. Thue: 
The 10laler form of thought correeponds a priori and adequately 
w', ~ha reality of a higher order but 
it reaches. 
only as far as 
Lorenz (1) p.34. 
It ia characteristic of the evolutionary ep.1stemolog!st to 
extend this conception of cognitive limits, developed in regard 
to 10laler animals, to include the intellectual achievements of 
man. Thue we read in Lorenz that: 
We can no more aecertain how much exists in absolute 
actuality in addition to the facta and relationships 
rendered in our image of the universe than the watar 
shrew can ascertain that it could short-cut many 
detours in its crooked peth-learning. 
Lorenz (1) p.34. 
A.J.Clark 105 
And in Campbell that: 
Biological theories of evolution ••• are profoundly 
committed to an organism-environment dualism which when 
extended into the evolution of sense-organ perceptual 
and learning functiona, becomes a dualism of an organism's 
knowledge of the, environment versus the environment itself~ 
At this level he (the evolutionary epistemologist) has 
no hesitancy to include a 'real world' concept even though 
he may recognise that his own knowledge of that world ••• 
is partial and limited in ways analogous to the limitatione 
of the animal whose epistemology he studies. Having thus 
made the real-world assumption in this part of his 
evolutionary epistemology he is not adding an unneeded 
assumption when he assume. the same predicament for man 
and sciance as knowers. 
Campbell (1) p.449. 
Certainly, it 8eems to follow tram the evolutionary considerations 
concerning fallibility and scope (i.e. niche-orientation) that 
man's phenomanalimage of reality will be limited, imperfect and 
biased with respect to our peculiar needa and niche. Whether the 
same can betaken to follow for our conceptual or acientific 
image is anQther matter and one to which we turn in due courae 
(chapter 7). That there ~ auch a tendency of thought'in 
evolutionary epistemology is not, however, to be doubted. Lorenz 
calla it 'incomprehensible arrogance' to believe that all rational 
beings would need to share the laws of thought of man and Anthony 
O'Hear (OIHear p.206) reports Hirzel as claiming ,that acience in 
no way enables us to transcend the limitations of brain and sense 
organs suggeeted by the evolutionary model. It may ba noted 
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that were this to follow there is some danger of undercutting 
the basis of the evolutionary argument itself, which seems to 
require that science give us a picture of the objective reality 
in which adaptation occurs. If this danger is to be avoided, 
it must be ~y virtue of the critical ontological realism said 
to flow from the appropriateness argument discussed in 2.5 above. 
from such conaiderations it seems to follow (~erspectival bias 
and imperfection notwithstanding) that we should believe that 
the world really is largely as we naturally take it to be. 
By axtenaion, the formulable truths of everyday discourse, should 
embody an acceptable, if partial and biased, response to mind-
independent reality. Some relation between everydey formulable 
truths and a materially independent reality thue flows from the 
obaervation (coneequent upon the appropriatenese argument) that: 
There i. (in phenomenal experience) an 'objective' reflection 
of the Ding an aich which, ~aver, doe. not achieve expreseion 
in tha Ding an aich' s awn terms. 
Campbell (1) p.447. 
And science, presumably, may then be •• en a. an extension of 
everyday discourse, .haring in ita reali.tic connection to the 
mind-producing world and ~ in it. avolved limitation. and 
imperfectiona. Drawing all this together, we may now formulate 
six theeee, found in ths writings of evolutionary epistemologiats, 
which may be expected to give the anti-realist varying degre.. ef 
trouble; 
(1) ~terial Realism, the material world exist. in full 
independence of human CApacitie. to scquire knowledge 
of ita nature. 
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(2) Critical Ontological Realism; the formulable truths 
of daily discourse embody an approximately correct 
picture of those parts of reality with which man 
has been forced to cope. 
(3) Scientific Realism; science offers a valid description 
of mind-independent reality. 
(4) Phenomenal Relativism; other creatures, being forced 
to cope with other aspects of reality, may form very 
different phenomenal images of reality to our own. 
And, more contentiously, supposing (in some internal tension 
with (3) ) our scientific conceptions to be inextricably bound 
up with our limited, contingent and biased basic sensory and 
cognitive modes; 
(5) Thing-in-itself Realism; there may well be 
and (6) 
. factlte of' reality to which lIIe ha·ve, even in principle, 
no access'and which must therefore continually resist 
d';ibl'lption in language. 
Conceptual Scheme R&alb'm; other beings may be 
biologically suited to obtaining a grasp of such 
facets· and may therefore sustain intellectual 
knowledge which transcends man's capacities to 
grasp it. 
The natUral anti-realist ia now in deep water, particularly 
regarding aseertions (4) - (6). For given the ban on transcendent 
concsptions it seems uncfear what grasp we can have 1)f·tne notion 
of' forms of thought ahd experience which we do not POSS888. Thus 
Neil Tennant writes that: 
An abiding enigma for evolutionary epiStemology is how or 
whether we can make sense of the implied relativity of 
-------------------------_. 
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conceptual schemes or of access to reality while not 
ourselves being able to form any intelligible conception 
of how the world is to a radically different kind of 
organism, one endowed with different sense modalities and 
leading a totally alien life. 
Neil Tennant (3) p.4 
And adds that we should allow no conception of the world as it 
may be tin absolute actuality' as opposed to how it seems to be 
given our modes of perception and cognition. Such an attitude, 
though it seems to conflict with the Thing-in-itself Realism of 
soms evolutionary writers, is hardly surprising in an anti-realist. 
For clearly, the assertion of Thing-in-itself Realism (and to some 
extent of all the Realisms in (1) - (5), especially (3) and (4) ) 
will be prey to the argumant deployed by Rasmussen and Ravnkilde 
in 5.2 above, which claims that, in the absence of a non-constructive 
interpretation of existential quantification, no existence claim 
can be legitimate which precludes the production of some satisfying 
instance. Since we cannot produce instances of how the world may 
be in itself, and since we cannot experience alternative phenomanal 
or conceptual schames, such dimensions of transcendence look 
cloeed to the anti-realist. 
A general formulation of our difficulty, then, would seem to 
be this; how, given anti-realist views on grasp of aense, can we 
find intelligible the conception that there should be facets 0', 
or ways of looking at, reality which are in detail or experienced 
nature beyond our capacity to conceive? In other words can we 
consistently append to assertions (1) - (6) the further claim 
(7) Semantic Anti-realism; languagei. unable to support 
any grasp of varification-transcendsnt maaning. 
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If not, then the natural anti-realist must either give up one 
or more of the problematic claims or accept that his is a self-
defeating position. If, on the contrary, we can make 
anti-realist sense of some or all of the difficult claims, we 
shall have shown the compatibility (in a naturalised setting) 
of semantic anti-realism with a realistic metaphysics in which 
the nature of reality may .intelligibly outrun the limits of 
mante apprehension of it. 
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II 
TRANSCENDENT CONCEPTS 
AND THE 
CONCEPT Of THE TRANSCENDENT. 
110 
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6. Internal concepts of the transcendent. 
6.1 Two dimensions of realism have now made demands on the 
would-be natural anti-realist. One dimension invo1ves realistic 
claims concerning the status of our actual and potential knowledge. 
That knowledge must (at times) be knowledge of an external and 
mind-independent reality if evolutionary claims concerning the 
nature of adaptation are to carry any authority. The other 
dimension involves the realistic idea that the real nature of 
the world may well exceed our capacities to achieve knowledge 
of it and that the way we know what we do know of the world is 
a distinctivaly human one. These two dimansions correspond to 
what we earlier termed the Appropriateness and the fallibility/ 
scope arguments respectively (2.5 above). 
We may reserve comment on the first dimension of realism 
(reflected in theses (2) and (3) in 5.4 above) until chapters 
7 and 10. A promising strategy for securing the anti-realist 
intalligibility of claims in the second dimension (i.e. regarding 
theses (1), (4), (5) and (6) above) might be to try to reveal 
the problematic claims as disguised non-transcendent assertions 
concerning manls own cognitive limits, as diagnosed from within 
our conceptual scheme. The idea is to distinguish the anti-
realistically unacceptable notion of a transcendent concept 
(one whose conditions of application may apply quite unrecogniaebly) 
from the acceptable idea of a concept of the transcendent; 
a warrantedly assertible claim to the effect that the limits 
of our warranted assertions (and hence of our understanding) 
need not be the the limits of the world. 
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6.2 The goal, then, is to rehabilitate claims (1) and (4) - (6) 
as non-transcendent assertions concerning cognitive limits. 
Two preliminary comments are in order. The first is that in 
seeking to show the intelligibility of these claims, I am not, 
immediately, seeking to show their truth. In particular, theses 
(5) and (6) concerning Thing-in-itself and Conceptual Scheme 
Realism must remain tentative at ,least until after the discussion 
of science in chapter 7. The argument I present is designed to 
show that these claims, as they stand within evolutionary 
epistemology, are not senseless to the anti-realist, at least if 
he is careful in his formulation of them. The second preliminary 
comment concerns thesis (1), the assertion of Material Realism. 
This will be treated as a corollary of (5), the assertion of 
Thing-in-itself Realism. The latter thesis claims that there 
may tJe, f.~ts of, reality to which man has' in principle no access 
(lntal~actual or paroeptual). To make sanse of this is clsarly 
;' : '" 
to make sanae. of ,the.claim of I'IatljJrial Realism viz. that the 
world exists in full independence of human capacities to ,acquire 
knowledge of it. The advantage of treating (1) as a corollary 
of (5) is that it deflects a fair criticism of any independent 
defense of the sensa of (1). The criticism i8 that the assertion 
of ... tarial,-Ra~lia. has no distinotive content Inthe abeance,of " 
a commitment to Thing-in-itself Realism. For if a beliaf in the 
independence of the material world did not at least iasue in the 
pos8ibility .of humanly unknowable features of reality it lIIould be 
hard to locate any substantive disagreement betweantheanti-reelist 
idealist end the proponent of material realiem. In suoh .• situation 
a Material Realist whp is !!!U.a Thing-in-itself ReaJ.h.,t might try 
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to avail himself of the account of content given in terms of 
an acceptance of strict bivalence for decidable claims developed 
in 5.3 above. Such a defence, as remarked earlier, is somewhat 
weak; it still looks unlikely to distinguish him from the 
anti-realist idealist who may ~ accept bivalence for decidable 
claims but conceives the bivalence as somehow flowing from our 
decision procedure rather than preceding it in full independence. 
One way the realist can make out the difference is by accepting 
the possibility of determinate but humanly unknowable features 
of reality - an acceptance expressed in Thing-in-itself Realism; 
hence the proposal to concentrate on Thing-in-itself Realism and 
allow ~terial Realism to flow from it. 
The focus, then, is on claims (4) - (6); roughly, that there 
may be faceta af reality ta which we have na potential access 
and that tNars,_y be forms of life whose. phenomenal and intellectual 
realUiee are partially closed off from our full understanding. 
If we are to demonstrate the legitimacy ( = anti-realist 
intelligibility) of such claims we must pay special attention 
to the logical form of the evolutionary arguments eaid to support 
them. 
Claims (4) - (6) flow from whet, in 2.5 above, we called the 
fallibility/scope arguments of evolutionary epistemology. That is 
to eay they flow from arguments concerning the nature of the 
evolutionary process whereby our own particular investigative 
capacities were produced. for that process may be expected to 
generate forms of basic cognition and perception which are 
contingent, imperfect and selected with special reference to a 
particular type of being's needs and intereeta. Two main obeervations 
A • J • t:l a rk 11 4 
were said to bear on this. The first was that selection of 
particular traits takes place from a randomly generated pool 
of options viz. those provided by chance mutation ('random' 
here means 'with no causal connection to the particular features 
of the environment which such mutations will ultimately succeed 
or fail to exploit'). The second was that selective pressure 
constitutes a satisficing and not an optimising force (in the 
sense of satisficing developed at 2.5). It favours whatever is 
most effective in the actual context in which selection occurs. 
The prime evolutionary virtue is cost-efficiency. Swift,roughly 
accurate decisions will be rewarded. Painstakingly detailed 
processing is intensive of time and energy. Loss of accuracy 
is prafarable to ioss of life. Selection is also context-
dependent; the utility which is selectively favoured is utility 
within a specific life-form. What is a good option for a frog 
may spell extinc~ion for a sparrow. Human cognition, likewise, 
may be expected to be focussed on whatever aspects of the physical 
universe were most vital to our ancestors when selection of our 
, 
present capacities occurred (see Campbell p.421 or Tennant (3) p.33). 
In the light of such observations (reservations concerning the 
scope power and status of human science notwithstanding) we can see 
why the avolutionary epistemologist may refuse to identify the 
range ot humanly accessible reality (the world which we can 
investigate) with'the full and absolute contours of reality itself. 
Our knowledge is arrived et by contingent, unprivileged and 
predictably biased means. 50 how could the nature of our knowledge 
transcend the nature of our means of acquiring knowledge? Hence 
claim (5). We can see also why he allows the possibility that 
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the reality directly and intellectually accessible to other 
beings may be radically different to our own. If our range of 
knowable facts and perceptible properties is limited and coloured 
by physical apparatus selected from B random pool with regard to 
the peculiar needs of the human life-form, then it follows that 
alternative life-forms might directly access other aspects of 
reality and (perhaps) intell~ctually picture the universe in 
terms of mental structures evolved to suit ~ needs and 
interests. Hence claims (4) and (6). 
The vital fact regarding the anti-realistic intelligibility 
of such claims to emerge from this is that the true content of 
such claims involves only notions of the genesis and limitations 
of ~~ particular cognitive capacities. The evolutionary 
epistemologist does not, or ought not, presume to go beyond such 
claims, for to do so is to become embroiled in debate over 
allegedly transcendent concepts. All he needs, to substantiate 
claims (4) - (6) is a harmless concept of the transcendent which 
is expressible entirely in terms of the accessible data of 
evolutionary theory. There need be no suggestion that we can 
sustain any positive conception of how the world ie in itself 
beyond reference to the human life-form, nor that we can know 
what it ia like to employ alternative concaptual schemee. Once 
we realiae this, the tension between en anti-realist semantics 
and an evolutionary view of knowledge and reality begins to 
dissolve. For the inference from the dependance of meaning 
on human capacities to the rejsction of any conception of the 
world as it' really' is, is valid if and only if the sense of 
• conception' involved is that of a concrete or positive conception. 
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That is, a conception ~hich purports to be one of the ~ay the 
~orld actually is, as opposed to the bare conception that there 
may be facets of reality beyond the scope of human kno~ledge. 
The latter negative conception is assertlble on the basis of the 
evidence of evolutionary epistemology for the claim that there is 
a reality to which all cognitive processes are adapted and ~hich 
is never kn~n in full by eny such processes. A failure to 
distinguish positive and negative senses of 'conception' turns 
the legitimate rejection of transcendent realism (the doctrine 
that ~e can sustain a grasp of concepts not necessarily capable 
of active manifestation in our activity) into an illegitimate 
rejection of material realism and cognitive bias - the notion 
that our grasp of reality is biased and limited and that the material 
universe from which it grew enjoys a self-subsistent,mind-independent 
existence. 
,-; 
The.~.OfIIIIIitlll8nt of evolutionary epistemology to this letter 
position is ~omplete and essential, for it studies the relatIonship 
between a creature's image of the world and the world whereof· it 
is an image. This relationship is plotted. out of practical 
necessity, from a human and 'phylogenetically unprivileged' 
position. Our scientific perceptions of reality form the basis 
of OUr Judgments of such relations. But they do eo out of 
praglll8tic, no~theoretical necessity. For we are to conceivs 
our own position as limited and imperfect in ~ays parallel to 
those of the creatures we study. Campbell's raal-world hypothesis 
thus enters our system as a necElssary internel construct. All 
our descriptions, thetJretical ones included, aretQ ba,seen 8S 
informed by our human nature and inh8riti~ our hu~n limitations. 
. 1 
A.J.Clark 117 
We thus conceive reality itself as at least potentially 
transcending our capacities to achieve knowledge about it. 
But this conception of a transcendent reality is entirely 
internal and negative in content, finding its warrant in 
the scientific picture of the nature of the knowledge-acquiring 
and belief-selecting mechanisms which we would expect the 
selective process to favour. The critique of the scope of 
human intelligibility may thus fall squarely within the scope 
of the humanly intelligible. 
6.3 Suppose such e line of argument were to be accepted. 
"How, precisely, would this enable the natural enti-realist to 
sidestep the problems of intelligibility raised in chapter 51 
The main difficulty for assertions of Thing-in-itself and 
Concept~al Scheme' ~~elism wes seen to be that initially raised 
by Raamusa$n a~d'RaVnkilde in 5.2 above. The difficulty, said 
to preclude the revisionary anti-realist from avoiding idealism, 
waa that of making constructive sense of the assertion of the 
existence of facets of reality falling outside our recognitional 
acope. For in the absence of a classical interpretation of the 
existential quantifier (which, incidentally, need not amount ae 
they"seem to believe it does to the absence of clas.ical logic 
in toto) Dr, IIOrS weskly, in the ebsence of any non-constructive 
interpretation of that quantifier, the anti-realist ie, a8 they 
say: 
cORllllitt.ed to a conception of the asaertability conditions 
of quantifications under which an existentially quantified 
sentence iaaaaertible Just in'caae an instance ~8rifying 
it can be produced. 
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But, they ask: 
How are instances of aspects of the world that resist 
capture in language supposed to be producible if not by 
means of language? 
Rasmussen and Ravnkilde (1) 380. 
Ostension, they rightly disallow since what is ostensible is 
experienceable and hence again fails to cover the kind of case 
in question. 
Rasmussen's and Ravnkilde's point is not a problem for the 
eclectic theorist who seeks only to combine a biological realism 
(viz. a belief in realism as regards our claims (4) - (6»with 
a semantic anti-realism, revisionary or otherwise. To see why 
we need only reflect on the logical form of the content of such 
ass.ertions of realism once they are revealed as assertions about 
hu~n cognj,tive limits. For that logical form is then seen to be 
eeeentially, no~exietential. The problematic claims ere rather 
negated universals whose assertion is warranted by the extrapolation 
. i 
via the thesis of phylogenetic continuity, of claims made about 
the nature and limits of the knowledge of lower animals to cover 
the case of man himself. The claims in the evidentiel data-base 
warranting the negated universal conclusion concern only the 
accessible reality. (e.g. the wetsr-shrBfll experiments) unproblematic 
to tha anti-realist. The deep question, for the revisionary 
natural anti-realiat, is whether this application of the thesis 
of phylogenetic continuity can meet the demand of the consarvative 
extension of knowledge (see 1.2). ror the application of the 
theeis here may eeem to warrant .conclusions for which no direct 
evidence is possible. But the contravention of this demand is, 
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in tnis case, more apparent than real. For our concern here is 
not, despite appearances, with knowledge beyond the realm of 
direct avidance but with knowledge of the limits of the direct 
evidence itself. The force of tha negated universals (see 
below) is not to go illegitimately (unconservatively) beyond 
potential direct evidence but to describe the limits of the 
realm about which we can make intelligible statements i.e. the 
realm where direct evidence is possible. It would be strange 
indeed if the enterprise of describing our semantic scope as 
limited were to be anti-realistically intelligible only on the 
defeating eupposition that we were properly able to go beyond 
those limite! 
Rasmussen and Ravnkilde's slide to idealism is greased by 
their insistence that the would-be eclectic theorist avail 
himself of existential quantificatioh in stating his belief 
in invaatigation-transcanding aspects of reality. The proposed 
; 022 0 ,; 0 0>0 ' 
responaa is that the proper form of anti-realist expression 
for the preae~t claims (4) - (6) ia not existential but negative 
universal. Thus they should be read as follows: 
(4') Phenomenal Relativism; It is not the case that; 
for all X, if X is a phenomenal image of reality then X 
must be a phenomenal image of the kind sustained by man. 
(5') Thing-in-it~alf Raalism:lt is not the caea that; 
for all X, if X is a facet (aspect,relation,description) 
of the material universe then X muet in principle ba 
knowable by us as that aspect, relation or deecription. 
(6') Conceptual Scheme Realism: It is not the case that; 
for all X, if X is a co~ceptual scheme adequate to cope 
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with the world then X must in important respects coincide 
with our own. 
These formulations are clearly in line with our stress on 
cognitive limits. As long as we stick to those formulations, 
however, we are at liberty to exploit an intuitionistic lacuna 
between - Yx(fx) and lx( - fx) as a means of avoiding the 
difficulties associated with a constructive interpretation of 
the existential quantifier. Thus we may exploit the intuition-
istic invalidity of the expression 
L; - Ix (fx) -~ l x ( - fx) 
in order to assert S' or 0' without incurring any commitment to 
grasp problematic existential claims such as: 
There is an X such that: X is a facet of the material 
universe and X ie unknowable by us 
or; 
- . 
There ie an X such that: X is a conceptual scheme adequate 
to cope wit.h the'world and X is importantly different from 
our own. 
These letter assertions, we saw, imply for the anti-reaiist 
what the claims of cognitive limitation spacifically rule out 
viz •. the constructability of fulfllling instances. of the schema 
3x( - fx) as it applies in such cases. 
To see the evolutionary claims as only claims about cognitive 
limits, then, is to see that there is no rsal difficulty as rsgarde 
their intelligibility. for to generate any such difficulty now 
would require the combination of a classical treatment of L (in 
which the inference from - Vx( fx ) to 3x ( - rx ) is' valid) 
with a ~ructive interpretation of existential quantification 
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(in which tne assertion ~x ( - fx ) requires the constructability 
of instances of - fx). 
Neil Tennant, however, has questioned with what right the 
intuitionistic lacuna ( i.e. the intuitionistic invalidity of L ) 
is exploited in the evolutionary case. He has pointed out ( in 
conversation) that the lacuna exists in recognition of two possible 
cases in which one might have reason to assert - ~x ( fx ) without 
being in a position to assert, for some individual constant a, - fa. 
Tha two casas being (i) that in which we have a demonstration of the 
abaurdity of Yx ( fx ) on general principles alone and (ii) that in 
which we can demonstrate the joint inconeistency of a set of instances 
F without being able to locate the,blame, as it were, in 
n 
anyone instance. Now cleerly, the evolutionary epistemologiat is 
notable to claim. that his i8 a caae of the second kind. He is 
not;fDt eDmrUG. in a poaitionto produce 80me set of facets of 
re_l1ty one of which Is known to' be unknowable, although lIIe do 
not know which! We are therefore driven to (i). The question 
then is; what kind of general principles are involved, and can 
they really result in the absurdity of the universel corrslates 
to 4' - 6' viz. 
CUC4') For all X, if X is • pNitnomenal image of reality 
then X must be a phenomenal image of the kind 
sustained by man. 
(UCS') For all X; if X is a fecetof the materi_l universe 
then X must be knowable by us. 
(UC6') for all X; if X is a conceptual scheme adaquate to 
cops with the world then X must In important respects 
coincide wIth our own. 
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It is probably unlikely that any strict demonstration 
of the absurdity of the claims (UCS') and (UC6') is to be had. 
(UC4') seems demonstrably false, however, since we are plainly 
aware that other beings (e.g. bets) do perceive the world by 
different means to ourselves hence it seems clear that their 
phenomenal image of it will differ from our own. Regarding 
(UC5') and (UC6') however, I do not think that the unavailability 
of any strict proof of absurdity should be held as conclusive 
evidence that the intuitionist lacuna is being improperly 
appealed to. For our quarry is a contingent empirical assertion 
of the form - Vx (rx) and not a mathematical assertion of the 
strict derivability of - ~x (rx) from a set of true premisses. 
Only in tha latter case can we demand that Vx (rx) be strictly 
absurd, i.e., result in a contradictiQn. The most one can 
leg,f.ti..-tely e.~ in the empiJ;ical case i, that there be a cogent 
argument (i.e. one ~hoaeforce is recogniaable by us) which at 
least weakly suggests the unlikelihood .ofUtS' and Ut6' above. 
The anti-realist, when he moves from the mathematical to the 
ordinary language domain, may be obliged in some instances to 
give up the identification of ths meaning of a statement with 
I 
what .verifies it conclusively. He may even allQW that conditions 
of conclusive verification may be unrecognisable by us should they 
obtain. JI'Ieaning, in such cases, is to be lo.cated in connection 
with recognisable but non.,.conclusive cond.itions of verification. 
This potential of the anti-realist to avail himself of such 
non-conclusive conditions is often overlooked, a. we point~d out 
in 1.2 
Whatwa need than, is not a proof! by gananl 'prlncipJ:eathat 
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the asaertion of UC5 1 or UC6 1 is absurd but just a cogent argument 
from ggneral empirical or philosophical principles that it is 
probably false i.e. a demonatration that weak (non-conclusive) 
verification conditions for 51 and 6' recognisably obtain. 
And that much, I believe, we already possess. Thus we may take 
as our general principles the th90ry of evolution by natural 
selection, the theses of cognitive adaptionism and phylogenetic 
continuity and the constraints imposed by the fallibility/scope 
considerations upon the cognitive powers of evolved products. 
None of the evidence which warrants the assertion of these 
contingent claims in any way transcends the range of data 
I 
allowed by the semantic anti-realist. These general principles 
do not result in a contradiction when conjoined to UC5' or UC6 1 • 
But they do non-conclusivaly suggest that they are false. Hence 
they af~o~d cogent if inconclusive argument for the truth of 51 
and 6' 1.8. the'ysuggest that, if UC5' or UC6' is true, then there 
IllUst be important provisos yet to be added to at least one of the 
general empirical principles involved (the most obvious candidate 
being the stance on cognition derived from the combined theses of 
cognitive adaptionism and phylogenetic continuity). In the absence 
of a~y such proviso we may justly regard UC5' and UC6 1 as having 
been shown by cogent argument to be falee. To deny that conclusion 
'WOUld require an expansion of our present state of information 
concerning the origin and nature of human cognitive capacities. 
Our previous use of the intuitionistic lacune is therefore 
justified under the first of Tennant's two options i.e. that in 
which we have a demonstration, on generalprinciplea alohe, of 
the absurdity of " Vx (rx). Except 'that, having moved away from 
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the mathematical ~omain, our demonstration may stop short of 
being one of absurdity and rest at being one of unlikelihood. 
By availing ourselves of the lacuna we may assert the falsity 
of UC5' and UC6' without committing ourselves to any problematic 
existential claims requiring the production of instances. That a 
presumption exists in favour of the falsity of these does not 
therefore suggest that we must necessarily be in a position (or 
be capable of being in a position) to assert for some individual 
case e.g. that here is a conceptual scheme importantly different 
to our own or that here is a facet of reality unknowable by us. 
The former seems more likely to be possible than the latter, but 
neither ~ be possible to make anti-realist sense of the 
claims 51 and 61 • 
The natural anti-realist, then, may invoke the intuitionistic 
lacuna between - tdx (fx) and 3x ( - fx) in order to sustain the 
reformulated realisms of 5' and 6' without facing the problem of 
the constructivs interpretation of existence claims. He can 
thus avoid what lorenz calls the 'incomprehensible errogance' 
of the assertion that 
any imaginable rational being would havs to be 
limitsd to the laws of thought of homo sapiens. 
lorenz (1) trans. pg.34, 
and embrace the humble thought that 
The fundamental indiscernibility of the last detail of 
the thing-in-itself remains, 
lorenz (1) trans. pg.31 
without essaying to sustain any transcendent concepts of the kind 
ruled out by a consistent anti-realism. With the evolutionary 
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epistemologist, we assert that we are cognitively limited beings 
employing contingent modes of conceiving the world. With the 
anti-realist we assert that we have no positive grasp of the 
nature of the world save that yielded by those very contingent 
capacities. By combining the two we arrive at the notion, by 
no means inimical to common-sense, that the intelligible world 
over which the meanings of our language range is limited by 
our capacities to recognise the truth of assertions about it 
but that there is no reason to believe either that material 
reality is a product of human intelligence or that human 
intelligence and semantic scope afford a privileged and exhaustive 
survey of the material universe. The world itself does not 
inherit the limitations of man. 
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7. Evolution&ryEpistemology and the Scientific Image. 
7.1 It was the task of the preceding chapter to delimit an 
intelligible concept of mind-independent and potentially 
mind-transcending reality. Mind-independence, we may now 
reflect, could be argued for without any implications of actual 
. or potential mind-transcendence. That is to say someone might 
believe the world is mind-independent in the sense of being 
ontologically self-subsistent and prior to the emergence of 
minds, without believing that any of its real aspects may 
transcend man's capacity to come to know them. Such a person 
would be disagreeing with the theses ofthing~in-itself and 
conceptual scheme realism attributed to the evolutionary 
epistemologist, but accepting the bare claim of ~terial Realiam. 
In what follows I shall offer some reasons for thinking that 
such a belief ( in what we may call ths epistemological transparency 
of every facet of material reality), though not inconsistent with 
evolutionary findings, is unlikely to be true given what we know 
of evolved knowledge~acquiring mechanisms in gensral. The 
obeervations which bear on this conclusion are precisely those 
mobilised in support of the theses of Thing-in-itself and Conceptual 
Scheme Aealiam 1n chaptsr 6, and used to gsnerate·an interne'! 
concept of reality as mind-transcending. But such observatione 
(essentially, those of the fallibility/scope argument in -2.5) 
need careful handling if we are to attempt to extehd tho1rresults 
to includs the findings of human sciance. The burden of the 
argumant of the previous chapter wal!lthat by inspecting our 
achieved knowledge of the meane by which knowledge ia achieved 
the natural anti-realist might be able to conceive reality itself 
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as potentially transcending our capacities to come to know it, 
and that he might conceive this without claiming to grasp any 
transcendent concepts. But is this picture of cognitive 
limitation, developed in studies of the basic cognitive and 
perceptual capacities of 10w3r animals truly applicable to the 
scientific world-view of man? If it is not then the claims of 
Thing-in-itself and Conceptual Scheme Realiem, though perhaps 
anti-realistically intelligible as claims about limits, will 
still fail to be~. Such a fate would certainly soften the 
hoped-for metaphysical impact of combining a semantic anti-realism 
with an evolutionary epistemology. But if the extension is allowed 
and natural limitations and bias seen to afflict scientific 
knowledge, then the question must arise as to the status of the 
evolutionary conjecture itself. for by what right could the 
evolutionary epistemologist then quentify over all evolved 
life-forms in formulating his general account of the relation 
, , 
bstwsen cognition and reality? 
7.2 Venturing gently into these turbulent waters, we may begin 
by considering a fairly typical kind of claim in sub-atomic 
phySics. There are, we are told, six kinds of quark ( the up, 
the down, the strange, the charmed, the bottom and the truth - this 
last being only hry recently discovered23 ). By drawing on theoriss 
which use quarks in their theoretical descriptions, the phyaicist 
can explain, ina unifiSd account,the macroscopicaUy disp8t'ate 
phename08 of radioactivity and magnetism. 
What is the evolutionary apistemologist to make of such claims? 
How, if at all, ia the fallibility/acope argument of 2 .. 5 meant to 
apply to' .thebel.1sf that there .areaix quarka? It Ml'dlyneads 
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stating that the belief in itself is not survival-relevant. 
So where does the evolutionary picture intrude? The extension 
to science, if it is made at all, will clearly not be made by 
concentrating on individual beliefs. This is the mistake made 
by, for example, Anthony O'Hear in his recent article 'On what 
makes an epistemology evolutionary'. for O'Hear fails to 
identity the only plausible direction of evolutionary influence 
on our scientific theorising viz. the evolutionary genesis of 
our basic data-acguiring and belief-selecting strategies. 
Thus D'Hear asks: 
When we come to creatures, such as ourselves, who have 
explicit beliefs about the world, does the selective 
elimination of evolution work by knocking out the holdars 
of inadequate theories, or does natural salaction work 
diractly on the theories themselves? How, in other words, 
ara beliefs winnowed by nature? 
O'Hear p.195 
O'Hear, e8eing that neither of these is plausible as a means 
of transmitting any evolutionary impact to high-level ecientifi~ 
theories concludes that evolutionary considerations are irrelevant 
to claims 'of an epistemological na~ure' (eee O'Hear p.216). 
. , 
In coming to this conclusion, however, he is failing to give due 
"'--" 
consideration to a third option. It is that we hu~'n beings 
'winnow out' our own beliefs; but we do so in accordance with 
basic strateg1ee, encoded in actUlllcognitive mechaniallls,lIIhlch 
are the product of natu.ral.sslection. In other warde 1t is, the 
holders of unsuccessful belief-basing or belief-eelecUng mechanisms 
which natural sebetion will have knocked. out, not, the holders of 
falae high-Iavel beliefs or (aomehow) fslse thaoriee themselves. 
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By a belief-basing mechanism I here intend, roughly, man's 
perceptual access to the world. If we based our beliefs on 
sense experiences which stood in no causal relation to the 
world, we would produce useless beliefe and no doubt die long 
before we had got close to propagating our genes. Similarly, if 
we chose among competing beliefs (based, let us say, on satisfactory 
causally-linked perceptual input) in an irrational fashion, choosing 
always the belief which is least supported by the data, or which 
is ths hsrdest to understand, or which we think will be the least 
useful to accept, we would again be unlikely to survive in a 
hostile environment. By noting the likely influence of 
evolutionary factors on belief-basing and selecting mechanisms, 
the evolutionary epistemologist can (to some extent et least) 
explain why it is that hUlIBn baings have the kind of brains 
which tend to !l8ke the kind·of theorieewbich.!!!!:!I!s.. Evolutionary 
considerations" if thay apply to the scientific realm at all, 
must therefo~e apply not directly to. specific. scientific beliefs 
(which may be detrimental to survival, or irrelevant~as 
commentators never cease to insist) but indirectly, via the 
ways we come to select thoss bslisfa, and the primary access 
to.data provided by the hu_n·senees. If our discussion is to 
be fruitful, then, we must shift it frO!ll tha locus of specific 
theory~ euch e, querk physics, to that of general scientific 
qlethod. 
7.3 On eny plausible view of the scisntific method ths conduct 
of science involves the performance of some renge of cognitive 
operations upon some choice of data. The cognitive operations 
may include some kind of ranking of competing Bxp~an.tory 
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hypotheses in terms of the deli~ate balance between simplicity 
and comprehensiveness and utility. (Sober calls this the trade-off 
betweBn simplicity and fruitfulness.) And the data may be in the 
form of direct observational reports or it may be more or less 
impregnated with theory d9pending perhaps on the extent to which 
previously accepted hypotheses are assumed in the construction 
of the evidence upon which some current claim is to be based. 
But no matter how intricate the web of intervening theory it will 
remain at root true to sey that science takes observational reports 
as inpute, generates explanatory laws and models as outputs, and 
decides amDngst competing laws and models by employing informal 
heuristic demands. The explanatory laws and models which get 
accepted are therefore eubject to two eources of constraint. 
The first SOUl'ce liee with the obeerved phenomena thsmselves; 
a theory lllUetbe true to the fact.. The second Bource lies with 
the structut'Bof human (and perhaps.n) rationality; e good theory 
should be simple, beautiful, cOlRprehensiv9, suggestive end so forth. 
If this pictu~e of the acientific method appears too simplistic 
it can be filled out in various ways. Probably ths most powerful 
24 
contemporary way to do so is to adopt a Bayesian analyais of the 
scientific method. This amounts to a characterisation, in formal 
terms, of the'proC8ss by which a given belief or theory is chosen 
over its rivals. Thus the scientist is assumed (this is, of course, 
an idealisation) to hava as data a humber of observational reports, 
and a number of competing hypotheses said to explain them. The 
probability that the observational reports would be obtained if 
sach explanation ",ere true ia assumed to be known (it is often 
.2U!. i. s. each hypothesis implies that the relevant' observations 
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would have peen obtained but it may be less - witness the 
statistical correlations predicted by q':lantum theory). The 
scientist's esti~te of the probability that a given hypothesis 
is true (or the correct one to accept) is then to be derived as 
a joint function of 
(a) the probability that the evidence would be obtained 
if the hypothesis were true (the so-called 'forward 
. probebility function') 
and (b) The prior probability which the scientist gives to 
the hypothesis in the firet place (the so-called 
'subjective probability function'). 
In other words, subjective cognitive preferences (encoded in (b) 
above) will play a role in detarmining which hypothesis a scientist 
accepts. In one sense this ·is.unsurprising. lIIe all have sets of 
ingrainad beliefs.ooutraality which influence our decisions. 
On the other hand, allowing. this common fact to intrude into our 
account of scientific method opens up the possibility that someone, 
~?arating with a perverse prior probability function, would pick 
bad and fruitless hypotheaes. Thus, to quote Putnam: 
Arthur. Burks has • • • shown that .there ara even 'counter 
inductive prior probability functioR*' ••• such that if 
• scientist had that lIStric then.a more evidence callIS. in 
for a hypothesis then ·the scientist would aesign 
lower and lower weight to the hypothesis for a very long 
time. 
Putnam (4) p.192 
Putnam aeks whether there might be s further eet of formal 
rules specifying what prior probability funotions are reesonable 
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but thinks this unlikely. This informal subjective element, 
he further speculates, cannot be IJradicated even if we move 
to an avowedly deductive eccount of scientific method such as 
Popper's. for Popper's approach (consider only strongly 
falsifiable theories and accept that which you 7ail to falsify) 
demands. an informal choice over what st~ongly falsifiable theories 
we actually bother to test. ~any (indeed, infinitely many) weird 
and wonderful hypotheses may be strongly falsifiable but we shall 
not bother to test them, nor indeed ~ we test them ~ even 
if we triad. So again 'something like a prior selection is 
involved'. Nor, in fact, is it the case that scientists do 
opt only for strongly falsifiable theories. A pertinent example, 
citad by Putnam, is evolutionary theory itself which is notoriously 
weak on predictions. Such theories fall rather under ths rubric 
of' it'lf1!renbEito the 'best explanation'. That is~ their attraction 
is that they 'unify end explain large quantities of data. 
No utter hOw we try to view the scientific method, it seems, 
two thoughts intrude~ The first is that, as Quine has it, 
'whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence' 
(Quine (1) p.15). The second is that the'actual conduct of 
science must involve choices which are not strictly data-determined 
but depend rather on the perticular preferences or 'subjective 
probability functions' of scientists. let us nOl6 examine the ' 
implications ottfies8 thoughtS in a biological setting. 
7.4 The relevance of evolutionary, observBtions, concerning 
belief-basing Bnd belief-seleoting mechanisms to our view of 
the status of acientific knowledge now becomes cleerer. tor the 
.., . .', 
point is that both our direct sensitivities to data.end our basic 
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int.ellectual·preferences concerning how to respond to t.hat 
date may both be expected to share in the dual aspect of 
evolved atrategiee and to transmit this dual aspect, in some 
degree, el/anto our more high-level theories. This dual aspect 
involvee the appropriateness of such strategies on the one hand, 
and their fallibility and limitatione in scope on the other. 
Thus, to take the mettar of our dirsct sensitivities to data 
first, sciance, in being faithful to the phenomena, maintains 
the original tie established by the selective process between 
the phenomena as known by a being and the real world in which 
the. being must live. Yet by dealing only with the phenomena 
which happen to be experienced by human beings it inherits also 
the species-specific interests and random caprices of fate which 
combi.",d to rander acce,.aibla t.holSe partJcular aspects of reality 
in . that part.t:Qular ... y. Th~ scientifi.c: augmentation of our 
e~~eory capacl~les (via electron microecopes etc.) certainly 
extends the range of data available. But even such extensions 
" ' " . !. <, " ,. ' ," ,~. '.' . 
to our capacitiee ~st anewer to some checks in the gross 
,!' .. 
observational sphere (must issue in some directly checkable 
observational claime) or we ",auld have no cause to accept such 
augme~tation as veridical. Our belief-basing capacities therefore 
remain, albeit indirectly, our ordinary observational channela, 
the contingency and limitation of which is directly suggested by 
. . ,,') 
an avolutionary account of their genesis. 
Regarding our belief-selecting mechanisms or capacities, the 
situation is arguebly parallel. ror it may plausibly b~ sIJ9gested 
that the basic heuristic. and logical principles upon which human 
beings agree (tha basic foundation~ of science and mathematics) 
. . .:4, 
A.J.Clark 134 
are at least a partial function of our evolutionary past. 
As Ernest Sosa points out in a recent article, if it is 
permissible to refer to a faculty of sight in explaining 
'our remarkable agreement about colours and shapes' then 
why should we not appeal to an equelly inborn" 'faculty of 
reason' explaining our general agreement in the basic intellectual 
sphere. (Sosa's examples concern agreement about identity and 
contradiction - see Sosa p.63.) 
One wey to substantiate this notion of an inborn faculty 
of reason might be to suggest an a priori element in our 
asssssments of prior probability. Thus although subjective 
probability functions are no doubt largely the fruits of 
previous individual experience, they could also include a degree 
of innate bial!! comparable, parhaps, to a Quinian perceptual 
'qualltyspace. If this were so then we could, by availing 
ourselves oft"" Appropriateness argument, generate a partial 
explanatibn of why hUmans have the treasonable prior probability 
functions' which they do. This would parallel Quine's exp1anation 
of the cosmic utility of our innate similarity spacings (recall 3 4 
above). Thua we might suggest that a being endowad with Putnam's 
'counter-inductive prior prObability function' ltIould fail to choose 
appropriate low level beliefs and ha'nce stand at a basic biological 
disadvantage against competing 'theoreticians t • Such a being, upon 
spying the ~ec8ntly' savaged carcsseof a fellow hum.n~might conclude 
that it 1118$ then even less likely than before that eome predatory 
animal 'lurks in the nearby caves. Such a stratagy does not look 
conducive to aurvival ~nd reprodUction. for us {not for him) that 
Is 'the'good nfllll8-; some trust in oJrinn~te probabili~y spacings 
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(if any) would not be misplaced. The bad news is that such 
innate prior probability spacings, though no doubt adaptively 
strategic, may still fail to guide us in some very advanced 
theoretical contexts. To some extent, no doubt, man is capable 
of transcending such natural prejudices. It is, however, a deep 
and unresolved question whether man can realistically hope to 
transcend all such natural 'limitations' in his quest for knowledge. 
To the extent that he cannot, it must remain an open question 
whether we might be systematically blind to the potentiel value of 
explanatione which fail to satisfy our basic cognitive preferences. 
For such explanations, for thet very reason, may never be formulated 
or tested by human beings. Sober, indeed, hes suggested that it 
might be unwarranted to believe that any cognising being must share 
the kind<of human 'rationality evinced by refarence to the 'parochial 
feature(e)''ofoorDllm adapUv,", ,._ehi~ryt (Sober, p.117). And this 
could .... 11,,"ineiude the kind of heutistic' constraints mentioned 
above. Against· thiS it may he "Y. be .helD that soma features 
(such as the dssire for simple hypotheses) nsturally reault from 
deMnds of informational economy derivable from the broad 
evolutiDll8rybiaa towards cost-erficient and promptproceesing of 
data, .nt;t hence will probably beaha:r~u;l by any ,evolved rationel 
bsing.~ut.thi ••. or courS8, may pnly mean that there are some 
mistakes which any .rstional beingie compelled tQ makeS 
It !a the essenUal, prilDit!.~~'l"u. of the belief.-bas11'J9 and 
eelecting capacities implicated in scientific theory construction 
which thereforElilesds us to adapt the evolutionsry epistamologist's 
etti tude ofcriticaJ, hypothe1;ical rll8Usm. Reference to the 
selective history of such baeic capacitias may exp.l~ why man's 
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mind can make theories which work. But equally, reference to 
the fallibility and opportunism of evolved strategies may explain 
why ( as the' history of science well attests) man tends to produce 
theories which ara locally adequate to restrictad sets of data 
rather thah ones which are absolutely true. We probably do not 
have {not vat, and maybe not ever} total access to all aspects 
of reality, and the basic strategies we employ in the areas of 
belief-formation and choice may, on occasion, mislead us, or 
blind us to better options. If both our data base and the 
cognitive orientation we bring to bear on it are to some degree 
the contingent, imperfect and limited products of our peculiar 
evolutionary history, then it is unlikely that anything we build 
on them will have the sbsolute suthority of some uniquely true 
.~dcomplete picture of the real world ,we live in. 
O'Hearla denial of the relevan~,or evolutionary claims to 
an .a~s8ment pf the status o~ achieve~ human knowledge (O'Hear 
p.216) thua looks to b", undermined once lIIe recognise ,the role of 
. .' .' ),' '. ." 
basic observational capacitiee and, potentially et leaat~ of 
cognitive preferences, in theory construction and theory choice. 
From, thisparsf:!ective, esesrtions made by evolutionary epistemologists 
a"d ,qu"i~d by . opponen~e such aaO' Hear ,look much more acceptable. 
Such: BSSSJ;'t;iCJn8 would, include the thQtlghta thata 
ScienUf!c thougf")t is not Yet, .,and presumably IIIU1, ,,~, be,.' 
completelyf.rsefrom men'sirW.om teaching mecm.n.t ... · " r 
Wuketits. 10 . 
The,thought that; 
£volutioobea eet bounds to' .,the rea lise tion of: :hutMlnpower. 
ibid. p. 10 
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and the thought that; 
(the evolutionary epistemologist's) knowledge of (the) 
world, even with instrumental augmentation, is partial 
and limited in ways analogous to the limitations of the 
animal whose epistemology he studies. 
Campbell p. 447 
7.5 None of this, of course, strictly follows from the observation 
that our belief-basing and selecting capacities have their roots in 
man's particular evolutionary background. It might be that by fortuitous 
genetic aa~tation man has evolved a brain capable of grasping the 
whole truth about the universe, end capable of overcoming all the 
natural limitations of direct access to data and innate heuristic 
pr.ferences which might otherwise prevent his knowledge reaching 
this perfected zenith. If that were the esse then the claims of Thing-
in-itselfar!d ConcfiilPtual Scheme Realism would have to be dropped. Any 
gaps irt OUt; knowl"dge, or divergences of conceptions of reality with 
other.beings, would be at .worst temporary inconveniences. "-teri.l 
realism could still be preserved simply by observing that on our 
best theory, the physical universe pre-dates the emergence of mind. 
So even if we beliave nothing in the universe can transcend our 
ultimate powers to know it, we may stUl believe in tha mind-
independ~nce of that universe. .This poaeibUity, atrangely, se8llts 
to elude Rasmussen and Ravnkilde (reesll 5.2 above) who aeemed to 
" l ";,' " 
think that a belief in independence could have no content (at least 
for the anti-realiat).except aa a belief in the existenc~ of 
mind-tranecendent aspects of reality. But, as Wright observes 
(Wright (2) p.14), it must surely be incorrect to think that a 
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belief 1n mind-independence requires a belief in the ineffable. 
There is, I think, no reason to suppose that we may not locate 
the substance of the disagreement between the ontological realist 
and the idealist simply by alloWing the realist to believe in a 
theory ot the emergence of mind out of a self-subsistent reality 
which the idealist cannot endorse. 
A scientific realist of this radical nature who sees in 
science a bOUndless enterprise of penetration to the noumenal 
depths 'of reality, may still accept the evolutionary account of 
man's perceptual bias and limitstion. But hs will insist that 
no similar account of cognitive limitation end bias is in any 
way implied by the evolutionary picture. In this vein leslie 
Stevenson has insisted (in correspondence) on a distinction 
between " .' 
our sense-organs (wh!.~h are indeed limited in ways presumably 
determined by evolution) and our concepts. • •• That 
our perception is limited does not imply that our conception 
is similarly limited. 
L.Stevenson. 
Such an objection is, however, misguided. For the argument 
so far has not been simply that limitations in perceptions ~ 
. . 
limitationa in conceptions so much as that the range and nature 
of our theoretical '~~nceptions . may well be limited and bi~S8d' in 
way~ analogous'to thosa in which our perceptions ere limited. 
; ,;. • e' ~ 
An evol~~d feculty of reeson, so 'the suggestion goes, is certainly 
. . 
different to an evolved feculty of sense (it may enable us to 
transcend the imperfections of the sensory faculty); but why should 
we believe it to be exempt from the considerations of fallibility 
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and scope usu~lly asso'iated with t~e products of th~ selective 
process? The onus of ~roof must bp. on those who connider human 
cognition to be Elotirely free of U·<3 usual biological and 
evolutionary Um; tatior,s to suggest how it could be 130. To 
doubt the evolutjonary claims, it seems to me, must involve 
disputing at lea~t one of the following; the notion that cognitive 
structures a~, sl;bject to natuTel selection, or the notion that 
human cognitive ~ tructWres stand in a relation of phylogenetic 
continuity to the.se of lower animals or the thesis of materialism 
itself - the 1deR that all our mental structures depend on physical 
ones. In the ab~ence fif any such c;oncrete suggestion as to why 
human thought is D2i lJmited and bJBsed by the physical sUb-stratums 
of its existence I see no reason to doubt the evolutionary 
epistemologist.s notion that the wflrld itself extends beyond 
even its in prin,;iple humanly accensible contours, or to doubt 
that evan its acr,essibl e contours ore ineradically Coloured by 
the particular c"gnitil'e organisat1on we bring to bear on them. 
An alternat I ve (it somewhat puzzling) strategy for the Radical 
Scientific Reali~t is to accept th" force of the argument for 
cognitive limits but til insist that. such limits are 'pro tempf)ra I 
and may yet be tfanscel,ded by the I.se of the human intellect. 
Thus Wuketits, wl'o was earlier seell to accept the considerations 
suggesting impertactio" and bias it! int",Uectual strategies goes 
on to say that: 
A new image of mal, implies man's view of his evolutionary 
past which Is sti:tl present and not yet overcome. 
Wuketits p.22. 
The Implical.ion ie that once \.,e understand the 'evolutionary 
past' we shall o\/ercom~ it; it is «.hus that the goale of realism 
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and objectivity in science are to b9 compatible with the pr~gmatic 
fallibilistic implications of the nature of the process which made 
the brains we employ to do science. The primary task of evolutionary 
epistemology, thus viewed, is to achieve a proper view of objective 
reality by subtracting any elements or strategies su~ceptible of 
species-biased, contingent explanations rooted in manls evolutionary 
heritage. 
To attempt to do this is, I fear, to risk being left with 
nothing. for it is by no means inconceivable that there are n£ 
labsolute truths' about the universe to be had; that all truth is 
truth for a given type of being, having access to a given variety 
of data, within an intellectual framework adapted to 8 particular 
set of needs and capacities. This thought (pursued in chapter 10 
following) sugyests tl~t the evolutionary 9pistemologist ought not 
to see himself es polishing the mirror of nature so as to eneble 
it the better to reflect the absolute contours of reality. Rather, 
he is refining ~ view of reality which, though validated 
pragmatically, is not to bs held unique or privileged. 
Clearly, however, there is something right about the picture 
of evolutionary epistemology 'ironing out the bugs' in some of 
our cognit1ve strategies. ~n can often recognise inbuilt cognitive 
prejudices which are inappropriate in an extended theoretical 
context. They may then b~ abandoned, written off perhaps as a 
residue of our evolutionary past which refuses to Iwork reliably 
in the "life-world" of modern man l (Wuketit~ 22). An example 
given by Wuketits concerns feedback causality (reciprDcal causal 
interaction between elements in a complex structure). This, he 
saye, is a concept we need and now· employ but one which sits uneasily 
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with 'the inborn expectation of linear causality, the inborn 
cause-effect notion'. The idea is that we explain our unease 
with the new notion, and hence take a step towards overcoming 
it, by referring the attractiveness of the linear notion to 
the simpler conditions which our basic cognitive predilections 
were formed to deal with. Examples could be multiplied. 
Einstein's resistance to quantum physics on the grounds of its 
statistical nature may be seen (correctly or incorrectly) as a 
result of cognitive prejudices more appropriate to the macroscopic 
realm. Or (one which should appeal to the natural anti-realist), 
classical logic might be seen as misguidedly importing principles 
valid in a simple, concrete context into the entirely different 
setting of a modern logic replete with abstract and infinitistic 
claims. Classical dilemma, for instance, is surely a valid 
principle when it is used with regard to claims concerning physical 
objects in the near vicinity. This speedy decision procedure for 
primitive contexts may have become encoded in our brains. Yet it 
may be (as the intuitionist believes) demonstrably inappropriate 
in a wider, more theoretical context. The attraction of dilemma 
is thus explained by its validity in a primitive context; but the 
criticisms of it may still stand. 25 It is in this way that an 
evolutionary perspective may help us to explain why it is that, 
as Dummett puts it: 
There are certain errors of thought to which the human 
mind seems naturally prone. 
Dummett. RP in IQ p.374. 
But to agree that an evolutionary perspective may help us to 
understand some of our natural bias and thus aid us in transcending 
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it is one thing. To believe it can allow us to polish the mirror 
of nature to the extent of reflecting the unique and unvarnished 
truth about everything is quite another. It is Rorty's fear that 
such, indeed, is the project of evolutionary epistemology (see 
chapter 10). But this need not be the case. For one thing, if 
our earlier observations concerning the role of some innate 
weighting of prior probabilities and the potential limitations 
of the observational base of science are correct, then the probings 
of evolutionary epistemology will themselves be as limited and 
biased as any. They may, like any probings, refine our world-view 
and render it more useful to us. But they could not be expected 
to elevate it to the rarified heights of a true metaphysical 
realism. Similarly, although it is undeniable that science allows 
us to prescind from the realm of phenomenal experiences (see e.g. 
McGinn (3) p. 112 ) the resultant discontinuity between science 
and perception cannot serve to underpin a full Radical Realism. 
For the issue must then devolve upon the nature of the capacities 
by which the perceptual is transcended. If scientific progress 
(including criticism of man's perceptual and conceptual capacities) 
is indeed bounded and biased by the somewhat contingent perspective 
of human thought, then the goel of such endeavours will be the 
improvement of a human picture of reality, and not the production 
of a positionless one. We may polish the mirror without seeking, 
in the reflection, the noumenal structure of the material world. 
7.6 let us turn our attention now to the anti-realist; what is 
~ attitude regarding the meaning of scientific statements? 
The semantic anti-realist must believe, in some sense, that scientific 
claims may not intelligibly outrun possible observational warrants 
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for such claims. Such. demand must be carefully understood, 
for on the face of it it may appoar to rulo out too much. 
Individual claims of quantum theory are, after all, far 
removed from any obvious observational warrant. The demand, 
properly understood, is not that every scientific sentence 
(e.g. 'there is a sixth kind of quark') must have a particular 
warrant in gross observation. That would be absurd. Rather, 
it is the weaker demand that every roughly delimited theory 
should yield some claims in the form of observation statements 
which we could, in principle, actually check. Thus where our 
physical theory involves some abstract mathematical description 
of reality the demand is that: 
The justification for asserting that the structures thus 
abstractly described concretely exist remains the power to 
explain observable phenomena via the effects on one another 
that (the posited unobservable objects) have attributed to 
them. 
Dummett. PL in lQ p.213 
This weaker demand fits nicely with a broadly Duhemian 
view of the evidence for scientific claims. The view, that is, 
that it is scientific theories as wholes which have observational 
implications and that individual sentences concerning the objects 
and relations posited by such theories cannot be independently 
conceived of as being true or false. Thus a theory which posits 
unobservable objects will be falsifiable as a whole by virtue of 
its observational implications. But individual sentences 
containing its terms will not have individual warrants (outside 
the context of the overall theory) in the observable realm, and 
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so will not be independently verifiable or refutable. 
Some of the objects and relations spoken of in a scientific 
theory will thus be theoretical in the Dummetian sense in which: 
A theoretical term is one on which a determinate semantics 
has not been conferred in the sense that no general procedure 
has been provided for recognising anything as conclusively 
establishing or as conclusively refuting individual sentences 
containing that term. 
Dummett SQ in 1£ p.405 
From such thoughts we can construct an anti-realist critique 
of a certain kind of scientific realism. For suppose someone holds 
that every scientific sentence either describes or fails to describe 
the conditions which obtain in an independently existing realm. 
This is the extension of ordinary semantic realism to the scientific 
field. The anti-realist will predictably object. It is his belief 
(argued at length in chapter one above) that we can conceive of a 
sentence being true onlX by associating it with the recognisable 
conditions which would lead us to assert it. Given the Duhemian 
point, however, some individual scientific sentences cannot be 
associated with recognisable conditions of truth or falsity. 
Instead they function in an overall theory which has an associated 
complex of observable implications which may be recognised as 
obtaining or failing tv obtain. The semantic anti-realist is 
thus under some pressure to adopt a non-realistic attitude to at 
least some parts of scientific theory (Witness Dummett's somewhat 
gnomic remarks in the closing paragraph of CSP). For to the extent 
that an individual scientific sentence describing e.g. the behaviour 
of the sixth quark is not associated with its own independent 
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observable conditions of truth or falsity, the anti-realist 
is unable to conceive that it could ~ true. Instead, in 
quasi-instrumentalist fashion, he must conceive it as only 
part of a picture which may, as a whole, find warrant in 
the observable. 
A note of caution, however. To say that some scientific 
sentences are not ~ to be conc~ived as individually true 
or false need not imply that they can ~ be so conceived. 
tor they might cease to be properly theoretical if we gained 
(augmen~ed) observational access to the levels of reality 
spoken of in the theories in which they occur. This would 
occur if, for exemple, a quark-microscope were to be built. 
The claim, then, is not that what is presently a theoretical 
sentence in a scientific theory could never be known to be 
true or false. Rather, it is that it cannot be assumed to 
be either true or false unless and until man gains observational 
access to the sector of reality of which it speaks. Until 
then, the sentence itself must, as we said, be understood 
as part of a picture which helps us explain what 1! presently 
observable; a picture which, in the clessic phrase, 'laves 
the phenomena'. 
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7.7 We may now distinguish three possible attitudes to science 
(I do not, of course, claim they are axhaustive) and ask which, 
if any, is the proper attitude for the natural anti-realist. 
Attitude 1. Radical Realism - Man has,perhaps by fortuitous 
genetic saltation, been endowed with a brain which is capable 
of revealing to us the entire· and ultimate nature of all 
reality. Man is capable of completely transcending his basic 
cognitive and perceptual abilities to achieve this centreless 
view. A true scientific statement is one which describes 
reality from this position. 
Attitude 2. Critical Internal Realism - Man has evolved a 
brain which builds theories adequate to the accessible data. 
Such theories, however, may not be conceived as affording 
unique or privileged pictures of reality. Our access to data 
may be limited and the kinds of theories we build will reflect 
also the particular nature of the human mind. A true scientific 
statement is one which is adequate to any data we can ever 
gather. 
Attitude 3. Conceptual Relativism - Man has evolved a brain 
which conceives reality in an entirely human and capricious 
manner. It makes no senss to assume that our science bears 
any objective relation to an independent reality. Talk of 
scientific theories as being ~ is misleading insofar 8S 
it suggests any degree of objective validity. 
Both the evolutionary epistemologist and the anti-realist 
have reason to dispute Radical Realism. Evolutionary obsarvations 
concerning probable cognitive limitations and contingancias of 
thought suggest that the avowed goal of attitude 1 is unrealistic 
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and perhaps even incoherent. And the meaning-theoretic 
observations of the anti-realist suggest that we may not 
regard individual theoretical sentences as being true or 
false descriptions of theory-independent reality, nor endorse 
any conception of truth for whole theories which goes beyond 
the idea of their being warranted in potentially available data. 
It is the task of the natural anti-realist to combine these 
observations (thus endorsing Critical Internal Realism) without 
falling into the attitude of Conceptual Relativism. In giving up 
Radical Realism the natural anti-realist must beware of allowing 
a species-specific non-objective account of scientific knowledge 
to rob him of his right to regard science as descriptive of the 
common reality to which various beings are variously adapted. ror 
to lose this right is, as we saw earlier ( in 5.3 above) to lose 
the right to do evolutionary epistemology at all. 
One way to aecure the position of Critical Internal Realism 
is to adapt a conception of the scientific enterprise formulated by 
Baa van fraaaaen. Van fraaasen's idea is to regard science as aiming 
at the production of theories which are empirically adequate. An 
empirically adequate theory is a thaory which says only true things 
about the realm of the observable and measurabls (see van freassen 
p.64). Generally apeaking, of oourse, a scientific theory will make 
claims which go beyond the realms of the presently obeervable and 
measurabls. A theory will thus have a modal (a model is 'any 
structure which satisfiee the axioms of theory' (van Treassen 43) ) 
which describes how the world i8 if e given interpretation of the 
theory is correct. Thie deecription of how the world is will include 
various unobservable or theoretical elamants. It ia van fraassen's 
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cleim tha~ we do not need to think of such a model as being 
literally true in order to believe tho theory. In order to 
believe the theory we need only to agree that the observational 
sub-section of tha theory affords a true description of ths 
world ae we find it. Ae van Fraessen puts it: 
The adequacy of modele does not require all their 
elements to have counterparts in reality. They will be good 
if thay fit those phenomena to be saved. 
van Freassen p.135. 
A theory is thus Just a means of modelling appearances (ibid.51). 
That is not to say, however, that two theories which are equally 
successful at modelling appearances will be equally good for there 
are the pragmatic virtues of simplicity, usefulness, relation to 
human concerns etc. to take into account as well. Appeal to such 
pragmatic concerns explains why we may prefer one empirically 
adequate theory over another (cf van Fraeeeen p.S? - 92). 
SCience, on this account, aims to produce theories which have 
models which are true with regard to all the strstches of observable 
(including measurable) reality in which they are intsrpreted. But 
what is observeble is, for van Fraassen, just the notion (endorsed 
by the minimal anti-realist on page 21 above) of what the preeent 
. 
epistemic community could ever observe. Observebility is therefore 
observability-in-principle ~ obeervablilty-to-us. It ie, precisely, 
what is observable in principle by us. Simply put; 
X is obeervable if there sre circumstances which are auch 
that if X is present to us under those circumstances then 
we observe it. 
van Fr.assen 16. 
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Observation is thus tied to the present epistemic community 
and science aims at a correct description of whatever is accessible 
to that community, in the light of the interests of that community26. 
The limits of the range of phenomena dealt with by science are 
(naturally) the limits of the phenomena accessible to human 
beings - and these may, without paradox, include our limitations 
themselves. Thus: 
The human organism is, from the point of view of physics, a 
certain kind of measuring epparatus. As such it has certain 
inherent limitstions - which will be described in detail in 
the final physics and biology. It is these limitations to 
which the 'able' in 'observable' refsrs - our limitations 
qua human beings. 
van Fraaeeen 17. 
Van fraaaaen'8 account sits comfortably with our earlier 
observations. Human science will inherit, and may evsn rscognise, 
tha limitations of the beings which do science. It is thus that 
an internal 'concept of the transcendent is generated; a concept 
which acknowlsdges, on the basis of accessible evidence, the 
possibility of aspects of reality beyond our scisntific reach. 
Human acience, thus conceived, is not trained on absolute truth. 
What it reveals is, rather, something which is probably at leaat 
partia~ly true of mete~ial reality, revealed in 8 fashion which 
reflects also the real nature of the human cognitive apparatus. 
Combining these attitudes to ecience with the evolutionary 
perspective on our basic observational powers derived from the 
Appropriateness argument yields a defence of critical intarnal 
realism. For the observational Bub-eection of • good model will 
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thus answer, in part, to the basic observational powers which we 
believe to have been moulded to cope with the independent reality 
in which we compete. Thus our scientific models, insofar as they 
answer to the phenomena, are not to be disconnected from the real 
nature of the world. But the models we choose to accept may not 
be the only models which could account for the same appearances 
and they may not be the models which would be chosen by some other 
race with either different kinds of interests (hence choosing models 
on the pragmatic basis of alternative heuristics) or access to 
different kinds of observational data (hence having criteria of 
empirical adequacy different to our own). 
The conception of science as Modelling the accessible phenomena 
is thus perfectly competible with e degree of reelism concerning the 
relation of euch models to material reality. They work because they 
are constrained, in their obeervational sub-sections, by the 
ontological order by which man'e own capacities of observation 
were moulded. We conceive of our theories ae reflecting that 
ontological order. But we recognise the limits of our obeervational 
powers and the contingencies of OUr human interests. So we conceive 
the reflection as incomplete, non-unique and eomewhat perspectival. 
Our theories will bring out particular features of a reel-world 
phenomenon. But ~ features and to what extent will depend 
(a) on what information we have at our disposal and (b) on the 
particular naeds and interests which the theory is designed to 
serve. These.two features correspond satisfactorily to the 
contingency of the range of real-world phenomena to which man 
has direct observational access and to the particular kind of 
interest which man's needs and the nature of the human brain allow 
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him to have regarding the accessible realm. 
In treating science as aiming not at the 'discovery of 
truth concerning the unobservable' but at the construction of 
modele 'adequate to the phenomena' (van Fraassen 5) the constructive 
empiricist (as van fraassen calls himself) proves an ideal mate 
for the anti-realist. for recall the anti-realist's qualms (7.6 
above) concerning our grasp of truth for highly theoretical sentences. 
Such sentences, involving claims about unobservables, need not now 
be conceived as being true at all. Rather, in believing the theory 
as a whole we believe only that what it says about tho observable 
is true. Our understanding of highly theoretical sentences thus 
need involve no more than our grasping how the entities and 
relations they postulate serve to aid us in the explanation of 
the phenomena the theory seeks to 'save'. 
In the light of this discussion we may close the present 
chapter with an informal dsscription of the proposed relation 
between scientific knowledge and material reality given in terms 
of a Special relation of tolerance. Thus suppose we mean by P 
some set of basic cognitive strategiss snd sensory modalities 
posse seed by a creature of a given biological constitution Q in 
some envil'onmental niche S. Then we may call the set P tolerated 
by material reality if 
P provides 8 Q-type being with a phenomenal picture of S, and 
a .sst of reactions and similarity spacings with regard to 
that picture of S, such that Q-type beings are enabled to 
act in B manner conducive to survivsl in S, 
and we may call a scientific theory or world-view P' maximally 
tolerated by material reality if 
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pi is a theory of material reality which has a model 
able successfully to account for all the observaole 
phenomena. 
pi may thus be conceived as an ideal scientific theory for Q-txpe 
bsings. Such a theory is related to the material reality it 
explains by the original tolerance relation obtaining betwaen 
p and the environment. The Justification for calling pi a theory 
of the real lIIorld thus rests squarely on the evolutionary 
Justification for taking P to be causally moulded by the world 
lIIith IIIhich it coped. 
A true ecientific theory is thus identified with one that is 
maximally tolerated by the observable realm. And there lIIill, of 
course, be an infinite gradation of tolerances betllleen the minimal 
(accounting for only a small number of phenomena) and the maximal 
(accounting for all the phenomena). No maximally tolerated theory 
has yet been found, and perhaps none ever lIIill be. But the crucisl 
point is this; even if one ~ found, still the reflexivity of the 
formulation of the tolerance relation (its relativisation to'~ 
and contingent capacities) would rob it of any claim to be the one 
unique metaphysical truth fated to be agreed by all rational beings. 
The intelligible goal of science, lIIe may nOlll aay, is nEi the 
one true description of the 1II0rld-in-iteelf but the production of 
more and more highly tolerated models of the 1II0rld we find around 
us. And a theory is, ultimately, nothing more or leea than a 
useful arrangement of information. Just ~ arrangements of 
information lIIe find useful will depend on our human needs and 
capacities and the particular cognitive orientationwB happen 
to possess. 
A.J.Clark 153 
The strong conclusion to draw from the picture of science 
as aiming at tolerated models and useful theories would be that 
even at the ideal limit of human enquiry there might be a plethora 
of available theories all of which have models which are 
observationally and heuristically adequate. (Such a conclusion 
is endorsed by Putnam (1) p.1 - 25.) For our purposes, however, 
something weaker wil~ do. We may conclude simply that the one final 
theory (if one is all there is) at the ideal limit of human 
scientific enquiry is still not the only possible 'correct' 
representation of reality even if relative to our cognitive 
constraints and observational access there are no visible alter-
natives. In other words, given the natural possibility of alter-
native .life-styles, needs, capacities and cognitive structures it 
makes no senss to idsntify our ideal scientific account of reality 
with the ultimate nature of the world-in-itself. Just because we 
do not regsrd our theories as unique or necessary, however, does 
not mean we may not regard them as valid repreeentations, in the 
light of our interests and atructure, of the available information. 
It is this combination of cosmic contingency and limited objective 
validity which allows the evolutionary theorist his scientific 
account of the common adaptive environment while admitting the 
cognitive bias and limitations implied for man by the adaptive 
account itself. 
We may sum up the present chapter by remarking (1) that the 
natural anti-realist has, it seems, some convincing grounds for 
bslisving that his account of cognitive limitation and bisB applies 
even to the realm of scientific enquiry, (2) that he may therefore 
accept the conceptions of the transcendent enshrined in the theses 
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of Conceptual Scheme and Thing-in-itself Realism and (3) that 
by adopting an account of science as aiming to produce tolerated 
models of an independent reality he can ensure that the constraints 
of cognitive limitation and bias fall short of undermining our 
faith in the scientific foundations of evolutionary theory itself. 
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8. The Return af the Transcenden~al Object? 
8.1 The epistemology and metaphysics of the natural anti-realist 
may now appear to be assuming a familiar, and familiarly 
discomforting, shape. For we seem to be witnessing a recognisably 
Kantian dislocation of Appearances from transcendental reality or 
the world-in-itsalf. On the one side we have ratianal beings and 
their possibly various phenomenal images and scientific theories. 
On the other side, ever elusive behind the veil, we have the 
material realIty with which the phenomenal image copes and which 
sciance may adequately~. How far, then, has the natural 
anti-raalist now committed himaelf to recapitulating the much 
criticised Kantian divide? 
8.2 Kant'a usa of the notion of the world-in-itself has been 
frequently criticised as at best ambiguous and at worst 
demonstrably inconsistent. On the one hand Kant cleerly believed 
that the notion of the world-In-itself was both a logically 
consistent one and an inevitable conceptual construct of human 
thought about reality. To conceive of the experienced reality 
of a human subject as Appearance is, he felt, necessarily to 
conceive of aomething that appears. But since all that is given 
ta experience is necessarily given In the mind-involving terme 
of general human modes of perception and thought (viz.the MoJL~ of ~~ 
~ ~~categories) it follows that of that something that appears 
nothing can be known. Thus we read that 
All our representations are, it is true, referred by the 
understanding to some objects; and since appearancea are 
nothing but representations, the understanding refers tham 
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to a something, as the object of sensible intuition. But 
this somethIng thus conceived is only the transcendental 
object; and by that is meant a something = X of which we 
know, and with the present constitution of our understanding 
can know, nothing whatsoever •••••••••• (A 250). 
On the other hand, however, Kant believed that all knowledge 
had to be of Appearances alone. It thus had to relate to what 
could be given in experi~nce. If it did not so relate it could 
be nothing for us. Thus, in anti-realistically familiar vein, 
Kant writes: 
Or; 
We demand in every concept, first, the logical form of a 
concept (of thought) in general and secondly, the possibility 
of giving it an object to which it may be applied. (A 239). 
We therefore demand that a bare concept be made sensible, 
that 1s, that an object corresponding to it be presented 
in Intuition. Otherwise the concept would, 8S we say, be 
without~, that is, without meaning. (A 240). 
Or egain; 
The understanding can never transcend those limits of 
sensibility within which alone objects can be given to 
us. (A 247). 
In such pessages Kant may be seen to endorse something 
very like the anti-realist's demand of conservative extension 
or harmony i.e. the demand that nothing be assertible indirectly 
which is not (in principle at least) aS8ertibie directly by a 
human agent ( see 1.2 p.15). further evidence of such a 
tendency maybe found at B 195, A 226 <'the e~i8tence of the 
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thing (is) bound up with our perceptions in a possible 
experience') and B 724. Kant's empirical realism may thus 
be plausibly interpreted to involve a kind of semantic 
anti-realism27 • This general araa of Kant's thought (the 
insistence that all meaningful use of concepts must relate 
to conditions of application in a possible human experience) 
has been termed Kant's principle of significance (Strawson p.16). 
Given this principle of significance, however, the meaningfulness 
of the very idea of the world-in-itself is put in jeopardy. The 
difficulty is simply how to Justify, in the light of this anti-
realistic strain of thought, the assertion that things-in-
themselves are nothing for y! instead of the assertion that 
they are nothing at all. 
One way to describe the problem is to focus on the constructive 
interpretation of existential quantification which is a feature of 
Kant's empirical realism/semantic anti-realiem. for Kant's problem, 
on the surface, is very like that which the natural anti-realist 
faced in chapter 5. Thus Kant affirms that he intends existential 
quantification to be understood constructively by saying that: 
Existence has to do only with the question of 
whether 8uch a thing be 80 given us that the perception of 
it can, if need be, precede the concept. 
B. 272 
Vet he believes !!!a that the thing-in-itself cannot be given in 
perception since it is precisely the notion of a thing which is 
'not to be thought as object of the sensea' (B 310). Since we 
therefore cannot even asaert that there ~ a world-in-iteelf we 
must ask what legitimate role the concept can play. Coneistency 
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with the principle of significance now seems to demand that 
we drop the notion of the thing-in-itself altogether. 
Kant did not want to lose the notion of the world-in-itself. 
The idea of a noumenal reality was essential to his moral 
doctrines (see e.g. the discussion of freedom at B xxviii). 
What's more he seemed, at times, to believe that appearances 
must be somehow conditioned by the nature of noumenal reality 
even though we can have no idea of how this occurs or in what 
respects it may be so. There is the suggestion of such a view 
et A19 where Kant speaks as if the transcendental object affects 
the mind (the faculty of repreeentation) to cause sensation. 
The same thought seems to be behind his references(e.g. A3BO) 
to the tranecendental object as being the ground of appearances. 
It aurfaces also at A104 where, following a discussion of the 
transcendental object as an unknown factor X he adds that 'the 
object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge 
from being haphazard or arbitrary'. At least one recent 
commentator has therefore taken the view that: 
The transcendental object expresses the element in experience 
which makes it compulsory and non-arbitrary. It is the 
element of control in all our experience. 
rindlay 27. 
Vet it is by no means clear that Kant haa any right to auch a 
conception of control. ror Kant insiats upon our total and 
unavoidable ignorance of either the nature or the mechaniams 
of any relation which may obtain between the phenomenal and tha 
noumenal. In this vein he asserts that: 
We are unable to comprehend how noumena can be and 
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the domain that lies out beyond the sphere of appearances 
is for us empty. A 255. 
The problem remains; why to say that what lies outside 
appearances is 'for us empty' and not just empty full stop. 
As Strawson nicely puts it, are these not things of which we 
~ comprahend the impossibility rather than things whose 
possibility we cannot comprehend? (Strewson 265.) 
B.3 Some philosophers, however, would deny that Kant wanted 
such a notion of control at all. Thus 8ird, for example, argues 
that Kant was explicitly hostile to the doctrine which he (Bird) 
terms noumenalism - the idea that noumena affect us and cause 
outer appearances (Bird, pp.20 - 35). On Birdls view, Kant can 
be seen to deny that such a theory could amount to an acceptable 
account of perception. The 'physical influence' theory of A390, 
Bird tells us, is acceptable to Kant only 1! it is tsken, like 
the empirical theories of A386, A387, as a scientific account 
operating within the realm of appearances (Bird 34). Conversely, 
elthough we may speak las if noumena could be regarded as causes 
of our perceptions' this cannot be a genuine theory since no 
evidence for it can be given in our experience. Instead, the 
idea of noumena is to be the idsa of a logical possibility alone. 
And this, Kant tells us, is Ivery far from being sufficient for 
real possibility' (8302). In order for the control theory to 
count as a genuine option ( a description of a real possibility, 
as ws may now say) would requirs, in addition, 'the possibility 
of giving it an object to which it may be applied' (A239). 
Which is precisely what the reference to noumena involved 
precludes us from doing. 
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If there is any way for Kant to avoid the Strawson-type 
objections cited above it probably involves the mobilisation 
of this apparatus. for wa now have a distinction betwean 
(a) grasping the real possibility of a concept and (b) grasping 
its mere possibility i.e. grasping that it involves no logical 
contradiction and that it is therefore at least not impossible 
that the conditions it attempts to describe should obtain. 
In the light of this distinction, and given the Kantian usage 
of the idea of noumena, we may argue (despite misleading 
passages such as A240 quoted earlier) that the principle of 
significance is best seen n2i as describing what is involved 
in grasping the meaning of a claim per se but rather what is 
involved in grasping the meaning of a claim that such and such 
a state of affairs is really possible" This is what we cannot grasp 
regarding the claims about naumena. And thia why Kant can 
consistently conclude not that there are no noumena, but rather 
that: 
It is an open question whether the notion of a 
noumenon be not a mere form of a concept. 
Kan.t A253. 
Ths point is that it is only the mere form of the concept 
that Kant n!!2!. As long as we can think objects as things-in-
themselves Kant's moral and metaphysical ends are eecured. The 
fact that we cannot ~ them as such ( = graep the real 
possibility that there are naumena) need not, it seems, rob the 
claim of all sanse for us (8 xxvi). Unless, of course, 1IIa seek 
to espouse a control-theory as a description of a real possibility. 
Instead, Kant has made room for faith in an extra-phenomenal reality. 
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And this manoeuvre can succeed as long as we can grasp the 
meaning of the claim that such a reality is at least barely 
possible, even if it is not really possible as far aa our 
knowledge goes. It is thus that the idea of a noumenon is to 
be a 'merely limiting concept' aimed at curbing 'the pretensions 
of sensibility' (8311). The illegitimete, positive sense of 
noumenon is, if we are right, the idea of the concept as 
descriptive of a real possibility; this idea, Kant tells us, 
ia one we cannot begin to comprehend (8307). 
Whether theae manoeuvree are euccessful in reconciling the 
notion of the world-in-iteelf with the principle of significance 
I do not know. Findlay thinks they are, and that~ Kantian 
transcendentals are not the 'mere surds' which soma (e.g.Strewson) 
take them to be. He views with horrorStrawson's surgical removal 
of the transcendental organs (Findlay 377) and believes they are, 
on the contrary, essentiel to the profoundest elements of Kant's 
thought. The important point, for our purposes, is that if Kant 
has e consistent account at all, it looks likely to depend on 
the distinction between real and bare possibility just outlined. 
But this distinction is one to which the anti-realist is not 
entitled. For the anti-realist, !l! grasp of meaning comes down 
to a grasp of conditions of warranted assertability. And the 
warrants are necessarily such as could, in principIa, be given 
in experience. There is simply no room in such a system for any kind 
of 'minimal' or 'mere' grasp of a proposition of the kind which Kant 
felt we could have in terms of our appreciation of its bare 
possibility i.e. the fact that it contains no logical contradiction. 
In other words, for the anti-realist all possibility 18 real 
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possibility. For to understand what some claim of the form 
'possibly P' means is in part to grasp the conditions which, 
were they to obtain, we could recognise as warranting the 
assertion of P (recall chapter 1). Which is, in turn, 
sufficient (in Kant's terminology) for the real possibility 
of P ( see 8303 ). 
The Kantian idea of the world-in-itself is, it seems, 
crucially ill-adapted to survive in the environment of real 
possibility where the anti-realist would have to locate it. 
For the anti-realist semantics, if it is a semantics of real 
possibility alone, can leave no room for the manoeuvres which 
may insulate Kant from Strawson-type criticisms. In the absence 
of euch manoeuvres the world-in-itself becomes, as Straweon 
arguee, an idaa of which we can comprehend the impossibility 
rather than one whose possibility ( = real possibility) we cannot 
comprehend. If, then, the natural anti-realist is nevertheless 
truly committed to a Kantian metaphysical divide, his situation 
looks bleak. Can the apparent commitment be avoided, or must 
our hero fall foul of the traditional objections sketched above? 
8.4 The evolutionary epistemologist, building on the account of 
science developed in chepter 7, might adopt either one of two 
'metaphysical' stances. But only the s9cond of these, I shall 
suggest, is open to the evolutionary theorist who is drawn !!!2 
to an anti-realist account of meaning. This second option avoids 
the difficulties associated with the Kantian conception of the 
world-in-itself. 
The first option is the wholesale acceptence of the 
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indescribable transcendgntal object. That there is a tendency 
in evolutionary epistemology towards such an acceptance is 
undeniable. Thus O'Hear suggests that for the evolutionary 
epietemologiat: 
the world remains elusively and forever behind our 
representations of it and our methods of arriving 
at them, whether they are simple observations or 
more sophisticated theories. 
O'Hear p.209. 
This return of the transcendental object is, he conjectures, 
motivated by the observations concerning fallibility and scope 
and by the denial that the individual is ever a paesive receiver 
of information as opposed to an active and biased interpreter 
of signals from the unknown outside. 
It is aasy to eee how our own account, as detailed in 
chapter 7, could be taken in some such way. Thus it would be 
Bsked, relative to all the potentially various models of reality 
which man or other rational beings might construct, what it is 
that they are all models of. They are, we said, models of 
indapendent material reality constructed in accordancs with 
the nseds, proclivities and capacities of the beings who operate 
with them. But material reality, then, must surely take on the 
aspect of the Kantian world-in-itself looming behind all the 
various systems. Option (1), then, relates all the theoriss of 
science and the images of sense to one (indescribable) world-in-
itself. It holds that there obtains a causal connection, or (in 
the case of written theory) a reference reletion between our 
representations and eome unspecifiable reality, All representations 
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(scisntific snd common-sense) thus stand on one side of the 
great divide, with trenscendental reality on the far noumenal 
bank. 
There is, however, a aecond option, which is to retain 
the notion of multiple valid models and images of reality 
whilst rejecting all play with the idea of an indescribable 
single way the world is beyond all these descriptions. Care 
muat be taksn, for the evolutionary epistemologist does, of 
course, believe in one common reality. The auggestion is not 
that ws deny this belief, but that we refuse to allow that 
common reality to become an indescribable world-in-itself. 
Rather, we should say it is ~ reality (the reality shown 
in our phenomenal image and in our scientific theories) which, 
however, we apprehend only incompletely and in terms of our 
partioular seneory and intellectual apparatus'. The difference 
is somewhat subtle, but important. On thie alternative account 
the distinction between the world end the world as we (or some 
other being) know it is one which gste drawn entirely on the 
side of Kant's Appearances. For the contsnt of-the claims of 
fallibility and bias is given, we saw (chapter 6) , purely in 
terms of the acoessible, internal evidence. So it is given in 
experience. So the distinction, for us, partskes of real 
possibility and is not merely (as Kant's seems to be) a matter 
of the consistency of the claim that our Appearances may not, 
be mirrors of some ultimate noumenal reality. Kant, by ehowing 
that the supposition of a noumenel realm did not imply any 
self-oontradiction of the form P and - P, securad all he thought 
he needed; room for faith in extra-phenomenal facte. Hie distinction 
is thue a transcendantal one end not an empirical one. 
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The evolutionary epistemologist, by contrast, is clearly 
concerned with an empirical distinction which he believes 
thrust upon him by his studies of lower animals and his theory 
of the selective background of cognitive processes in general. 
Option one,by elevating this distinction into a transcendental 
claim, makes the mistake of ignoring the basis of the claim in 
what is actually given in human experience. We could not expect 
a properly transcendental claim to be so based, and this gives 
us the clue that there is something amiss with the first option. 
Option two seeks to avoid the metaphysical extravagance 
and methodological oddity of postulating an indescribable 
world-in-itself. It holds instead that the world which is 
modelled £!fr be described after all; indeed, describing it is 
just what the model does. It is just that we are not to believe 
either that our phenomenal images or scientific models are likely 
to constitute the only possible means of effective description,or 
that the descriptions they yield will be complete, unbiased and 
totally accurate. In this way the transcendental divide is 
replaced with an empirical one. The world to which the various 
models, or images, relate is not some unspecifiable noumenal 
realm. It is rather ~ world; the world non-uniquely and incompletely 
described in our models and images. It is ~ world which ie 
potentially transcendent and whose potential transcendence is 
internally recognised by the natural anti-realist. We can sustain 
no conception of any of its transcendent aspects, to be sure, but 
in recognising the possibility of such aspects we are not inviting 
a Kantian notion of the world-in-itself. The world we describe is 
the very world which other beings "might deacribe in other ways, and 
to various extents. 
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8.5 One of the attractive aspects of such a story is that it 
gives due weight to the appropriateness argument which links our 
known world to the world in which we actually live. Kant's 
transcendental divide is thus seen to be spanned by an empiricel 
bridge. This bridge allows us to claim that our images and 
models are causally related to the world of which they are 
images and models. The natural anti-realist does not, it seems, 
have to face the probably insurmountable difficulty of giving an 
account of the assertability conditions of the claim that there 
is a noumenal reality which stands in no knowable relation to the 
world of experience. Instead, he may deny the Kentian thought 
that the world of Appearances stands in no knowable logical 
relation at al! to the world-in-itsalf and insist that Appeerances 
are knowingly related to the nature of the world-in-itself but 
with the provisos (i) that the reletion is not unique or 
metaphysically privileged and (ii) that Appearances (including 
the ecientific) are always a l£int function of our human nature 
and the nature of the world-in-itself. The natural anti-realist 
thus countenances (what Kant does not) a knowable bridge linking 
Appearances to the world-in-itself. But the bridge is just one 
of many possible bridges, and our interests and capacities are 
essentially represented in its construction. 
The natural anti-realist is: we may say, entitled to 
precisely that notion of control which Ksnt was not. For 
by seeing our knowledge (where it is a priori) and our sensory 
and intellectual means of acquiring knowledge as a product of 
interaction with the world in which we live, he is able to take 
on board the thought that our id'eas of the world are at least 
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indirectly regulated by the material reality with which they 
have to cope. Even a priori concepts (if we believe there are 
any) may be reformed as ba.sic cognitive strategies a priori to 
the individual but a posteriori in the species. Kant's worry 
that: 
If intuition must conform to the constitution of the 
objects, I do not see how we could know anything of 
the latter a priori. 8 xvii 
is therefore resolved28 • A logical link between concepts and 
material reality may be preserved even when these concepts (or 
forms of concepts) are such as appear to be known a priori. 
Kant could not imagine such a species a posteriori link and 
so was forced to divorce entirely the world as given under such 
basic concepts (the world of Appearances) from the world-in-itself. 
Perhaps the best way to show the difference between the 
Kantian conception of the world-in-itself and the natural 
anti-realist's idea of material reality is to note, finally,that 
the latter but not the former can be known to be ontologically 
real. Kant's idea, we saw, is essentially the idea of a bare 
logical possibility (8307). But where Kant therefore says of 
the transcendental object that: 
We are completely ignorant whether it is to be met with 
in us or outside us, whether it would be at once removed 
with ths cessation of eensibility, or whether in the 
ebsence of senaibility it would still remain. 8345. 
The natural anti-realist is in no doubt. Materiel Reality, unlike 
Kant's world-in-itself, is known to be ontologically prior to 
minds. ,Indeed, it is known to be an essential alemant in tha 
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production of minds. As such there can be no doubt that it 
would continue to exist in the absence of sensibility. 
8.6 In the absence of any commitment to the Kantian transcend-
ental object, our earlier use of the term 'Thing-in-itself 
Realism' can now be seen as, if not mistaken, at least potentially 
misleading. The claim(s.4 p107)was that there may be expected 
to be facets of reality to which we have, even in principle, no 
access. This was asserted alongside a conceptual scheme realism 
which recognised (among other things) that other beinge might have 
access to some of these facets and thus grasp what are for us 
transcendent facts. It is clear from the discussion of 8.4 that 
the world about which such beings may know is still ~ world. 
Clear too that it is the world we model' which may transcend the 
details which our models can display. As such the terminology 
of Thing-in-itself Realism, with its overtones of a Kantian 
transcendental distinction, can be seen to be inappropriate. 
A new term ' T-Material Realism' may now be introduced to capture 
the sense of the old claims. Thus we take the original thesis of 
Material Realism ('the material world exists in full independence 
of human capacities to acquire knowledge of its nature') and add 
to it the thought that the full nature of this material reality 
need not be uniquely or completely described by man's potential 
investigations into it. This strengthens the claim for it rules 
out the idee that the world, though independent of man'e capacities 
to know it, is nonetheless necessarily knowable in full and unique 
detail by the exercise of these capacities. The 'T' thus stands 
for 'Potentially transcendent' .ndsignsl. our recognition of 
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the constraints which the fallibility/scope argument seems to 
place on human knowledge and theorising. 
To sum up, then, we have denied the accusation that the 
account of science as modelling material reality invites the 
unwelcome return of the transcendental object. We have argued, 
in effect, that from within a given, highly tolerated model S 
it is sensible to regard other possible alternative models 
P, Q, R as models of the reality described by S. Similarly, 
within P, it would be right to see S, Q, R, as models of the 
reality described by P. What makes no sense is to seek after 
a standpoint from within no model at all and to ask what 
transcendental reality is modelled by P, Q, R, 5 1 ••••• • 
n nx 
One nice consequence of this analysis is that we can allow 
the possibility of alien epistemologists (perhaps even alien 
evolutionary epistemologists) working successfully with a 
different model of the 'common reality' to our own! Such 
epistemologists may even diagnose man's models as a natural 
end explicable outcome of our own biological nature as it 
appears to their science. We, of course, might do.the same for 
them! Each ecientific model would therefore be aufficiently 
powerful to embrace the working of the other, though they may 
each be baaed on different intellectual strategies and basic 
forms of access to data. 
So far, then, we have argued that the natural anti-realiet 
1s not to be committed to any conception of the transcendental 
object of the kind which led Kant to postulate an inaccessible 
world-in-itself. The concepts of the transcendent embedded in 
T-~terial Realiem and Conceptual Scheme Realism are all to be 
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located on the empirical side of the classical Kantian dichotomy. 
It remains to consider one further 'concept of the transcendent' 
derivable from the naturalised analysis. This concept (which is 
again an empirical one in the Kantian eensa) depends on the 
contingency of man's direct recognitional access to the conditions 
which make somg statements true. It is the Quarry of chapter 9 
following. 
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9. On Blind ~en and ~rtians; an anti-realist's guide to the 
galaxy. 
9.1 There remains a third and final concept of the transcendent 
to be drawn from the natural anti-realist's perspective on language 
and mind. This third dimension of transcendence (the 'phenomenal 
relativism' of 5.4 p. 10a above) ie quite independent of the other 
two. It flowe solely from the contingency of human direct recog-
nitional capacities implied by the evolutionary account of their 
genesis given in chapter 3. In recognising this contingency the 
natural anti-rsalist recognises also the possibility that there 
could be other language-using beings whose words are (at times) 
geared to direct recognitional capacities other than our own. 
Such beings, I shall argue, could make assertions which we can 
know to be meaningful yat which involve concepte whose full 
meaning necessarily transcends our semantic graep. 
9.2 Tha goal, to be clear~ is therefore ~ to provide, by the 
imaginative appeal to other investigative capacities than our own, 
any sense of verification-transcendent truth for the sentences of 
our own language. Such a projsct would be doomed from the start. 
Rather, it is to secura the poseibility that 80me eentences in an 
alien language, L2, might 8ustain meanings which are associatad 
with truth-conditions which, though non-transcendent forthau8ets 
of l2' can be ~nown to be transcendent from the point of view of 
the usere of 80me home language, L,. 
The former project, but not the letter, is doomed by ths 
obvious inability of the imaginative ect itself to secure any 
extre intelligible content for our 'sentences in the face of the 
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classic anti-realist challenges of acquisition and manifestation. 
These challenges suggest that we show t.hat we know the meaning 
of a sentance only by our ability to use it correctly. That ability 
can .be judgad only relative to the accessible circumstances of our 
employment of the sentence. So we can heve no reason to credit 
ourselves with knowledge of the meaning of any sentence insofar as 
that meaning is supposed to relate to some transcendent state of 
affairs. Such knowledge of transcendent meaning ie as incommunicable 
as it is, for the same reason, unacquirable. for all we can be 
taught is to correlate meaning with accessible states of affairs. 
Such, then, is a potted version of the 'argument for semantic 
anti-realism' given in 1.2 p.11. Reflection on such an argument 
ought to reveal immediately the entirely spurious nature of any 
conception of transcandent meaning baaad on the appeal to other, 
better endowed, creatures. for to suggeet that we may acquire 
8uch a conception by reflecting on the possible knowledge of such 
beings ia to confuse 
with 
1. Acquiring a notion of verification transcendent truth 
. for the sentencea of our language, 
2. Acquiring the notion that there may be soma contingent 
limit a on what can be expressed and what meanings can be 
suetained by the sentences of our language as undarstood 
by tha community at large. 
To think that (2) implies (1) is to ignore the force of the 
acquisition prong of the anti-reslist's challenge at1tiraly. for we 
lack any account of hov Merere'lection on the possibility that 
there 'are contingent limite on what ie accessibla t'o ue (limits 
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which may not apply to some other being) could help us to grasp 
the meaning of some sentence in default of any way of correlating 
that 'meaning' with circumstances which impinge on the consciousness 
of the learner. The natural anti-realist endorses (2) but not (1). 
He allows, on empiricist principles, no conception of verification-
transcendent truth-conditions as involved in the meaning of any 
sentences we understand. But he recognises that what we can understand 
may be limited by the particular range of recognitional capacities 
common to the human race. From the latter flows the intelligibility 
of the (non-transcendent) concept of the transcendent toiled for 
in chaptar 6 above. 
The essential point then is that we may conceive !b!l our 
present powera could be extended or !h!i some other being might 
enjoy different capacities to our own without conceiving the 
meaning of our present utterances to be such that their truth 
be recognisable only by the employment of such extended capacities. 
Any attempts to donate meaning to our present utterances by the 
imaginative extension or alteration of our present capacities to 
recognise assertion-warranting circumstances falls foul of precisely 
the same arguments as does a fully fledged semantic realism. 
Oummett recognises this fect in the 1972 postscript to 'Truth' in 
which he writes that: 
The fundamental difference between the anti-realiet end the 
rsalist lies in this; that ••• the anti-realist interprets 
'cepable of being known' to maen Icapable of being known by 
us'. whereas the realist interprets it to mean 'capable of 
being known by soma hypothetical baing whose intellectual 
capacities and powers of observation may exceed our own'. 
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The realist holds that we give sense to those sentences 
of our language which are not effectively decidable by 
appealing tacitly to means of determining their truth-values 
which we do not ourselves possess. The anti-realist 
holds that such a con caption is quite spurious, an illusion 
of meaning, and that the only meaning we can confer on our 
sentences must relate to those means of determining their 
truth-values which we actually possess. 
Dummett. T in lQ 24. (My stress). 
Kant, too, regards our grasp of meaning as unaffected by any 
imaginary extensions or alterations we may make to our ordinary 
range of perceptual and intellectual capacities. He writes, 
concerning the notion of sensible intuitions unlike our own that: 
This extension of concepts beyond ~ sensible intuition 
is of no advantage to us only ~ sensible and 
empirical intuition can give to them (i.s. our Judgments) 
body and meaning. 
Kant. 9149. 
In the terminology of chapter a, imagination alone cannot extend 
the bounds of our grasp of real possibility, which remains always 
tied to what can be given ~ in actual experience. 
For all these reasons, then, the mere ides that other beinga 
might enjoy asaertion-verifying capacities other than our own must 
be rejected as a semantically significant factor in our own grasp 
of the meanings of ~ sentences. Such reflections, however, do 
nothing to undermine the alternative possibility mentioned above 
viz. that the sentencea of some alien language L2 may have meaninga 
associatad with direct recognitiona! capacities shared by most 
users of L2 but lacked by all native uaers of L1• The thought that 
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such a situation could obtain is surely a natural one. If the 
evolutionary explanation of our shared direct recognitional 
capacities given in terms of common evolved quslity spacings 
and sensory mechanisms (chapter 3) is accepted it seems obvious 
that other beings, with other partially random evolutionary 
histories and initially adapted to different kinds of 
environmental niche, might evolve different quality spacings 
and sensory mechanisms to our own. They might be eble to 
distinguish smells we cannot, or be unable to distinguish 
colours ws can. They may use sensory modalities we do not 
even possess. Their cspacities of direct recognition, then, 
could easily be wildly different from our own. All this, I 
think, is obvious. But the implications of such obvious natural 
facts for ths anti-realist's analysis of meaning seem never to 
have been properly thought through. For this contingency of 
capacities of direct recognition stands in 80me tension with the 
claim often attributed to the enti-realist, that ws can have no 
conception of evidence- or verification-transcendent truth (see, 
for example, Devitt p.7?). I propose, therefore, to consider 
various imagined cases in which the feculty of unmediated recognition 
possessed bY'8 speaker is not, as a matter of fact, one ehared by 
the meaning theorist. This situation, as we shall see, provides 
the anti-realist with some unueual puzzles and generates the third 
and final internal concept of the transcsndent mentioned above. 
9.3 Let us supposs (case one) some being is capable of colour 
discriminations beyond our unaided reach. We would encounter 
initial difficulties in translating some of his utterances. 
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When he says 'X is QI and ty is not Qt we might be unable to spot 
the relevant difference between the two cases. If we are to 
translate what he says as a true claim that Q of X we must find 
some way of making the discrimination of Q intelligible to us. 
One wey would be by the scientific measurement of wavelengths 
of light reflecting off objects said to be Q. In that case, 
assuming we find a distinctive wavelength to correlate with Q, 
we may claim mediate access to the truth-conditions of the claim 
that X is Q. So it may seem we have no cause to concede that 
there are true claims in the alien language L2 with truth-condItions 
which are verification-transcendent to users of L1• 
We are tempted to say, in the above case, that we now know, 
thanks to the endeavours of the scientIfic epistemologist, what 
the aliens ~ by 'X is Qt. For we know when 'X i8 9' is correctly 
aasertlble and when it ia not. Let us, for the present, leeve this 
optimism untarnished. Certainly, there seems to be no ultimate 
difficulty In assigning !2m! non-transcendent content (in L1) to 
the words of su~h beings once we have isolated (if only by scientific 
means) the features of public reality upon which some initially 
problematic description in their language fixes. It is juat that 
if the aliens are able to recognise, without acientific augmentation, 
some colour a.which exceeds our own basic viaual range then their 
sensitivity to Q is an important fact which we will need to take 
into account if we are to translate successfully that sector of 
their lenguage. We have to know what they can aee before we can 
begin to decide what they mean. And this is a matter for scientific 
investigation. The complication is not new. Karl von frisch29 
noted that before signs and signals to which a common bee reaponds 
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can be interpreted, it is necessary to form an opinion (on 
scientific grounds) of what a bea can and cannot see. (They 
cannot, for example, distinguish blue or red from grey.) 
One interesting point which already emerges from the 
consideration of such cases concerns ths relative power relations 
of the semantic theorist and the epistemologiet as discussed 
in 4.4 above. The notion that the epistemologist has no direct 
task to perform in the analysis of meaning (see e.g. p.82\ can 
now be seen to be valid only if the community whose language is 
to be interpreted is a human one. In the case of a non-human 
community we have no reason to assume (as we do for our own language 
- see p.64) that those whom we study relate the basic stataments 
of their language to circumstances which ~ find directly accessible. 
To leern what the aliens mean may require the scientific augmentation 
of our own baSic capecities, as in the case of the alien colour 
term Q. In auch cases the epistemologist, observing and scientifically 
investigating the being ,its environment and its structure, may have 
work to do before the semantic theoriet can sven begin. Such cases, 
it will be noticed, vindicate the kind of dialectic envisaged by 
McGinn (4.4 p. 83 above) between the realist and the anti-realist. 
Thus the human realist may dispute any assumptions about the 
alian's faculties which might othsrwise inspire the evangelic 
terran anti-realist to embark on a premature critique of the 
alien's use of his own language. for the grssp of meaning which 
the aliens can successfully manifest to one another may be crucially 
more extensive than the grasps of meaning obviously manifest to us 
by aasociating their actions with circumstances ~ can immediately 
detect. The same complication would affect our capacities of 
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acquisition of grasp of meaning, and for the seme reason. A 
human child, placed in an alien society, may be unable simply 
to 'pick up' the language since what is directly accessible to 
the teacher may elude the pupil. To use the Quinian analysis, 
we may have no innate quality spacing which makes sense of 
grouping togethar various (to us disparate) objects as being Q. 
Since the meaning of complex etatements in the alien language 
may be built on such baeic grasps, the human child, unaided by 
science, may be unable to learn the language at all. 
Suppoae now (esse two) that we have been able to achieve no 
scientific measurement of the conditions of application of some 
basic alien term. Let us continue to call it Q. If the whole of 
some alien tlanguage l were thus afflicted we would be (perhaps) 
unwarranted in calling it a language at all. But we need only 
imagine a cass where we hsve achieved sufficient correlations 
of utterances with true fscts to formulste s working scheme of 
translation. The only snag is that the aliens will parsist in 
saying that such and such sn object is Q, such and 8uch an objact 
is not Q, etc. • Try as we may we continually fail to grasp what 
property of the objects is at iS8ue. When pressed, the aliens 
tall us Q is a secondary quality which they Bee but which is not 
like human coloura. And yes, they can draw us pictures of Q -objects. 
Except we cannot, alas, recogniss the Q-element in their 
representations. They do not know how to test scientifically for 
Q, just as, (once), we had no notion of a scientific teat for 
perceived colour as correlated to wavelengths of reflected light. 
In this new esse, clearly, we have no idea of what IX is Q', 
said of some'object X, means at all. All we know i. when the aliene, 
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as a matter of fact, call something Q. But perhaps this is 
enough. for surely all we had in case one was a means of testing 
for Q. So why not, in case two, just use the aliens themselves 
, 
as Q-detecting instruments. Wouldn't that, pace our initial 
intuition that we have no idea of the meaning of Q in csse two 
at all, give us just as much information concerning the meaning 
of Q as did the scientific tests in case one? If not, then what 
is the operative difference betwsen having a machine which,say, 
gives six blips when 'X is 8' is assertible and having an alien 
tell us when it is7 
The scientist, in case one, has B mediate grasp of the 
'meaning' of Q. He will give us a verbal account developed 
in terme of sensitivity to wavelengths of light etc •• Such 
scientific or otherwiae verbal explanations are, we trust, 
oapable of !2!! practical demonstration; grasp of the meaning 
of the scientific account is itself to be justified in terms 
which ultimately involve capacities of correct use demonstrable 
in relation to circumstances recognisable by the human community, 
e •• g. alien asaent or dissent to attributions of Q correlated 
with readings on the diale of light sensitive measuring devices etc •• 
In case one than we do not arrive at our understanding of Q in 
the .ame way as the aliens do. But it begins to look as if we 
can show that we grasp the semantic significance of Q in the same 
way as they do by our capacity to y!! Q correctly (i.e. as they do). 
The meaning of Q, it may now seem, is the same for the scientifically 
augmented human as it is for the alien. But the route by which a 
grasp of meaning is attained is different. 
How, then, is case two different? Can we not simply use 
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the aliens as Q-detecting instruments of a quasi-scientific 
kind and claim a mediate grasp of 9 like that? Of course not. 
for in that case we would have no independent decision procedure 
by which to determine whether 9 was properly applied in any 
given case. We would have to taka it on trust from the aliens. 
In case one we can imagine a master of L2 (somewhat misguidedly, 
as it will turn out) turning to us and saying: 'Yes. You have 
learnt the meaning of g'. He would say this in view of our 
demonstrable capacity to use 9 only in appropriate circumstances. 
But no such accolade is imaginable in case two. For what language 
master would allow that a pupil has lsarned the meaning of a term 
if his only decision procedure was to go and ask someone whether 
the term did Dr did not apply in some new context? It would be as 
if a child were to claim to know the meaning of 'proton' merely 
bacause his fathar could convince a scientist thet ~ (the father) 
knew the meaning of proton! Knowledge of meaning is not transitive. 
Knowing aomeone who knows does not, in and of itself, instil any 
knowledge in us. Putnam's division of linguistic labour - the idea 
that we successfully use sentences whose meaning we may not grssp 
as fully as some specialist e.g. 'The car battery is flat' - has its 
limits. In such cases we always know aomething of the meaning of 
the terms involved e.g. wa know that if the battery is flat the 
car (ceteris parabis) won't start. And the rest is uncashed 
cheques; we could learn more if we needed to. The cheques in case 
two, however, are not ao much uncashed as rubber; they are guaranteed 
to bounce. for we know nothing of the distinctive meaning content 
of 9 (in case two) and, so far as we know, are incapebleof learning 
of it if we tried. 
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In case two, then, there can be no real doubt that the 
meaning of 'X is Q' eludes us. Which is not to say that we know 
nothing of semantic interest concerning Q at all. For what we 
do know is that Q describes a phenomenal property of the alien's 
apprehension of the world whose physical trigger for beings of 
their constitution we have not been able to isolate. We have 
every reason to assert, of Q, that the aliens themselves know 
the meaning of the term, for we can perform tests of elien 
competence in the use of Q based on Q-groupings provided unseen 
by some members of the alien community end tested on others. 
Thus we may get a ·group of Q-objects (picked out by an alien) 
and ask other aliens whether the objects are all Q. If they 
continually g9t it right - i.e. agree non-collusively as to 
which objects are Q and which are not - we must surely grant 
~ anti-realistically aound grasp of the meaning of Q. For the 
anti-realiat explicitly assarts that it. is permissible to allow 
that a speaker knows the meaning of a basic sentence (even if he 
can give no verbal account of it in what his grasp of its meaning 
consists) just so long as he can demonstrate a capacity to use 
the eantencs correctly in relation to circumstances public within 
the community. In such cases, ordinarily: 
The faculty of recognition attributed to the speaker 
will be a faculty of unmsdiated recognition; neither the 
speaker nor the meaning-theorist can say whereby he 
recognisss the condition as obtaining. That which renders 
the sentence true is the very thing of which we are 
directly aware when we recognise it as being true. 
Dummett .IE. 449. 
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The difference, in the present case, is just that the 
meaning-theorist is not himself a member of the linguistic 
community whose speech he is assessing and hence is not 
himself necessarily directly awere of the saine things as 
his subject is (there is no 'we' of the kind mentioned in 
the last eentence of the quoted passage). But this, in the 
presence of 'unseen competence tests' such as those described 
above, cannot warrant us in denying to the alien the implicit 
grasp of meaning we so readily allow to our fellow man. 
The claim that 'X is Q', made in L2 , is therefore a 
claim the truth-conditions of which are transcendent with 
respect to speakers of L1• We cen tell ~ it is true, by 
asking, but we have no gresp (implicit or mediate) of that in 
virtue of which it is true when it is true. Is this the kind 
of counter-exempl~ to the anti-realist ban on transcendence 
which the semantic realist requires? Clearly not. For what 
the anti-realist denies is that the words and sentences of 
our public language may have meanings best explicated by a 
notion of transcendent truth-conditions. But even in case 
two there is no sentence requiring such an analysie. For the 
claim that X is Q is one whose meaning we demonstrably failed 
to grasp. Even though the claim that users of L2 grasp the 
meening of 'X is Q' is one we have every reason to accept. 
We must therefore edmit, with the anti-realist, that: 
(P1) There is no sentence whose meaning we grase which 
has verification-trenscendent truth-conditions. 
For we can neither acquire nor manifeet anygraap of the meaning 
of Q in case two. But we must alao allow that: 
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(P2) There may be sentencee which we grasp to have 
meaning (in l2) but which are verification-
transcendent with respect to a native epeaker 
of l1. 
The claim, in l1' that 'The claim that "X is Q" has meaning 
in l2' meets all anti-realist requirements. It is an ordinary 
claim in our language whose truth-conditions can be recognised 
to obtain, ~hen they do obtain, by means of the kind of 
competence tests suggested above. The truth-conditions 
of the claim that 'X is Q' is meaningful in L2 concern the 
obse~vable behaviour of native speakers of l2 in testing 
situations ~e can devise. 
9.4 l2 need not be the language Df alien beings. It could 
be the language Df our ~n community as it is apprehended by 
the members of some eub-section of that community, e.g. the 
blind. The aliens are a useful expository device but all that 
is necessary is that some beings should lack a direct recognitional 
capacity which other beings pDssess. The ability to recognise 
colour is a clear case of a direct recDgnitional capacity ~hich 
most of us anjoy but ~hich is denied to the blind. Thus a blind 
person may, by comparing the non-collusive reactions of sighted 
persons to objects in his (the blind person's) pDssession, come 
to endoree a claim like (P2) concerning the meaning of colour 
terms, i.e. come tD conclude that ~e know the meaning of e.g. 
'The book is red' even though he himself could not decide 
(except by asking ue) the truth of a claim to that effect. 
Imagine now the case of a blind pareon ~ho ie given a 
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scientific aid such as a colour-discriminatory bleeper 
(four blips for red under normal light, two for purple etc.). 
~erely by virtue of his possession of the bleeper the blind 
man is surely no better able to grasp the meaning of 'The book 
is red' than he is without it. It would be as if the alIens, 
in case one, had given us a Q-discriminator but we still did 
not understand how it worked i.e. what it measured (except 
trivially i.e. it measures the presence of ~). In all these 
cases the augmented interpreter is no better orf than tha 
non-augmented one. for we might as well ask 'Is that red?', 
'Is it ~?' as look to an instrumant whose functioning is a 
mystery to us. The alien and the instrument are on a par. 
It might therefore be thought that what would make the 
difference is an understanding of how tha machine works or 
of the physics of the phanomena it measures. But this suggestion 
as we ahall see, makes the mistake of assuming that it is 
possible to achieve a scientific measurement of secondary 
qualities themselves as opposed to a measure of some alleged 
physical correlate to such properties. To understand the machine 
would be to understand the correlate, but it would not (for 
reasons to become apparent) help us to understand the meaning 
of alien sentences which employ the term ~, or (if we are blind) 
of human sentences which employ the term 'red'. 
Such caees, I shall suggest, force the anti-realist to 
distinguish: 
AR1: Grasp of meaning amounts to the ability to recognise 
the circumsta~ in which an assartion is warranted , 
and AR2: Grasp of meaning amounts to the ability to recognise 
~ an assertion is warranted. 
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Ordinarily, the conflation of AR1 and AR2 is harmless. 
"y capacity to satisfy AR2 is generally dependent on my 
capacity to satisfy AR1. But we have just seen that the two 
can come apart. Thus the blind man can, by asking us or 
consulting his instrument, satisfy AR2. But we want to say 
he has no real grasp of the meaning of e.g. 'The book is red'. 
Certainly, the augmented individual grasps something of 
informational significance when he learns, by using his 
machine, that the book is red. Nonetheless it seems plausible 
to suggest that in grasping the significance of such a claim 
he has still failed to grasp all that a sighted person, or an 
alien Q-user, grasps when he learns the meaning of tgt and 
of 'red'. 
Reflection on the home-language parallels of cases one 
and two therefore suggests that the scientist, in case one, was 
only improperly allowed a complete grasp of the meaning of Q 
after all. By virtue of his grasp of the underlying physical 
conditions of the use of g he achieves, to be sure, an increment 
of understanding over and above the parrot-fashion grasp of the 
humans in case two. But still his grasp seems necessarily less 
than that of a native user of l2' 
The scientific epistemologist, we might say, has grasped 
what we now term the underlying conditions of use of g. But 
theaa need not in any way be associated with the grasp of 
meaning which the native speaker of l2 acquires by exposure 
to public conditions of assertability of g, In which case the 
scientist has certainly grasped something, and it is related to 
the matter of ~ g is assertible aa true of aome X. But he 
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has not really grasped the meaning of 'X is Q' for he has 
not grasped the public circumstances which are associated 
by speakers of L2 with the warranted assertability of the 
claim. The scientist's grasp of the underlying conditions 
of the asaertability of Q for some object is obviously not 
necessary for a grasp of the meaning of 'X is Q' (as the 
very existence of the aliens demonstrates). Now it seems 
it is not sufficient either. 
The intuition, then, is that the physical story still 
leaves something out; something which is essential to the 
alian'e grasp of the meaning of sentences involving Q. 
Such an intuition is surely a natural one. It seems to be 
shared, for sxample, by Colin McGinn who suggests (McGinn (3) 
p.21) that sensory experience represents the world ae 'having 
attributes whose existence and identity have their source in 
subjective aspects of the representer l • Such attributes are 
necessarily incapable of being fully captured by any physical 
descriptions of the state of the world such as those offered 
by our scientific models. Secondary quality concepts, McGinn 
argues, are sense-specific (~inn (3) p.138). To grasp auch 
concepts requires a certain kind of sensory activity. Primary 
quality concepts, by contrast, are said to be rooted in the 
external world alone and hence to be graspable even by beings 
lacking our kind of sensory experience. The image, which we 
ahall have cauae to endorse, ia (in the case of secondary 
qualities) one of a 'subjective grid contributed by ths mind.' 
(McGi~n (3) p.72.) The circumstances which warrant the 
assertion of secondary quality claime, I ahall argue, ralate 
A.J.Clark 187 
essentially to that subjective grid, and are thus transcendent 
with respect to any being lacking our kind of grid. Such 
circumstances can be public in the (anti-realistically) 
necessary sense only because meaning, for the natural anti-realist, 
was seen to relate to correct use as manifest within a given 
communi~. It is this localisation of ths demand of manifestation 
(noticed in 4.4 p.81 ebove) which allows us to recognise 
sense-specific subjective elements as a possible ingredient 
of public meaning. 
Such thoughts, however, need careful handling if we are 
to expose their anti-realistically aound content. For at first 
sight it looks as if any difference in meaning between e.g.home 
and alien speakers employing Q must turn directly on the lack, 
in the home cBse, of ths alien Q Qualla. For if we hsve achieved 
scientific measurement of the conditions under which aliens 
assert to 9-ascriptions, and can reliably predict such assent, 
where !!!! could the difference between our augmented and their 
direct grasp of Q lie? Ultimately, as we shall see, the intuition 
that Qualia make the difference turns out to be a sound one. 
But they make the difference only because the ~ of a ssntencs 
keyed to certain perceptions of Qualia can be ehown to be 
potentially different to the use of a sentence keyed either 
to scientific measurement or to Qualia associated with another 
senss modality. Thus the Qualis make the difference, but they 
do so not in ths role of the essentially private object but 
rather in ths public role of an essential determinant of a 
certain kind of use. (Roughly, a use anawerable only to conseneus 
criticism within 8 community employing 8 givsn direct recognitional 
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capacity trained on a given secondery quslity such as redness 
or Q-ness). 
It is not hard to see why Qualia, in the role of private 
object, are an unsuitable anti-realist basis for the ascription 
of differences in meaning. For meening, for the enti-realist, 
is essentially a public phenomenon within a given community. 
The recognisable circumstances upon which grasp of meaning is 
said to depend are public circumstances. Any difference in 
private Qualia which did not show up in a difference of public 
use (e.g. inverted spectrum stories etc.) would not constitute 
a difference in the meaning of colour terms in the mouths of the 
normal and inverted subject. If it were Qualia !!2n! which made 
the difference in meaning between the scientist and the alien, 
or the augmented blind man and the sighted man, then we would 
have to allow that meaning could likewise vary across our 
community even though (let us imagine) public agreement 
concerning the ~ of such terms is unanimous. Such a thought 
flies in the face of the Wittgensteinian roots of the anti-realist 
analysls. Wittgenstein ceaseleesly laboured to convince us that 
all that counts, semantically, is the ability to ~ 'rad', 
'yellow' etc. correctly. Learn that and you have learnt the 
meaning of the colour term involved. The qualitative nature of 
eny 'inner procsss' which may accompany the psrception of colour 
is semantically irrelevant. The type of beetle in the individual's 
'box' is not logically connected to the meaning of his words. 
(Sae e.g. Wittgenstein (1) prop 258 - 293.) 
Like Wittgenatein (op.cit. prop. 305) , it is no part of the 
anti-realist's program to deny the existence of Qualia. 
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Rather the point is just that as regards semantic significance 
individual Qualia (qua private object) must be seen to be inert. 
But juet because the individual Qualia are thus inert we need 
not conclude that it is a sementically insignificant fact that 
we associats Qualia of some kind with the meanings of certain 
terms. What our individual Qualia are like may well be (as 
Schlick, for example, held30 ) incommunicable. But to grasp 
the meaning of claims involving Qualia may still require that 
we procees our perceptual input in a way which gives rise to 
a certain kind of qualitative experience e.g. the experience 
of colour, or of ~type appearances. 
The naturalised epistemologist may seek to locate these 
intuitions within the context of a general cybernetic approach 
to secondary phenomenal qualities; such an account explains 
the opaqueness of the private objact whils still insisting 
that to grasp the meaning of claims concerning such qualities 
it is necessary to process information in a wey which gives rise 
to at least the ~ of qualitative experience concerned ( e.g. 
the experience as of seeing a coloured object). A natural 
anti-realist who endorses euch an account may deny Frank Jackson's 
claim (Jackson p.135) that the placa of Qualia in the Bcheme of 
things ia outside our comprehension. Instead he may assert that 
the existence of Qualis and the opaqueness of claims about 
specific qualis to beings lecking certain sensory mechanisms 
are both matters well within the explanatory scops of a physicalist 
account of reality. Qualia, on the kind of model in queation, 
are best seen as apparent registrations due to the information 
detecting and processing equipment employed by a given organism. 
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This claim echoes some remarks made by Hintikka in which 
he portrays our conceptual scheme as an instrument the 
evolved function of which is the registration of information 
concerning the world. ~ of the registrations of such an 
instrument are said to reflect 'the mode of functioning of 
the instrument itself'. (Hintikka p.193). That some of our 
registrations should thus be merely apparent is a conclusion 
which can only be strengthened by the reflection that the 
indirect nature of evolution by natu~al selection is unlikely 
to provide us with channels of information-processing which 
are in a technical sense noiseless - that is, channels 
indicating as output only the real-world events which are 
taken as input. Indeed, a truly noiseless channel (one 
yielding perceptual representations without any secondary 
qualities) may even be a conceptual impossibility. For all 
information, if it is to be carried at all, must be carried by 
eome medium (cf. ~cGinn p.9S) and that medium, being in and of 
itself non-informational, will sursly add some subjective 
colouring or Inoise'. Apparent registrations, thus conceived, 
are, let it be stressed, entirely real. They are - to uee an 
ugly phrase - real apparent registrations; we have them, but 
they correspond to nothing in the real world. To think that 
they do,· (to believe like Jackson, that the existence of QueHe 
amounts to a, refutstion of physicalism) is to confuse processor-
phenomena with information. 
That processor-phenomena are the wrong ~ of thing to 
31 be given as input is the explanation behind the 'peculiar l 
opaqueness of Qualia. Since Qualia are due to processing 
they are not themselves codable ae input, 8e information even 
~ I '::II 
though they may carry genuine information 32 • McGinn however, is 
wary of s-.lch 8 proposal. Secondary quality knowledge is not, he 
points out, as informationally inert as it seems to suggest. 
Sensitivity to colour, for example, gives a bee genuine information 
concerning what plant to alight upon (McGinn (3) p.9S). This is 
surely correct. But the fact remains that the informational content 
of the bee'e knowledge is logically independent of the qualitative 
nature of the colours the bee sees. All that counts informationally, 
I would suggest, is ~he distinction among plants which the bee is 
thereby dieposed to make. These same distinctions could presumably 
be made in other ways and the information preserved. I shall 
argue, however, that the meaning of secondary quality claims cannot 
be associated with their information content alone. To grasp the 
meaning of such claims it is not sufficient to perform a range of 
discriminative activities. For the ~ by which the discriminations 
are made is aleo an active element in the meaning of such claims. 
It is for this reason that the full meaning of claims involving 
secondary qualities transcends the grasp of beings forced to rely 
on alternative means of effecting the same discriminations among 
objects. The meaning of these claims, if this right, can be grasped 
only by actually processing information of an appropriate sort in a 
certain way. Thus Dennett, in an unpublished paper, suggests that: 
~ quale-predicate 'green' is not uninterpreted, nor is it 
interpreted by an ostenaion to e privata and intrinsic property 
of something in my mind. Rather it is interpreted ••• by being 
linked to some particular hardware, my hardware. 
Dennett (2) p.25 
A given set of qualia is thUs not accessible to anyone who 
processes information differently since they are Tegistrations caused 
not solely by a common object but also by the functioning of the 
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detecting and processing equipment itself. To address a famous 
question of Nagel 1s 33 , that is why we cannot know what it is like 
to be a bat. But insofar as qualia do not therefore (qua qualia) 
constitute information about the world itself, their tendency to 
dissolve in the presence of objectivity is no surprise. The allegod 
poverty of physicalism turns out to be no more than a praiseworthy 
economy. For no amount of information concerning ~ someone else 
receives and processes data will produce in me the kind of apparent 
registrations produced in him by actually processing information 
in just that way. 
9.5 The problem, then, is how to ramain faithful to such an 
account (which randers the meaning of our secondary quality 
concepts transcendent with respect to beings 'whose sensory and 
processing apparatus is of a radically different type) while 
yet respacting the anti-realist's demand that all difference 
in meaning show up in a difference of~. For, to recall one 
of our earlier examples, can not the acientifically augmented 
human Y!! the alien term ij in just the same cases as the alien? 
An initial thought is that it is the directness of the 
alien's apprehension of Q which makes the required differenoe 
in public Use between humans and aliena. The pivotal issue, 
so this thought suggesta, is not, after all, the qualitative 
nature of Q (which might differ even among aliens) but the 
direct nature of their capacity to recognise when Q applies. 
The difference in USe between a direct and mediated grasp of 
the circumstances in which Q is properly asserted might then 
be said to lie in a difference in the de feasibility conditions 
appropriate to the two kinds of warrant in the direct aasartion 
A.J.Clark 193 
question. There is something of value here, as we shall see. 
But the difference cannot turn on the directness of the 
alien's capacity alone. For we can imagine alternative 
direct means of discriminating all and only Q-objects which 
intuitively !!!!! afford the beings who employ them no 
proper grasp of Q. 
Thus suppose34 (case three) the aliens use Q to distinguish 
two kinds of violet. One, the Q-violet, looks (to us) identical 
to the other (the Q-less violet). But we are happily able to 
distinguish the two by our own sense of smell (the aliens, we 
may add, have no sense of smell at all). for Q-violets have 
a distinctive and unpleasant odour which Q-less violets lack. 
Supposing Q to be a colour discrimination we lack, we may even 
go so far as to make the tie of Q-violet to stinking-violet 
(for want of a better name!) lawful. The chemical which tinges 
the leaves of the violet Q is also the very chemical which 
offends our human noses. In such a case we have a direct 
recognitional cspacity enabling us to discriminate between 
violets in just those cases in which the aliens do. And yet, 
if our earlier intuitione are correct, we do not want to say 
that we thereby graep the full meaning of 'the violet is g'. 
So directness alone, it seems, is not enough. 
The fault in case three, it may be suggested, lies with 
the locality of the example. For surely the colour Q and the 
distinctive odour ere not always and everywhere found in 
convenient conjunction. So the potential divergence of use 
between Q-based and odour-based discriminations is whst grounds 
the intuition of a difference in.meaning between the term Q and 
some odour-term Q'. There is something fundamentally right 
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about this thought which can, I think, be extended to·cover 
also the case of the scientific discrimination of objects 
into g and non-Q types. It is that the connections of 
secondary qualities to other aspects of reality is always 
contingent. Thus there are no necessary correlations 
between distinct kinds of secondary qualities (e.g. colours 
and smells) or between scientifically diagnosed states of 
objects and particular secondary qualities (e.g. being g). 
The lack of such correlations shows up in our attitudes to 
the defeasability conditions of claims involving secondary 
qualities (this is what was correct in our initial thought). 
And thie, in turn, ensures that there will always be a potential 
divergence in the use of a term g batween nativa users of g and 
any communities who base their ascriptions of Q on either 
different modes of direct recognition of circumstances apt 
for the description g or on some mediate means of recognising 
when Q is likaly to be used. 
The crucial observation, in demonstrating the lack of any 
such necessary connections between various kinds of secondary 
qualities and between secondary qualities and physical grounds, 
is that with regard to the warranted assQrtion of such claims, 
the native community is the law. Thus suppose (unlikely as it 
seems) that the alien-detected presence of g was always and 
everywhere conjoined with the human-detected presence of g. up 
until a given date. S~bsequently, however, we encounter an 
object which they identify ae having the distinctive look of Q, 
but which doesn't emell, to ua, of Q'. Would we say that the 
aliens are mistaken in their communally agreed belief that 
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the new object looks ~? Surely not, for to paraphrase McGinn, 
being ~ is best analysed as loo~~~, so we cannot plausibly 
claim that an object which they say looks ~ is actually non-~. 
(See McGinn (3) p.15.) Or would we say that we were mistaken 
in thinking that the new object did not smell of ~? Again, 
surely not. Rathar we would treat the new case as demonstrating 
what w~s surely obvious all along viz. that what is ~ by the 
alien use of 'X looks ~. is something other than what we mean 
by ·X smells of ~." and that exactly what the alien sentences 
involving ~ mean is a fact which transcends our capacities of 
understanding. It transcends them because we lack direct access 
to the kind of assertion-warranting circumstances which they 
associate with ~. 
This is even clearer in the case of mediate sciantific 
accees versus direct grasp. For suppose the blind man is aquipped 
with a bleeper which, to date, has given four blips only when a 
normal human observer would assert the presence of red, but which 
now begins to register four blips in the presence of a palpably 
green object (under normal light etc.). We might at first 
assume a machine malfunction. Then we find that there is no 
malfunction at all - all bleepers signal four in the preaence 
of these objects. We search in vain for any causal interference 
from the object to the machine. Satisfied' that there ia no 
interference end no malfunction, are wa to conclude that the 
sighted community is mistaken in calling such objects red? 
That surely, is absurd. What we ought to say instead is that 
the machine can only measure 80me contingent correlata of 
redness (the use of 'correlate' here is borrowed from ~cGinn) 
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which, it now turns out, is not even a perfect correlate 
at that. The moral of these stories is that even supposing 
some such correlation were as a matter of fact perfect, still 
our attitude to any imagined divergence of the two items 
suggests that to grasp the conditions of application of any 
correlative item is not, in and of itself, to grasp the 
conditions of application of the secondary quality term itself. 
for where such claims are concerned, the communal consensus is 
law. (Contrast the case of water and H20. The claim that a 
substance is water ~ defeasible by a scientific demonstration 
that it is not H20. No such demonstration could ever convince 
us that an object was not red if we all agreed it looked red.) 
Our argument, then, may be summed up as follows: 
(1) Grasp of meaning consists in grasp of asssrtability-
conditions. 
(2) A claim is defeated only if its essertability-conditions 
are shown not to obtain after all. 
(3) Date involving only correlative items cannot of itself 
defeat a s~condary quality claim agreed by th9 native 
community (as shown by the thought-experiments above). 
(4) So correlative data can't show that the assertability-
conditions of a secondary quality claim do not 
obtain (from (2) and (3) ). 
(5) So what they ~ show to obtain can never bs taken to 
be the actual asssrtability-conditiona of a secondary 
quality claim (from (4) ). 
(6) So the Bssertability-conditions of claims about 
correlative items and.claims about eacondary qualitiBS 
must be recognised a8 different even if, 88 • matter 
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of fact, the circumstances which warrant the two sets 
of claims happen to be co-extensive (from (S) ). 
(7) So the meanings of the two kinds of claims are 
different in an anti-realistically intelligible 
sense (from (1) and (5) ). 
This argument secures the intelligibility' of the distinction 
between two conceptions of how meaning depends on grasp of 
assertability-conditions developed in 9.4 above. for the 
anti-realist, if he accepts the argument just given, can show 
why it is that grasp of the meaning of some terms requires not 
just grasp of when their assertion is warranted (AR2 - which is 
satisfied also by grasp of the conditions of application of a 
correlative co-extensive item) but also (AR1) of the particular 
circumstances (e.g. redness or G-ness) which the native community 
associate with the truth of claims involving such terms. These 
particular circumstances are public only within a community 
equipped with certain sensory and cognitive mechanisms and 
manifestation of correct use can, in such cases, properly occur 
only amongst members of a community so endowed. We can thus 
claim that in case three the aliens cannot grasp the meaning 
of our claim that the violet is Q'just as we cannot grasp the 
meaning of their claim that the violet is Q. And this even 
though, as a metter of fect, Q' and g serve to mark out the 
same distinct sets of flowers. 
It seems then that where we are dealing with statements 
involving secondary qualities35the circumstances which make 
those ststements true are constituted in part, by the particular 
sensory channel and mode of processing with which those qualities 
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are experienced by a native speaker. Where the channel is 
different, or where it is a mediate one (as in the case of 
any scientific account) the meaning of the secondary quality 
claims cannot be fully grasped. This was brought out by a 
consideration of the public d9feasibility conditions of 
secondary quality claims. They are defeasible only by 
communal consensus within the native community. No evidence 
from another channel or a ecientific account would defeat a 
communally accepted alien claim that X looks g, for the simple 
reason that whatever the alternative channel or scientific 
method measures it is not g itself, but only some contingent 
correlate of g. As a result we can always conceive of the use 
of the two coming apart without either item (g or its alleged 
correlate) being necessarily misapplied. 
Such considerations lead the natural anti-realist to a 
conclusion which goes somewhat bayond that of (P2) in 9.3 above. 
For (P2) may have appeared to mark only the pro-tempore 
transcendence, in default of scientific advance, of alien 
secondary quality claims associated with sensory modes or 
processing strategies not shared by the home community. If our 
recent arguments are correct, however, the situation is beet 
described by the more radical claim 
(P3) That the full meaning of claims involving secondary 
qualiti~e can be grasped only by speakers who ahare 
the eame kind of sensory apparatus and processing 
strategies as do the members of the community in 
which such claims were originally formulated. 
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Where secondary qualiti9s are concerned it eeems that 
the particular kind of direct recognitional capacity employed 
is partially constitutive of the circumstences it reveals BS 
obtaining36 • This explains why an individual lacking a 
particular kind of capacity can never satisfy (AR1) in 9.4 above. 
For the meaning of such claims is not associated (es primary 
quality claims more plausibly are) just with circumstances in 
the world, but also with circumstances consequent upon a 
particular aubjactive nature37 • 
The anti-realist, then, must accept that we are in a real 
sense limited by the semantic bedrock of our language. For we 
can have no full grasp of the meanings of terms associated with 
direct recognitional capacities other than our own. Such terms, 
it eeems, have truth-conditions which are necessarily transcendent 
as regards any community which lecks them. But this does not 
mean that we do not know ~ they are true; only that the 
circumstances which make them true are unavailable to us. 
In this fine distinction liAS the anti-realist's salvation. 
For he must insist that our grasp of meaning is necessarily 
aesociated with our grasp of recognisabls circumstances of 
warranted aSBertability. But our grasp of the meaningfulnees 
of soma assertion need not require that ths circumstances 
which ara associated with the meaning of some basic term 
(like Q) occurring in it must themselves be available for our 
inspection. The legitimacy of s notion of verification-
transcendent truth for secondary quality claims thus flows 
ultimately from our recognition of our own contingent 
limitations ae regards the range and nature of our direct 
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recognitional capacities. Such limitations constrain our 
meanings in precisely the way the anti-realist predicts. 
But our thought about reality, it seems, may stumble a little 
further on its own. 
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10. A new kind of mirroring. 
10.1 Various internal concepts of the transcendent have now been 
formulated38which individually and severally defeat the thought 
(outlined in chapter 5) that the anti-realist is of necessity some 
form of subjective idealist who is incapable of conceiving reality 
as in any way transcending tha bounds of the activity of the human 
mind. The natural anti-realist firmly rejects any such thought. 
He argues that we can, in a perfectly intelligible sense, conceive 
of reality as outrunning our capacities to know it. But he denies 
that grasp of meaning should be associated with a graap of truth-
conditions conceived as determined by such an independent and 
and potentially transcendent reality. This hybrid metaphysical 
stance treats man's semantic limitations as a special instance of 
his ganeral aansory and cognitive limitations. Our knowledge of 
meaning, like all our knowledge, is seen as partially determined 
by our particular (contingent and in detail imperfect) evolutionary 
heritage. The intelligible world, then, cannot be identified with 
the world-in-itself. But neither can it be totally divorced (by 
virtue of the appropriataness argument) from the independent reality 
in which we function. 
In this final chapter I seek to relate thia metaphysical 
picture to two main lines of contemporary philosophical thought 
about the nature of the relation between human representations and 
independent reality. One of thase is the issue of mirroring 
associated with the critical surveys of Richard Rorty; to what 
extent, if any, is the human mind to be conceived as a mirror of 
nature? The other is the issue of internalism versus externalism 
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discussed in recent work. by Hilary Putnam; is there exactly 
one correct account of how the world is or are all conceptions 
valid or invalid only within the context of some particular 
framawork of thought or relative 'to some particular needs and 
abilities? The two issues are obviously related. To believe that 
man can aspire to be the absolute mirror of nature is to believe 
in the one correct account of the externalist philosopher. But 
there is room for manoeuvre. I shall argue that the natural 
anti-realist can construct a sense of mirroring which is not 
committed to the externalist viewpoint. The subject matter of the 
present chapter, it will be clear, has already been touched upon 
(particularly in chapters 7 and 8 above). But the influence of 
the particular methods of depicting the issues employed by Putnam 
and Rorty is sufficiently powerful to make it worthwhile finally 
raiSing the questions in their chosen terms. 
10.2 Richard Rorty, famously, dismisses the picture of mind as 
mirror and with it the idea that the image in the mirror is 
(potentially) the image of reality as it is in itself. Such 8 
notion of man's representative powers is, he suggests, incoherent. 
For the notion of representation involved can never be seen to be 
a correct one, since we can never '.tep outside' our current 
system of thought to exemine its relations to a totally independent 
reality. The mirror theorist's idea of representation, Rorty arguea, 
requires the availability of a fixed perspective ( a 'neutral matrix 
of enquiry') from which to examine the precise nature of the relation 
between the representations and the things or states of affairs 
repreeented. But no such perspective is available for our mental 
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and linguistic representations must themselves embrace.all the 
possible perspectives we as human beings could occupy. Half of 
the representational equation is therefore necessarily missing. 
There can be: 
No transcendental standpoint outside our present set of 
representations from which we can inspect the relations 
between those representations and their object. 
Rorty (1) 293. 
The natural companion of the picture of mind as mirror, he 
then suggests, is the noti~n of the world-in-itself lying behind 
the image in the mirror. It is the world-in-itse1f which forms 
the missing half of the representational equation. But the appeal 
to an unknowable world-1o-itself can add nothing concrete to our 
knowledge. It can be nothing other that the 'purely vacuous notion 
of the ineffable cause of sense and goal of intellect' (Rorty (2) 663). 
The only properly intelligible notion of the world, for Rorty, is 
the notion that the world is constituted by whatever human beings 
can agree at a given moment exists. The world is thus 'a name for 
the objects that snquiry at the moment is leaving alone' (Rorty (2) 
663,. 
Rorty's attack on the idea of the world in itself and the 
correlative idea of the mind as a mirror has its roots in his 
desire to escape from the foundationa1ist tradition. This tradition 
was inspired by the urge to refute the Cartesian sceptic. The 
tradition therefore aasumes, from the outset, that human knowledge 
stands in nead of sure and secure foundations. The search for 
these foundationa is the search for privileged representations 
among the host of images in the mirror. Images which reflect the 
A.J.Clark 204 
properties of the glass will not do. Philosophy, in this tradition, 
is the discipline devoted to sifting the many representations in 
order to discern which are the true reflections of the world in 
itself. Only these - the privileged rapresentations - can stand 
as candidates for the bedrock of certainty which is meant to 
legitimise the structure of human knowledge. The prime candidate 
for the role of privileged representation has always been the 
so-called given. The given has meant a variety of things; in 
general, that which is directly present to the human mind 
(sense-data or whatever) unmediated by conceptual interference. 
This notion of the given has, however, been the subject of 
intense philosophical criticism by e.g. Sellars and Rorty. Their 
attack proceeds by noticing that nothing which we can describe can 
constiture a pure given. For, as soon as we try to describe it, as 
a red patch or by saying 'Here, now, redness' - or whatever - we 
invoke a specific means of conceptualisation. The believer in the 
given then faces a dilemma. Either the given is completely ineffable 
and indescribable - in which cass it cannot stand es a foundation for 
anything - ££ it is specifiable and describable, in which case it 
ceases to command the authority of a pure given. An indescribable 
given is useless as a base for the rational reconstruction of 
human knowledge. But e describable givan forfeits its privileged 
status as a conceptually unmediated contact with the world itself. 
All ettempts to secure the foundations of knowledge, Rorty 
believes, are likewise doomed to fail. Epistemology, concaived 
ae the handmaiden of the foundationalist program, is therefore 
dead. With this in mind, we can understand why Rorty combines 
his attack on the image of the mirror with an attack on naturalised 
epistemology. for it is Rorty's view that na~uralised epistemology 
is just a doomed attempt to find a successor subject-to epistemology 
ae conceived above (see Rorty (1) 10). Naturalised epistemology, 
Rorty thinks, is dedicated to the old task of polishing the mirror 
of nature. It invastigates the human mind - the great mirror -
with a viaw to separating tha impositions of tha mirror from the 
true raflectione of reality. Thus he writes that: 
The common motive of Quine's 'Epistemology Naturalised' (and) 
Daniel Dennett's hints at an 'Evolutionary Epistemology' has 
been to de-transcendentalise epistemology while nevertheless 
making it do what we had always hoped it might: tell us why 
our criteria of successful inquiry are not just ~ criteria 
but also the right criterie, nature's critaria, the criteria 
which will lead us to the truth. 
Rorty (1) p.299 
By studying the relationship of know1adge to reality the 
evolutionary theorist might be thought to be engaged in the tesk 
of seeking foundationalist justifications for some or all or the 
reprasentations within the mirror. Such a view is understandable. 
It might be suggested, for axample; by Loranz's comment that wa muet: 
Get to know the imperfections of our apparatus of thought 
end experience if we went to gain knowledge beyond those 
imperfections. 
Lorenz Trans. p.29 
Despite this, the image of evolutionary epistemology as a . 
foundationalist attempt to polish the mirror of nature remains 
a fundamantally misguided one. To be sure, the evolutionary 
epistemologist seeks, by axamining our evolved means of 
reprasantation, to gain insight.into the nature of the represented 
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world. He seeks, that is, to improve our knowladge of the world by 
increasing our awareness of the natu~e and scope of that knowledge 
itself. But whatever insights he may achieve, they are in no aense 
to be regarded as privileged insights. for science, to the evolution-
ary epistemologist, is an imperfect evolved tool lika any other. By 
its employment we may, with luck, increase our knowledge; but we 
shall never increase our E!£tainty. Indeed, certainty (of the 
foundationalist kind) is explicitly ruled out by the evolutionary 
picture of knowledge as at all stages approximate and imperfect. The 
evolutionary epistemologist, though he may seek to improve our image 
of reality, will never presume to elevate any part of that image to 
certainty. Thus Lorenz also writes: 
Nothing that our brain can think has absolute a priori validity 
in the true sense of the word, not evan mathematics with all 
its laws. 
Lorenz. Trans. p.27 
Everything, for the evolutionary epistemologist, has the status 
of a working hypothesis; no more is needed, and no more is possible. 
Rorty1s misgivings notwithstanding, I shall show that the natural 
anti-realist's notion of how the mind 'mirrors' an independent world 
is in no wise the feared noti.on of the mind sustaining a metaphysically 
determined and privileged representation of the world-in-itself. What 
evolutionary epistemology provides is rather a new sense of mirroring 
in which no parts of the image are held wholly or uniquely correct .nd 
in which the image of man is forever embedded in the image of nature 
itself. 
10.3 Rorty fears that the evolutionary epistemologist aims to 
underwrite a fully realistic correspondence relation between the 
images in the mirror and the world-in-itself. 8ath the idea of the 
world-in-itself and the idea of a correspondence to it are subjects 
of attack. Suppose this ~ the evolutionist's aim. In seeking 
to secure such a relation he would argue that if such ·a realistic 
correspondence were lacking, then man as a species would not have 
survived. This would, indeed, amount to deploying the appropriateness 
argument for quasi-foundetionalist ends. But the argument would, as 
Rorty suspects, fail. For it does not take account of the fallibility/ 
scope constraints on appropriateness described in chapter 2, or of 
the implications of those constraints for ecientific knowledge drawn 
out in chapter 7. I shall not repeat those arguments here, but shall 
sketch rather the nature of the image/world relation they suggest, in 
order to show its essential dissimilarity to the traditional 
mirroring account. 
The appropriateness argument had as its conclusion the claim that 
the knowledge of an individual X, when gained by means of access and 
modes of processing naturally evolved in the species XX, is likely to 
beer some useful (i.e.survival-enhancing) relation to the actual 
environment in which the being lives (essuming the environment to be 
much the same as when selection for those particular knowledge-acquiring 
capacities occurred). This conclusion was then amended by the 
constraints of cognitive bias, cost-efficiency and chance; knowladge-
acquiring mechanisms thus formed would be expected to be geared to 
the particular needs of a species in a given niche, to yield fast, 
approximate resulta, and to be choaen from a randomly occurring pool 
of options. All that follows from the evolutionary arguments, then, 
ie that mind should act ae an effective intermediary, for a given 
being in a given situation, between external input and eurvival-
relevant .ction. A notion of internal representation may be juatified 
by such a picture. But it cannot hope to justify a notion of mirroring-
representation of the kind which Rorty feare it aspires to. Indeed, 
the arguments/ 
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concerning cognitive limitation and bias are positively inimical 
to any such project. The evolved mind, for the evolutionary 
epistemologist, is likely to be as much a mirror of the ·particular 
life-style and history of the thinker, es it is of the world 
itself. 
The true aim of evolutionary epistemology, then, cannot be 
the justification of classical mirror-imagery. This, however, 
is not meant to deny the obvious facts about a successful system 
of internal rspresentations. It is rather to deny that such 
facts justify us in regarding our internal representations as 
privileged representations in the foundationalistts sense. Thus 
it is clear that many living creatures sustain and update some 
kind of internal representation of their (accessible) environment. 
This functions as a field of vicarious trial and error ( in which 
'our ideas dis in our stead') and a means of preeerving and 
arranging achieved knowledge ot the world. Internal representations, 
thus. understood, are distinct from the mirroring thesis itself. 
They are innocent and philosophically acceptable. This is becauss 
there is no euggestion that the internal representations themeelvas 
should be anything ~ the actual environment with which they cope. 
. . 
That is to say,that there is no clue in these internal repreaentations 
to naturela own preferrad way of being repreaented. Internal 
representations are just a means to the production of appropriate 
responses to environmental prassures. They may be pictorial, 
propositional, computational or whatever. The form is irrelevant, 
for they are judged not by success in copying (an idea of which we 
can make little sense) but by auccess in coping. Thus conceived, 
the notion of an internal ~epre8entation has no connection whatever 
with the foundationalist's idea of an accurate rapresentation. 
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There is, however, a possible objection to this line of 
reasoning. The objection runs parallel to one which Putnam 
once constructed concerning the nature of language. Putnam 
argued that a correspondence theory and a notion of truth wsre 
needed to exp~ain the success of language - how it helps us 
achieve our goals - even though a meaning-as-use theory was 
sufficient to explain the workings-of language (see Putnam (2) 
p. 15 - 20 and 129). In a similar fashion it might be argued 
that if we ara to explain success in coping, we ought to make 
reference to accuracy in copying. This is to argue from utility 
to metaphysical-truth-as-explanation-of-utility. But the extra 
step, in all these cases, is both an unnecessary and an implausible 
one. Our present concern is with the 'coping to copying' argument, 
and the fallacious nature of this inference is beautifully 
demonstrated by a quote from the third Appendix to Zeno Vendler's 
book Res Cogitans. It reads: 
~n's native equipment, including his ideas, has developed 
~ 
in response to the demands of the physical world. Does this 
entail that ideas must be • similar' to things in the world? 
No more than a saw is similar to the log it cuts or a sales 
curve to the activities it represents. 
Vendler 218. 
Representation - in the original mirroring sense - is alien 
to the evolutionary vocabulary of cbping, succeeding and responding. 
To the extent that talk of representation is acceptable it' reduces 
to the idea of a (conscious or unconscious) internal c~de suitable 
for the confrontation of an axternal reality. The world is 
represented by the construction of a symbolic analogue to the 
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accessible features of our environment. Computational operations 
may be performed on that symbolic analogue as a vicarious means 
of choosing among actions. We may ask how successful such a 
symbolic construction is in helping us attain our goals - we may 
not ask how similar it is to the world in which it functions. 
The phrase 'accurate representation of reality' may happily be 
replaced by the phrase 'useful arrangement of information'. 
A aales curve, in the aense of a 'useful arrangement ofinformation' 
is an accurate representation of the activities of selling in a 
given market in a given period. But this is accurate representation 
only in a most indirect and metaphysically uninteresting sense. 
The world, we may say, is vicariously representable as X, V Dr Z; 
but this does not make it like X, V or Z in and of itself. This 
is evident from the fact that it ia-undoubtedly vicariously 
representable in an infinite number of ways; Dr st lesst in as 
Many ways as there are useful arrangements of information relative 
to various forms of life. An alternative conceptual scheme, it 
8eems, is not an alternativa metaphysical construction of reality 
but just an alternative arrengement of (the same Dr diffarent) 
information appropriate to a set of alternative interests and 
capacities. 
For all that ths Natural Anti-realist upholda a version of 
internal repreaentationalism, then, he abides no implicatione of 
metaphysical aimilarity along the lines of the clasaical mirror 
theorist. Internal repreaentation takes aa ita object reality 
as it is known relativs to a particular sst of needa and capacities. 
It is, in a aense to be outlined below, an internalist theory of 
repreaentation. Despite this, however, something of the idea of 
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the mirror remains. for although we do not accept the idea that 
the human image of reality is the only viable image, and although 
we do not hold any part of the image certain, !!!!! we recognise 
a partial, pragmatic validation for our basic cognitive orientation. 
Our modes of sensory access and innate cognitive strategies have 
indeed served us well and it does not seem unduly optimistic to 
think that the refined, scientific image of reality we have arrived 
at by their sustained and self-critical employment does indeed bear 
some objective relation to the independent material realm with which 
they cope. Rorty's complaint (which is Putnam's e1so) that we of 
necessity lack any independent access to this material reality and 
ao ought not to evince a belief in it looks, in the end, to be 
unimportant. for the access we have is good enough for our purposes. 
And although we lack any absolute viewpoint from which to compare 
our refined images with reality itae1f, still we have a sense of 
the Mechaniam (natural selection) which moulded our basic cognitive 
natures in response to the preseures of the real world. The brains 
which do science having thus anewered to the demands of the world, 
it is no surprise that science, done by such brains, should afford 
a valid meana of knowing the world. 
In the light of thia amended eense of mirroring (essentially 
the 'empirical bridga' of chapter B) it becomea clear that we have 
no nead to posit any transcendental divide of the sort Rorty fears. 
The 'world-in-itself' which forms the other half of the amended 
mirroring equation is not held to be inaccessible and unspacifiable. 
Instead it ia just the wall-acces8ed and specified world we know; 
except that we have cause to believe that it. total contoura may 
exceed our knowledge, and we have cause to regard our knowledge 8S 
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formulated and systematised in models which owe some of their 
nature to our own cognitive preferences and capacities. But 
unlike Rorty,the natural anti-realist will not claim that the 
world is Just a name for whatever human beings can agree at a 
given time exista. For the limits of human agreement are just 
the contingent and biaBed limita of human investigative potential. 
Theae limits, the evolutio~ary theorist agrees, set the bounds 
of our grasp of meaning; but it is mere anthropomorphic conceit 
to think they therefore set the bounds of reality itself. 
10.4 The evolutionary epietemologiet, we eaid, has abandoned 
the foundationaliat project criticieed by Rorty. It followa, 
on Rorty's own definition of epietemology, that the idea of an 
evolutionary epistemology is a self~contredictory one. For 
epistemology, for Rorty, is nothing if not the discipline devoted 
to anewering the tarteaian aceptic. Evolutionary considerations 
can never succeed hare, since they are themselves based on 
observatio~s and scientific conjectures which the aceptic is 
unwilling to accept. ~odern theory of knowledge, aa Rorty sees 
it, is nothing but an undesirabla growth which has festered around 
the old and apparently illegitimata queation of how our inner 
representations can be known to be mataphysically accurate. The 
idea of an armchair diacipline devoted to the resolution of this 
question is, aa Rorty notes, tied up with the Carteaian idea of 
mind .s necessarily accesaible to its.lf. Only thua can pure 
conceptual enquiry reveal the privileged foundationa upon which 
the edifioe of human knowledge can stand. We, like Rorty, have 
given up this complex of foundational asaumptions and eapirationa. 
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Not only do we believe that there are no privileged represent-
ations in the mirror of nature - it seems that in the old sense 
thare are no representations there at all. Once representation 
gives way to response the mirror becomes a tool. If, like Rorty, 
we identify epistemology with the conceptual examination of images 
in the mirror in a foundational context, then evolutionary 
epistemology is a kind of anti-epistemology for it deniee the 
validity of that project itself. I suggest, however, that the 
identification of epiatemology with foundational projects is 
mistaken and that evolutionary considerations are epistemological 
in at least one important sense. 
Epistemology, Daniel Dennett hae suggested, embraces (has 
embraced) two distinct questions. One - which most philo.ophe~. 
now agree to be misconceived - is the queation 'Ia knowledge 
pos.ible?'. Thia totally general question i. clearly inspired 
by the d.sire to refuts philosophical scepticism. But to ask the 
question, to begin even to seek the sure and secure foundations 
of knowledge, is alreedy to concede the sceptic's point. Whenever 
we choose a foundation for knowledge we also fix its limit and it 
is always too low; and the foundations we choose tend to be rather 
arbitrary and indefiensible anyway. Sure and secure foundations 
simply do not and cannot exist; knowledge is a self-supporting, 
self-correcting structure. Thess points are made forcibly by 
"ichael Williams in Groundless Selief. Rorty is correct to 
diagnose the futility of' epistemology thus conceived. But that 
is only the first of Dennett's questions. The second, which Rorty 
fails to consider, is the question (given that knowledge ie 
possible) '~is knowledge possible?'. Thie lattsr question 
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may take the form (Dennett (1) III ) 'How do~s the nervous 
system achieve X V Z ?'; or it may take the form 'How could 
any system ( with features a, b,c ) possibly accomplish X 1'. 
The question 'How ie knowledge possible?' thus deals with very 
general mattere of design and function. It is just becsuse these 
matters are so general, so high-level, that they sre an appropriate 
concern for philosophers. Evolutionary epietemo10gy contributes 
to this enquiry in two ways. First, by addressing the question 
'How could a living system come to respond appropriately to its 
environment?' (the conditions for the production of the mechanisms 
of knowledge). To which an answer in terms of natural selection 
is indicated. Second, by providing a wealth of examples of different 
states of knowledge and different mechanisms for the acquisition of 
knowledge. Such examples, drawn frOm the animal kingdom, suggest 
some of the many ways in which X V Z may be achieved. Philosophical 
analysis in turn contributes to evolutionary epistsmology by 
clarifying the strengths and weaknessee of its arguments and 
8uggesting the valid forms of its conclusions. I see no reason 
to banish all this from the domain of the theory of knowledge. 
Quine'e dissolution of the firm conceptual/empirical barrier 
remOVes the main motivation for such baniehment. Vet Rorty does 
juet this, fooueeing all hie attention on the, (legitimate) queation 
of how, in practice, our knowledgs claims are Juetifisd. In thie 
he follows Sellar.~ insistenoe that Justification is juet a mattsr 
of 80cial practice and that all the rsat (empirical theories of 
evolution etc.) can therefore be of no help in understanding the 
Justification of human knowledge. But surely it ie not just ths 
justification but the understanding of human knowledge which is 
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a suitable topic for philosophical enquiry. We may agree, 
with Sellars, that human knowledge (in at least one vitally 
important sense) is a relation to, and among, propositions 
and ~ some privileged relation to objects. But propositional 
knowledge is ~ a way of knowing about the world. And the 
scope and atatua of a being'a knowledge (propositional or 
otherwise) of .the world is a topic which is usefully clarified 
by an evolutionary focus. Rorty, I conclude, is simply blind 
to the whole mmplex of legitimate enquiry surrounding the 
question 'How ia knowledge possible?'and hence insensitive 
to the philosophical value of naturalised investigations into 
the mechanisms of knowing. 
10.5 Apart from underscoring his criticisms of classical 
mirroring theories, natutalised investigations can give a new 
twist to the idea of the ocular metephor on which Rorty tends 
to blame our sins. In his sttack on the image of mine as a 
'great mirror' in which are mingled representations which are' 
metaphysically accurate and metaphysically defective (Rorty (1) 
p. 12) Rorty often focusses on the dominance of the sQoocalled 
'ocular metaphor' in Westsrn thought (ibid. 12 - 14). By the 
miaguided assimilation of knowing to seeing, Rorty claims, we 
generate the metaphysical realist's fallacy of viewing the mind 
as an organ which either geta, or fails to get, a clear view of 
the world itself. The twiat introduced by the evolutionary 
perspective, however, is that the mistake liss not in the 
sssimilation of knowing to seeing (sesing ia a. much smatter 
of inference as propositional knowing ie) but in a failure to 
appreciate the true neture of sight. For eight., on an 
A.J.Clark 216 
evolutionary analysis, has none of the alleged directness 
which the metaphysical realist seeks for knowledge. -Inatead 
of denying (as Rorty does) that knowing is best understood 
as a kind of seeing, we may argue that seeing itself faile to 
provide the paradigm of a direct represent~tional relation 
to the environment which the clessical mirror-theorist thinks 
it can. Vision, in an evolutionary context, is as indirect a 
means of access to reality as a bat's sonar. Yet for us (though 
presumably nEi for the intelligent bat) the temptation to elsvate 
a sonar based arrangement of information into the paradigm of a 
metaphyaically privileged repreeentation of the world is a 
minimal one. Evolutionary epistemology thus provides a 
perspective from which we may appreciate the indirectness' 
of vision, and indeed of any mechaniem of knowledge, as a 
meane of acceee to the nature of reality itsslf. Ae Campbell 
puts it: 
The vividnaas and phenomenal directness of vision neede 
to be corrected in any complete epietemology ••• • •• 
From the point of view of an evolutionary epietemology 
vieion ie juet ae indirect ae radar. 
Campbell 424. 
Vieion, we may say, i8 an 'indirect, ooincidence-exploiting 
mechanism', the coincidence in queetion being the coincidence of 
'locomotor impenetrability with opaqueness for a narrow band of 
electromagnetic waves' (ibid. 414). Fog and glaes are exceptione 
to thie coincidence - air and water are not. By .treesing the 
importance of thie coincidence and the general ihdirect and 
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random nature of evolved mechanisms of knowing the evolutionary 
epistemologist commands a novel way of defeating ths unwelcome 
implications of the ocular metaphor itself. 
"ost importantly, however, the adoption of the evolutionary 
perspective enablee us to form a new, more acceptable, conception 
of mirroring. It enables us to form a pragmatically justIfied 
conceptIon of a relation between thought and realIty which is 
non-unique and non-foundational; one which espires to none of 
the abeolute certainty or metephyeical repreaentativeness to 
which Rorty correctly objects. The netural anti-realist, 
adopting this perspective, etands revealed as a mirror-theorist 
of an unassuming disposition. "ind, he believes, is constrained 
by evolutionary factors to be a mirror of nature. But it 'is but 
one of many possible mirrors each of which may reflect nature in 
different waye and in different respects. The variety of 'mirrors' 
corresponds to the variety of needs and the vagaries of chance 
involved in the emergence and retention of particular cognitive 
or sensory .traits in a given species. This multiple mirroring, 
when extended·into the scientific ephere becomes the notion of 
multiple tolerated scientific models mooted by the natural 
anti-realist in chapter 7 above. Such models are (partially) 
valid descriptions of mind-independent reality which are 
nonethelees mirrors of the nature of the theory-builder •• 
much as of the world they describe. Neither science nor the 
senses, than, can be expected to uncover the mirror-theoriet·. 
grail - the true unvarnished image of independent reality. 
What remaine, and what eufficee for the non-foundational end. 
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of tha avolutionary epistemologist, is the pragmatic, 
incomplate and partisan 'mirroring' induced by the 
consideratione of the Appropriatenees argument. This buys 
a relation between thought and the world without inviting 
the metaphysical excesses to which Rorty, and as we shall 
now see, Putnam so strongly object. 
10.6 Putnam's objections to metaphysical excess find their 
expression in his attacks on 'externalism' and 'metaphysical 
realism'. Agsinst these he urges what he cslls the 'internalist 
perspective'. The prime characteristic of the intarnalist 
philoeopher, according to Putnam, is his refusal to ask the 
question 'What objects does the world consist of?' except from 
within the context of a particu~ar theory or description. 
(Putnam (4) p. 49). Tha idea that there is one absolutely 
correct, perepective-frae deacription of how the world is 
(tha claasical mirror-theorist's 9rail) is one which the 
internalist roundly rejects. The externalist philosopher 
is thus an incarnation of the classical mirror-theorist who 
believes that: 
The world consists of some fixed totality ·of mind-independent 
obJacts. Thare ie exactly one true and complete deacription 
of 'the way the world is'. Truth involvas some sort of 
correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and 
external things and sets of things. 
Putnam (4) 49. 
Putnam's internalist believes, by contrast, that this idea 
of one 'way the world is in itself' is one to which we can attach 
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no sense. Instead he proposes to settle for a multiplicity 
of valid descriptions of the world formed according to the 
needs, interests and capacities of particular beings in 
particular situations. The world as we know it is thus 
conceived as being cut up into particular objects and relations 
according to human needs and abilities. As Putnam puts it: 
'Objects' do not exist independently of conceptual 
schemes. We cut up the world into objects when we 
introduce one or another scheme of description. 
Putnam (4)p.52. 
for all that, however, Putnam insists that his arguments 
do not imply that there are no constraints on how we slice up 
reality at all. Internalism, he insists, .is not a 'facile. 
relativism'. The constraints are, as ever, pragmatic. To use 
Putnam's (very evolutionary) example, a conceptual scheme which 
told humans they could fly would quickly be proven to be 
misguided (Putnam (4) 54). 
Putnam's internalism, then, has much in common with the 
natural anti-realist's revised sense of mirroring in that it 
denies the privileged status of human representations and ideas 
of reality while continuing to resist the 'free creativity' of 
a subjective idealism. Yet Putnam, like Rorty, is wary of the 
naturalised approach. The reason, I think, is Juat that he 
(again, like Rorty) tends to see in evolutionary epistemology 
only what we have termed the 'Appropriateness Argument'. By 
failing to appreciate also the fallibility/scope constraints 
on appropriateneas Putnam finds in the appeal to evolution an 
obJectionabl~ realistic attitude to truth. The evolutionary 
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epistemologist, he fears, may try to argue that we have been 
selected so as to be sensitive to the metaphysically true 
facta concerning how the world 'really' is. In other words 
he seems to see in evolutionary epistemology a fallacious 
argument culminating in the classical mirroring thesis. 
For Putnam, the evolutionary theorist in philosophy 
assumes, at bottom, a metaphysically 'realist' notion 
of truth; truth as 'correspondence to the facts'. 
Putnam (1) 230. 
But this, as we have seen, is an erroneous view of the 
intended impact of tha evolutionary claims. Far from 
underwriting any form of metaphysical realism or classical 
mirroring-theory, evolutionary considerations may serve to 
undermine such ambitious conceptions of man's epistemological 
• status. Evolutionary epistemology, pacs Putnam's fesrs, is 
not in the business of offering a 'scientific theory of the 
noumena' (Putnam (1) p. 226 - 7). Indeed, part of its interest 
lies specifically in its opposition to any such pretensions. 
Naturalised epistemology is thus best seen as s source of ~ 
philosophical problems concerning the potential scope of lsnguage 
and thought rather than a solution to old ones such aa the 
problem of the Carteaian aceptic. Putnam's other worry, which 
is that any naturalised argument for cognitive appropriateness 
must be unacceptably circular, is thersfore unfounded. Hia point 
(Putnam (1) p. 246) is that the would-be natural mataphysician 
must rely on'the very things (such a8 causality and observational 
data) which his argument i8 meant to Justify. And certainly, some 
such circularity exists. But it is an objectionable circularity 
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only if the natural metaphysician is taken to be seeking after 
justification in the old foundationalist sense, rather than 
explanation and internal, pragmatic validation in the way we 
have suggested. If we first assume that knowledge is possible, 
and then seek to understand how it is possible, then the point 
about circularity has no ultimate force. Putnam's suspicions, 
like those of Rorty before him, seem rooted in a misconceived 
image of the naturalised epistemologist as a born-again 
foundationalist. 
In closing, we may therefore describe the natural anti-realist 
as a modest internalist. For although he accepts an amended 
sense of mirroring in which our common-sense and ecientific 
models do reflect the real nature of an independent world, he 
yet ineists that the reflections. in queetion be conceived as 
at 'all etages biaaed, fallible and unprivileged. He ie thus 
unwilling to endorse any claims of full metaphysical mirroring 
(the idea of the one true theory) or to participate in any 
search for Carteaian certainty. From the evolutionary perspective 
he favours we may claim for human thought only the limited and 
pragmatic validity of an instrument successfully adapted to 
serve a specific set of needa and answering to a specific rangs 
of investigative capacities. ftan, it seems, has no licence to 
credit himself with more. But nature, happily, has no caUS8 
to gift him with l8ss. 
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Conclusions. 
We have set out a position (natural anti-realism) ~hich 
combines a semantic austerity with a useful degree of 
metaphysicel richness. The key to this combination has been 
the injection, into the anti-realist semantics, of a naturalised 
epistemological component. Such a component was seon to bolster 
the anti-realist's demand thet grasp of meaning be analysed as 
an essentially public phenomenon and to donate (anti-realistically) 
intelligible content to the belief in an independent and potentially 
transcendent reality; a belief often thought to be endangered by 
the incapacity of the anti-realist to conceive of any of our 
sentences as being true or fslse in full independence of our 
capacity to recognise them as true or false. We have examined 
several ways in which the naturalised (in our csse evolutionary) 
epistemologist may form intelligible, internally warranted, 
concepts of reality es potentially transcsnding our capacity 
to know it without needing to regard. any of our sentences as 
expressing claims whose truth-conditions exceed our capacities 
of recognition. And we ,have suggested that a notion of reality 
as independent is available, whether we accept the concepts of 
the transcendent or not, simply by reflection on the form of 
our best explanation as to how mind and language (with all its 
anti-realistically described constraints) came about in tha 
first place. To conceive of reality as both in dependant of, 
and as potentially transcending the limits of, human mental 
activity is at once to defeat the thought (which seems to inspire 
much misplaced antipathy towards asserta~ility condition semantics) 
that the anti-realist is of necessity some kind of subjective 
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idealist incapable of conceiving of reality as logically 
independent of the form and contents of human mental activity. 
The other main results of our investigations may be briefly 
summed up as follows. 
(1) Publicity is relative. 
Reflection upon the kind of naturalised considerations 
which might prompt us to choose an anti-realist semantics 
yielded the thought that the demand of publicity, though 
perfectly corract, needs to be explicitly relativised to 
a given community. Language, both the anti-realist and 
evolutionary epistemologist agreed, is best understood as 
an instrumentality, keyed to public criteria and gearad to 
effecting the transfer of usaful information among the members 
ofa community. Classical accounts of meaning, by adverting 
to potentially unrecognisable truth-conditions, artificially 
detach the meaninga of our words. from the apparent goal of 
language and render our grasp of thair meanings unduly 
mysterious. Aa_ertability-condition accounta, by keying 
meaning to the public circumstances in which·we acquire and 
manifest our grasp of it, .re able to treat linguistic 
understanding .s • natural f.ct. But the principIa of the 
nac •••• ry publicity of meaning, conceiv.d •• a naturali.tic 
constr.int upon plaueiblyproJected meaning-content require. 
only that meaning ba public relative to the capaciti.. of 
verification end reoognition st.ndard within the api.tamia 
community in question. It i. not, for example, necessarily 
the case that the meaning-theori.t will alway. !b!£! tha 
/ 
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capacities of recognition which, insofar as they are standard 
among the linguistic community, suffice to explain the native 
speaker's ability to acquire and menifest (to other native 
speakers) his grasp of meaning. ~eaning, in auch caaes, is 
public only to the degres necessary to make !b!!£ grasp of 
meaning a naturally explicable fact. Publicity, we may 
conclude, is alwaya a relative mattar; ws can form no useful 
c,onception of publicity tout court. 
A side effect of the decision to treat the demand of 
publicity as a demand for natural explicability is that gresp 
of DBBning, to meat that requirement, need not be relativised 
to only the conscious sensitivities of a linguiatic community. 
For natural explanation require a only a communal capacity ~o 
detect aeeertion-warranting etimUli. And such a capacity, we 
saw, may be enjoyed in full independence of the language-user's 
conscious knowledge of the nature, or even of the modality, of 
the etimuli involved. 
(2) Concepta of the tranacendent. 
The keying of meaning to circumstances public within a 
given community was alao an active factor in the formation of 
• concept of tranacendent meanina In a hOll8 language L" for 
certainclaima _de in sona alien languagaL2• Thus aantancas 
involving alien .econdary quality experiencee were seen to b. 
necessarily opaque to us even though we could make (by carrying 
out t.sts of. non-collusive as.ent and diaaent) the warranted 
claim that auch sentences were meaningful to natIve speakers 
of L2• Here, then, waB one way in which we were able to generate 
.. 
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an internally intelligible conception of transcendent truth. 
for we thus conceived that soma claims in L2 may be made 
true, when they are true, by circumstances inaccessible to 
any native speaker of L1• Further concepts of the transcendent 
formulated involved the probable limitation and bias of man's 
general intellectual pictures of reality given the basis of 
such pictures in naturally evolved capacities of sense and 
cognitive strategies. Science, it was here argued, should be 
seen only as offering tolerated models of reality, acceptable 
to beings like ourselves, and not as offering privileged, 
metaphysically accurate reconstructions of reality which are 
true or false out of all relation to man's particular cognitive 
preferences and modes of thought. A 'scientific noumenalism' 
it was thus argued could take no' comfort from an evolutionary 
view of mind. 
(3) Our world and the world-in-itself. 
for all that, however, it was no part of our intention 
to deny the validity of man's scientific theoriee as (biased, 
limited, imperfect) accounts of. the nature of an independent 
reality. Nor was it part of our intention to recapitulate 8 
radical Kantian divide between the theorie .. ·of::man ,or any other 
being (with the possible exception of God) and an unknown and 
unknowable world-in-itself. Our notion of e mind-transcending 
and mind-independent reality was seen to be a thoroughly 
non-Kantian one, despite some surface similarities. ~terial 
reality, as it figures in the account we developed, is 
distinguished from the Kantian notion of a noumenal realm in 
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two (releted) ways. first, by the natural anti~re81ist's 
conception of a known mechanism (natural selection) bringing 
the apparent into (imperfect and unprivileged) line with the 
materially real. Second, by the insistsnce that the existencs 
of a potantially transcendent material realm is to be treated 
as a real, as opposed to a mare, possibility. It ie a notion 
grounded in the accessible avolutionary evidence for the 
claims about cognitive limitation and bias. As such it is not, 
a8 Kant's clearly was, a notion of a mera logical possibility 
(or consistent concept) which might be mobilised to curb the 
pretenaions of senaa and to clear a space for faith. The 
mind-transcending reality invoked by the natural anti-realist. 
is much closer to home. It is not the concept of a truly . 
transcendental reality about which man can necesearily know 
nothing whatsoever. Rather, it is the concept of our world, 
about which we already know quite a lot, extending nonetheless 
beyond the particular fcrm and Bcope of human knowledge of it. 
OUr final picture of the relation betweenhulll8n knowledge· 
and material reality may thua be described ae e mirroring theory 
of s redically non-cla.sical kind. The human mind, .0 our story 
goes, is indeed a natural mirror of independent reality. But it 
is only one of many possible auch mirrora, and in it. glaae 
there glistens not just the image of the world but slso, and 
inextricably, the familiar face of man himsalf. 
n."" ........ ca.a." 
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1. Ruesell, B. in e letter quoted in DEAR RUSSELL - DEAR JOURDAIN 
I. Gratton-Guinneee (Duckworth, London 1977) p.126. 
2. Examples might be Baldwin'. genetic logic or Spencer's 
naive raaliet epistemology (8ee Baldlllin,J. THOlliHTS AND 
THINGS OR GENETIC LOGIC (New York: ~cmillen, 1906) or 
the account of Spencer's thought given by Capek, ~. in 
'The development of Reichenbachls epistemology' REVIEW 
or METAPHYSICS 11 (1957) p. 42 - 67). A convenient 
summary of the history of Evolution.ry Epistemology is 
given in Campbell,D. (saa Bibliography). 
3. Witnase the racent worka by e.g. Quine,Tennent and 
Wukatits citad in the Bibliography. 
4. The quotee ara taken from Fraga's review of Hueearlla 
PHILDSoPHIE DER ARIT~IK (C.E.~.Pfeffer, Leipzig, 1981) 
" publiehed"tI ZEITSCHRln FUR PHILOSOPHIE UNO PHIL.KRITIK ,,/ 
vol.103 (1894) pp. 313 - 332. They are tranalated in . 
P.Gaach and ~.Black (Eds) TRANSLATIONS FR~ THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
WRITINGS OF GOTTLDB FREGE (Blackwell, Oxford, 1980) p.19. 
5. For thie picture of Wittgenstein's (and by axtension, tha 
.anti-realiet'a) attitude to meaning as flOWing from a 
naturalised view of mind I am much indebtad to a lecture 
given by John Skorupaki on 'Naturalism and anti-realism' 
(preaanted aa part of Nail Tannant's anti-realiem couraa 
at The University of Stirling, December 19B3). 
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6. See Herbert Spencer PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (New York: 
O,Appleton and Co. 1897) (1st Ed. 1855). For details of 
hia poaition, or a detailad historical account of tha 
various typaa of Evolutionary Epistemology to be found 
in the history of idsas, see Campbell (1). 
7. On this see A.Brennan 'The ~oral Standing of Natural Objects' 
in ENVIRON~ENTAL ETHICS 6, (1984) p.35 - 56. 
B. A mora complex formulation, taking account of the potential 
multiplicity of natural functions of ons part of a natural 
object, is available in Wright, L. 'Functions'. (Sse 
Bibliography for publication details.) 
9. An account of the importance of this somewhat neglected 
requirement (viz. transmi •• ibility) is available in 
'Conaciousness and complexity; evolutionary parspectives 
on tha mind-body problem' Bechtel and Richard.on, 
/ 
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL or PHILOSOPHY vol.51 no.4 Oec.1983: 
10. The term 'satisficing' has also baen usad in economics. 
There it i. sxplained •• followa. 'Supposs thare is aome 
policy A that maximi ••• epme output for 80me given set Clf input., 
and that a simplar rule of thumb B, doea almoat but no.t 
quita aa wall. To adopt B would be to 'satiafics'. Ths 
juatification for adopting B is that it is simplsr and lss. 
costly in managemant tim. and training. In other words, if 
one taka. into account all inputs, . including _nagamant ooata, 
A ia not optimal and B is'. (J.~ynard Smith 'Adaptation and 
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Sa~ie'icing' in commentary on Dennett 'Intentional Systems 
in cognitive ethology' BEHAVIOURAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 
(1983) 6 343 - 390). While admitting that 'the situation 
in animals is analogous' (ibid 370) Smith prefers, for the 
raaeon expreaaed in tha final eentenca of the quote, to 
talk of 'optimisation subject to constrainte' - the conetraints, 
namely, laid out in tha fallibility/ecopa argument it •• lf. 
Nothing in the praaent theaia, it aeems to me, turns on which 
mode of expresaion we choose to sdopt. 
11. i.a. 'ftutation can consiet of moving ana or more baeas from 
the string, or insertion of one or more additional 
ones, or tha substitution of ons nucleotide in placa 
of another at a given location'. 
Waddington (2) 94 See Bibliography. 
12. Some philosophers might object to the application of the 
hardware/software distinction to human beinge. / Because m1nd 
is necessarily embaHied, they would say, it makea no aens. 
to talk of human software. Thara is no .uch thing; all there 
i. is hardware, the phy.ical baing. In •••• nce, I wDU~d agra •• 
Thara is ind.ed no such thing as human eoftware. But what 
thers undoubtedly ie are varioua deacription. of the hardware, 
made at various l.v.ls of discour.e. The hardware/aoftware 
~ diatinction I have in mind ia thua innocuous becauaa firmly 
non-ontological. By aoftwara, I intend e' high-l.vel (a.mantic) 
deacription of the!!!!Ji!! which, d.acrib.d at the laval of 
atoma and molecules is the hardware it.elf. Two auch high-laval 
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deacriptions may be identical even if the corresponding 
low-level descriptions differ. Which is what is meant by 
my claim that the same programme may be instantiated in 
various software and run on various hardware. The 
functionalist analyeis I offer is therefore quite 
independent of any problematic ontological dualism. 
(for a discussion of functionaliam,lavals of description 
of physical systems etc. see Sesrle. INTENTIONALITY 
(C.U.P. 1983). 
13. H.A.Lewis, in a sympoeium article entitled 'The argument 
from evolution' (Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. LIII 1979 
p.207 - 223) objects to the Quinian account on the grounds 
that evolved usefulness and truth (or absolute verisimilitude) 
m.y diverge (p.214) hence that 8volution cannot be invoked 
to explain our ability to have true expectations (p.216). 
Such criticisms depend for their force on a misconception/ 
/ 
of the Quinian claim, and a failure to take account of the 
entirely behavioural and pre-semantic nature of the idea of 
a quality-space. For such prior spacings are invoked to 
explain the possibility of learning a language and not, in 
any direct way, to Justify the truth of Judgments of expectation 
expressed in language. (For a detailed version of this criticiam 
of Lewis 8ee David cooper's reply in the same symposium.) 
It is worth noti~g that the account we are developing is at 
paina to stress the divergence of evolved uaefulness·of 
representations and truth, classically concsivsd. This 
divergence is the concluaion of the Fallibility/scope argument 
of 2.5. 
A.J.Clal'k 
~ (ccntinu.d) 
14. Pc~ti.1J. (1921) .tudi.d the impcrtana. ct t~ p.rc.pticn 
ct .tructural ralaUon.h1p. tor t~ b.haviour at the 
Europ .. n Bitt.rn ooncluding that. 
A v.ry .~tic imitation at a heed on top at a body 
~ •• g •• di.c on • pOl.~ i •• utticiant to alicit 
datana. I'nctiona .nd that any datall in • h .. d, aya. 
tor inatana., doea not play an ilnpol'tant part. 
(PortialJ., A.F' .l. (1921) 'Zur Ethologia BZW Paychclogia 
von Botaul'U. Stallad.' !S! 15, 1 - 15. Quotad in 
I'IcCab. (1) 506). 
15. Sp.lk. (1976) .hew.d that 'naiv. tcul'-.onth old intant. 
pl'cc •••• d intQrMational inval'ianta .ora •• .adalitiaa' by 
.nUng the •• idway ba.an two mvi. .Cl'Hn. .hewing 
di,t.rant tUM and playing tha aoundtrack tc ana at tha 
,u.. The intanta .pant • .igni'ic.ntly grnt.r allCunt 
ct tt.a ~tching the til. whc.. .oundtl'ack ~a b.ing 
brcadca.t. (Sp.lk., E. (1976) 'Int.nta' int.l'.adal 
p.rcaption at avant.' COGNUIYE psYCHOLOGV B 553-560). 
16. Shaw .nd Pittinger (1977) dMon.tratad that ""-" .dulta 
•••••• gl'owth .nd ag.ing by an unoon.cicu. .an.itivity to 
topclogical tnn.tcNation. at .hol' and .tNin. 
(Shaw .nd Pittinger (1'77) 'On p.l'caiving chan,.' in 
H.Pick and E.lab_n (Ed.) "as OF' PERCEIVING AI) 
eRRMI" INfQRMTIPN (Lawrana. Erlbau. Anociata •• 
HUl.dal. t Maw Jal'HY.) ). 
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17. Thus, for example, damage to the left hemisphere seeme 
far more likely to cause linguietic difficultias than 
damage to t •• right, which tends to cause spatial 
awareness dysfunction (see Levy,G. (1979) 'Cerebral 
assymetry and the psychology of man' in ~.Wi~trock (Ed) 
THE BRAIN AND PSYCHOLOGY (Academic Press, New York) or 
Moscovitch, M' 'Information processing and the cerebral 
hemispher.s' in ~.S.Gazzariga (Ed) HANDBOOK or BEHAVIOURAL 
NEUROBIOLOGY (Planum Pr ••• , New York.) ) 
18. E.g. Macaen, ·H. (1962) 'Clinical symptology in right 
and left hemiephere lesions' in V.B. Mountcaatle (Ed) 
INTERHEMISPHERIC RELATIONS AND CEREBRAL DOMINANCE 
(John Hopkine Univ.reity Prese, B.ltimore). See also 
Susan Car.y .nd Rh.a Diamond 'rrom piecemeal to 
configuratiunal repres.ntation of face.'. 
SCIENCE 195 (1977) 312 - 314. 
19. Further evidence of the exist.nce of .uch capaciti •• i. 
found in Dixon, N.F. PRECONSCIOUS PROCESSING (Chichester, 
England; Wiley 1981). Sa. also Raview Article ~Not .eeing 
i.b.lieving: p.rception without aw.r.n •••• CONTE~ORARY 
PSYCHOLOGY 1982 Vol. 27 no.II. 
20. This poesibility wa. fir.t suggested to me by Nail Tennant. 
Nor, indeed, i. it a. implausible a. it may Bound - eea 
Wi.nar,H. 'Ext.rnal ch.mical ma •• anger.· in NEW YORK STATE 
JOURNAL OF NEDICINE 0.c.15 1966. 
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21 , That is so, at least, as long as our concern is only 
present-tensed other ascriptions of pain. Where other 
tenses ere concerned, ascriptions of pain may join the 
ranks of statements the conclusive evidence for whose 
truth no longer exists. 
22. For thie formulation of the evolutionary claims and the idea 
of exploiting the intuitionist lacuna between - ~x (fx). 
and ~x ( - fx) I am indebted to correspondence with 
Crispin Wright. 
23. As reported in The Guerdian, Thursday July 19, 1984, p.13. 
,24. The account of Bayesian theory which follows owes much to 
Putnam's exposition in REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY ( see 
Bibliography) pp. 188 - 196. Classical accounts include 
R.Jeffrey 'Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses' 
in PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE XXIII, :3 (July 1956) p. 237 - 246 
and L.J.Savage T'HE fOUNDATIONS Of STATISTICS (New York,Dover,1972). 
25. This is essentially ths position suggested at the end of my 
paper 'Meaning and evolutionary epistemology' (~!a Vol~IL 
1983 Part I p. 23 - 31). The idea of presenting it in terms 
of Explanation vs. Justification and the example of physical 
object language is due to Neil Tennant. 
26. A similar view is taken by C.A.Hooker who outlines a philo8ophy 
of science which he takes to be in accord with what he terms 
'naturalistic realism'. The goel of science, on such a view, 
is just the 'maximisetion of human epistemic potential'. 
See 'Philosophy and mete-philosophy of science' in SYNTHESE 
vol.32 nos. 1/2 Nov/Dec 1975 pp. 206 - 227. 
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27. Thia line of thought has been pursued by Carl Posy in 
'The language of appearances and things-in-themselves' 
SYNTHESE 47 (1981) 313 - 352 and 'Dancing to the Antinomy; a· 
proposal for Transcsndental Idealism' AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL 
QUARTERLY Vol. 20, no.1, January 1983, p. 81 - 94. 
28. ths classic account i8 given by Lorenz (see Bibliogrsphy). 
We may notice, in passing, that to adopt such a view is not 
to preclude the possibility that some concepts, Dr forms of 
concepts, are a necessary pre-condition of experience at all. 
It may be that it is only bacause material reality is such as 
to allow the 8uccsssful use of soma concepts (e.g. causality, 
temporsl succession, substance etc.) that self-conscious 
experience is possible at all.. Were material reality more 
chaotic, experience as we know it could be impossible. {On 
this sse Karl Popper, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS (London; 
Routledge and Kegan Psul) p. 47 - 48. 
29. The obsarvations on bee-sign syste.s are reported in THE DISCOVERY 
OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR John Sparks (BBC Publications 1982). 
30. Thus Schlick believed that langusge could, in snd of itself, 
communicate 'nothing but the logical structure of.the green 
colour' and not 'that ineffable quality of greenness which 
sppeare to constitute its very nature'. See e.g. the lectures 
on Form and Content given at The Univereity of London in 1932, 
or Dewald Hanfling's account in LO&ICAL POSITIVISM (Baail 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1981) pp. 96,97 from which the above quotes 
were taken. 
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31. K.nneth S.yre, in CYBERNETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY or ~INO 
(Routledge .nd Keg.n P.ul 1976) develop. ju.t .uch .n .ccount, 
arguing, far exampl., that c~laur. and pain •• 
• imply .r. not obJ.ct. of •• n.ory .w.ren •••• Th.re .re 
no information proc ••• ing chennele le.ding from something 
cell.d 'pain' to the •• at of .warene •• in the .ubJ.ct'. 
cort.x. P.in r.ther i. • f.atur. of the informational 
proc ••••• occurring within the final .tage. of the 
p.rc.ptual ca.cad •• (Sayr. 239) 
He goa a on to a.y that .lthough the phraaa 'I •• aware of 
My b. compbt.d by 'a r.d obJ.ct' or Ju.t 'red' we .hould 
not inf.r that r.d i, a po •• ibl. obJ.ct of p.rceptual .war.n •••• 
ror on. may .imil.rly •• y 'I •• 'drilling. pi.c. of wood' or 
'I .m drilling • hola'. The hola, though, 18 part of the 
drilling PEOp'a. but the block cf wood i. not. 
32. Thi. kind of di.tinction •• ama tc hev. b •• n .harply formulated 
by Clifford Hook.r who i. repcrt.d (~cGinn (3) p.gs) ••• rguing 
that •• oondary qualitie. ari •• out of the mod. or medium in 
whioh info~tian about the world i. giv.n to u.. The articl. 
r.farred to i. C.Hook.r~n Jvolutionary naturali.t r.ali.t 
doctrin. of p.rcaption' in PERCEPTION AND COGNITION. ISSUES IN 
Ttl FOUNDATIONS OF' PSYCHOLOGY .d. III.Saveg. (fUnn •• otaa 
Univ.r.ity of "inn.aota Prea., 1918). 
33. Saa 'IIIhat la it llka to ba a bat1' in Nagal,T. MORTAL QUESTIONS 
(C.U.P. 1919). 
34. Thia axampla 18 dua to Andrew Brannan of The UnJ.".raity of BUrling. 
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35. Some philosophers (e.g. Putnam (4) pp. 60 - 64) question 
the firmness of the primary/secondary distinction itself. 
If they are right, then much of what we naturally believe 
to be true of eecondary qualities alone will actually be trua 
of !!! qualitias whatsoever. I believe that a reasonable 
distinction ~ be made however, in terms of the causal 
efficacy of eome qualities (the primary ones) and the causal 
inertness of others {the secondary onss). This is n2i meant 
to imply that our grasp of primary quslities involves ~ 
subjective element, but merely that where eecondary qualities 
are concerned there is nathing but the subjective element. 
If, however, Putnam is, after all, in the right here this 
would mean that·the conclusions of chapter 9 would apply to 
all statemente whateoever and not (as I have argued) just to 
statements involving secondary qualities. This would then 
amount to a quite radical form of relativism in which to graep 
/ 
the meaning af any claim involved sharing some physical or 
functional structure with the being who makes it. It is not 
clear that .uch a relativism would be a viable option for 
the scientific epistemologist since it would threaten (se 
we saw in Chapter 7) to undermine his own position. I would 
therefore join with Field ('Realism and relativism' in Jaurnel of 
Philosophy,vol.LXXIX no.10 in resisting Putnam's attempt to 
aseimilate the primary to the secondary qualitie8 tout court. 
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36. One reeult of thie is that the simple functionelist account 
developed in 3.3 (p. 6~ - 62 ebove) must be amended. for 
doubtless we ought to allow as before, for variable physical 
realisations of the same subjective nature. Some being may 
surely see ~ epectrum of colours by employing some other 
natural mechanisms to our own. Vet as we saw in chapter 9 
it cannot be eufficient, in order to qualify as an alternative 
physical raalisation of the same eubjsctive naturs, merely to 
succeed in making a given rangs of diecriminations among 
objecte. .!::!2!! the discriminations are made, it now ssems, 
is a factor also. The earlieranalysie given solsly in terms 
of the cepecity to respond in appropriate circumstancss IS 
therefore inadequate in this n.w context (i.e. of sacondary 
quality claims). ~ more sophisticated account of functional 
similarity is therefore required if the functionalist account 
ie to be retained at all. In line with the cybernetic model 
/ developed in 9.4 we may suggsst that, where secondary qualitise 
are involved, the grasp of such terms is dependsnt not juet on 
what we csn call external functional similarity - the capacity 
to pick out the eame sets of objects - but ~ on internal 
funotional similarity. Thie latter would amount to the 
capacity to producs the same rangs of apparent registratione 
to accompany the discriminative behaviour. There ara,howsver, 
problems here in ths form of a very real threat of circularity. 
for the ascription of internal functional similarity now eeems 
to depend on our belief that ws ehare a eubjective nature 
instead of warranting that belief. A physical definition 
A. J .Clar\< 
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of internel functional similarity which does not appeal to 
tha eppaEent registretions thomselves is therefore required. 
In default of such e definition,any belief in a full 
explanatory functionalist account of the content of claims 
involving secondary qualities must remain e tentative ons. 
37. A similar conclusion is endorsed by McGinn (McGinn (3) p.72). 
38. They are 
(1 ) T-Material Realism (see page 1.68, ) 
(2) Conceptual Scheme Realiam (see pages-
_ "07.,11 5 ) • 
(3) Phenomenal Relativism (aee P3, page 198 ) 
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